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Preface
Neo-republicanism, as two of its foremost advocates argue, is characterized by
three main ideas: free persons, who are not subject to the arbitrary power of
others; free states, which try to protect their citizens from such power without
exercising it themselves; and vigilant citizenship, as a means to limit states to their
protective role (Lovett and Pettit 2009, 12). This revivalist form of republicanism
has at least two other distinctive features, though, one well remarked upon (and
critically so), the other not. The first is the claim that freedom as non-domination
is the defining characteristic of the classical republican tradition, the red thread
that ties together its Florentine and Atlantic contributors such as Machiavelli,
Milton, Harrington, Sidney, Blackstone, and some American Founders. This
claim is defended by Pettit (1996, 1997) and Skinner (1998), has been thoroughly
discussed, and is controversial. The second is the political character of most of
their solutions to the problem of domination in human relations. What do
I mean by “political” here? Roughly, the kinds of solutions classical republicans
have applied to the state in order to keep it from becoming a dominating force.
These political solutions have come in two forms. The first, participatory
approach gives citizens a voice through contestatory democracy, which consists
of “not only electoral rights but also the effective opportunity to contest the
decisions of their representatives . . . [via] impartial ‘courts of appeal’ [that] can
include the press and the streets as well as more formal channels of protest”
(Lovett and Pettit 2009, 25). The second, constitutional approach safeguards
citizens by means of the dispersal of power, such as the checks and balances
associated with the separation of powers, bicameralism, federalism, and inter-
national legalism (Pettit 1997, 177–80). Neo-republicans have unsurprisingly put
both of these approaches to work in the economic sphere. For example, in labor
markets with concentrated employer power they have favored political solutions
that are both participatory (e.g., labor involvement in managerial decisions
through German-style works councils and even socialism) and constitutional
(e.g., the “countervailing power” of either the state through democratic regulation
or workers by means of privileges to form unions and strike) (Gourevitch 2014;
Hsieh 2005; Lovett and Pettit 2009, 20–1). In sum, neo-republicans have relied
heavily though not exclusively on political solutions to the problem of arbitrary
power in the social, economic, and political spheres. Let us call this strategy the
political model of republicanism.
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What has been missing in the neo-republican literature is any systematic effort
to explore alternative, non-political ways of limiting arbitrary power—or enough
awareness of the potential risks of depending too much upon political
approaches. This gap in the literature is made all the more surprising by the
existence of a rich commercial-republican tradition, which has its roots in the
political writings of Johan and Pieter de la Court and reaches its fullest form in
those of Kant, Alexander Hamilton, and especially Adam Smith (Weststeijn
2012; MacGilvray 2011, Chapters 3 and 4). These thinkers saw commercial
society in general and competitive markets in particular as means for limiting
arbitrary power, ones that depended more on good institutional design than a
virtuous citizenry. Unlike classical republicans such as Rousseau, who regarded
the “hustle and bustle of commerce” as the prelude to slavery, Smith considered
competitive markets a source of liberation from feudal dependence: the modern
“tradesman or artificer,” he noticed, “derives his subsistence from the employ-
ment, not of one, but of a hundred or a thousand different customers. Though in
some measure obliged to them all, therefore, he is not absolutely dependent upon
any one of them” (Rousseau 1997, 113; Smith 1981, 420 [III.iv.12]). Whereas
Rousseau deemed the market order to be a deadly threat to republican values,
Smith and other commercial republicans regarded it as an essential tool for their
realization, one that required not only state support in the form of stable property
rules, the enforcement of contracts, and the provision of public goods but also
state refusal to micromanage the economy for the benefit of privileged rent-
seeking insiders. Let us call this alternative strategy the economic model of
republicanism.
Just as Pettit and other neo-republicans have revived and updated classical
republicanism for the modern age, so this book will aspire to revive and update
commercial republicanism—but in a manner that is wholly consistent with and
indeed guided by a Pettit-style neo-republicanism.1 My differences with Pettit
and other neo-republicans will therefore not be over theory but instead over
institutional design, especially the degree to which state protective activities work
with and rely upon competitive markets. In some cases, these differences will lead
to friendly amendments to the usual neo-republican policy platform, but in
many others the required changes will be more substantial. As Lovett and
Pettit emphasize, however, “neorepublicanism . . . is a research program, not a
1 My choice of a cover illustration reflects these similarities and differences: just as Pettit’s
Republicanism features a Dutch Golden Age painting of Amsterdam’s city hall at the time, so
mine features a contemporaneous painting of a merchant shipping anchorage off the coast of Texel
Island in North Holland, at some remove from Amsterdam.
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comprehensive blueprint or ideology” (26), so such internal debate should not be
cause for concern. Different empirical beliefs among neo-republicans, especially
with regards to the form, extent, and causes of arbitrary power and the most
effective remedies for it, will unsurprisingly lead to divergent policy conclusions.
Such republican policy pluralism ought to be welcomed, in fact, and even if we
are not eager to welcome it, it is surely inevitable in light of the “burdens of
judgment” (Rawls 1993, 54–8).
Regardless, Exit Left will contribute further to such pluralism by building and
applying an economic model of republicanism, one that is just as committed as
progressive republicanism to checking arbitrary power and protecting the most
vulnerable but is friendlier to the use of market mechanisms; that is, it puts more
emphasis on resourcing exit from dominating relationships and encouraging
competition in the spheres of family, market, and state than does the political
model that is usually favored by neo-republicans. It does so by facilitating
different kinds of competitive markets in each of these three domains: dating
and spousal markets in the domestic sphere, labor and product markets in the
economic sphere, and locational markets in the political sphere. What links these
domain-specific markets together is a single, powerful idea: namely, that the
effective ability to pick and choose among a variety of potential partner-providers
and to exit relationships and reenter the marketplace if and when those relation-
ships prove unsatisfactory is the best way to protect participants from arbitrary
power. Extensive, empowered choice in the service of non-domination is the
strategy at the heart of this economic model of republicanism. We will see this
strategy unfold in diverse ways across subsequent chapters, but in each case
competitive markets will act as mediating institutions ensuring that human
association takes place on terms consistent with republican liberty. Far from
reducing politics to economics, as some republicans might fear, this approach
harnesses economics in the service of the distinctively political goal of freedom as
non-domination.
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Introduction
Arbitrary power is a pervasive feature of human societies. Women suffer in
silence at the hands of domineering husbands who inflict psychological and
physical abuse at will, unchecked by effective laws or cultural norms. Workers
without meaningful options in life toil under the capricious rule of foremen,
afraid to speak out against mistreatment for fear of losing their jobs. Residents of
inner-city minority communities endure the daily humiliation of stop-and-frisks
by police engaged in illicit racial profiling, while businessmen quietly pay bribes
to corrupt officials with the discretion to grant or withhold essential permits. In
each sphere, arbitrary power enables abuse and silences voice.
We rightly regard this subjection to others’ wills with a special horror and
dread, not just because it makes exploitation possible but because relationships
built upon it are both mutually corrupting and morally stifling. Those people who
exercise arbitrary power become arrogant and contemptuous as a consequence:
they start to think of themselves as more than human, no longer bound by
standards of fairness or decency, and to think of those beneath them as undeserv-
ing of respect, concern, or even simple courtesy. Those who have such power
exercised over them, on the other hand, become degraded, anxious, and syco-
phantic: they lose their self-esteem, live with the gnawing fear of displeasing the
powerful, and speak only with insincere flattery upon their lips—or with what is
worse, the sincere flattery of those who have adopted their masters’ views. Such
mutual corruption reaches its nadir in the relationship between slaveowner and
slave, but it can be found in less extreme forms in the relationships surveyed
above, where it undermines the conditions necessary for reciprocity, mutual
respect, and ethical development more broadly.
No contemporary school of political theory has been more focused on the
singular evil of arbitrary power than republicanism, and no republican theorist
has been more instrumental in the revival of this tradition of political thought
than Philip Pettit, whose Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government
(1997) and On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy
(2012) jointly present a powerful philosophical defense of distinctively republican
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conceptions of justice and legitimacy.1 In these two works, Pettit defends the
priority of political liberty, understood as non-domination, i.e., immunity from
arbitrary power. More specifically, he argues that one agent dominates or pos-
sesses arbitrary power over another when s/he has “the capacity to interfere with
impunity and at will in certain choices that the other is in a position to make”
(Pettit 1996, 578). If this interfering agent’s actions “track the interests and ideas
of the person suffering interference,” however, then such interference does not
qualify as an exercise of arbitrary power: when I give you the key to my alcohol
cupboard with explicit instructions not to return it but upon twenty-four hours’
notice, you do not arbitrarily interfere with me if you refuse to return it to me
immediately; rather, you act as my faithful agent, tracking my avowed interests
(Pettit 1997, 55; Pettit 2012, 57). Unsurprisingly, then, the key to protecting
political liberty on Pettit’s understanding is to guarantee as much as possible that
interferers’ acts track the avowed interests of interferees, in which case those acts
will be non-arbitrary.
I will discuss Pettit’s theory (and certain objections to it) in greater detail later,
but for the time being I want to emphasize the central role that it gives to voice. In
Pettit’s alcohol-cupboard illustration, what makes it possible for you to track my
avowed interests is precisely my avowal: I provide you with explicit instructions,
presumably accompanied by an explanation of why I am asking you to follow
them (e.g., “I’m having trouble controlling my drinking”). Other conditions will
need to hold in order for your tracking of my avowed interests to be reliable—
competency conditions (e.g., skill at hiding the key) and motivational conditions
(e.g., willingness to perform the role faithfully), for instance—but on Pettit’s
understanding of tracking the avowal condition looks to be a necessary one.
Whereas arbitrary power silences voice, its negation requires voice.
His approach has immediate implications for how we evaluate state interfer-
ence with our lives: such interference is arbitrary only when it fails to track “the
welfare and world-view of the public” (Pettit 1997, 56). The priority of political
liberty therefore requires those institutions that enable citizens to give voice to
their interests and ideas, including the freedoms of speech, press, and assembly,
the right to petition for redress of grievances, and most obviously the right to
vote, whether for elected representatives or ballot propositions. This avowal
1 I do not intend by this to downplay the important contributions of other scholars. Of special
note in this regard are Quentin Skinner and Frank Lovett. Skinner’s pathbreaking works (especially
Skinner 1998) recover a conception of freedom as non-domination from the Florentine and Atlantic
republican traditions. Lovett’s writings, most recently his book A General Theory of Domination and
Justice (2010), formalize and at times modify Pettit’s theory. I will frequently engage with Lovett’s
work over the course of this book, as his approach is highly congenial to my own.
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condition is necessary but insufficient for reliable tracking, however, because the
politically powerful must also be properly motivated to respond to these
expressed interests and ideas, be it through electoral competition, judicial over-
sight, or monitoring by pressure groups and investigatory media. As Pettit argues
in On the People’s Terms, the state will not become a dominating institution itself
so long as the people share equally in control of the direction it takes, and equal
control can only be secured in a properly structured constitutional democracy
with a “contestatory citizenry” ready to speak out against arbitrary exercises of
power (Pettit 2012, 5–6).
Is voice really the only way, however, to get interferers, be they private or
public, to track the (avowed) interests of interferees? Return for a moment to
Pettit’s alcohol-cupboard example. Suppose that, instead of having to rely exclu-
sively upon you as my agent, I faced a continuum of agents offering different
kinds of “commitment services” at various prices and quality levels and that
I could freely choose between them and exit from my relationships with them if
they proved unsatisfactory in some way (e.g., incompetent or unmotivated).
Under these circumstances, voice would be largely superfluous: my preferences
would be revealed not through explicit instructions and explanations but rather
implicitly, through choice and exit decisions; moreover, the pressures applied by
exit would permit such a system to meet both the competency condition (wide
choice and the possibility of exit would eliminate incompetent providers) and
the motivational condition (exit, both actual and potential, would discipline
providers). Given the right circumstances (viz., a broad array of providers with
diverse characteristics and services), free choice and exit can act as effective
substitutes for voice, revealed preferences as effective substitutes for stated
ones, in compelling interferers to track the interests of interferees. Moreover, if
exit is a live option and this is common knowledge, then it may not need to be
exercised. A credible threat of exit may be sufficient to motivate providers,
allowing exit to act not merely as a substitute for voice but as a complement to
it; in other words, potential exit can empower voice, forcing providers to heed the
words of their clients, be they words of instruction, explanation, or complaint.
This possible role of exit as both a substitute for voice and a complement to it
can also be seen in the examples that opened this book. The surest defense against
domination for women in abusive marriages is exit: so long as divorce laws are
liberal, restraining orders are effective, and reasonable employment opportunities
and/or alternative marital prospects are present, wives can either flee abuse or
credibly threaten exit in the hope of modifying spousal behavior. Similarly,
empowered workers with many job options need not tolerate abusive foremen—
and if capitalists are aware of this fact, they will rein in their supervisors for fear
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of losing good employees. Even in cases of racist cops and corrupt officials, exit
may be a real possibility, albeit one much easier for the well-heeled: because the
freedom to migrate between political sub-units is a characteristic feature of open
societies, especially federal ones, their exploited citizens and businesses have the
option of moving from poorly-run cities, counties, and states to better-run ones;
moreover, if tax revenues move with them, the administrators of these sub-units
may find it in their interest to fix the problems in question, perhaps even before
an exodus begins. Note that in each of these cases the right conditions must be
present for exit to be effective at restraining arbitrary power: only if exit is legally
enabled, economically feasible, and costly to potential abusers can it do its full
job. Fortunately, however, these conditions for effective exit can frequently be
created (if they do not currently exist) through a proper mix of constitutional,
legal, and policy reforms; we do not need to rely on fortune, individual or social,
to secure exit’s benefits.
Given the promise of exit as a means of limiting arbitrary power, one might
expect it to play a prominent role in contemporary republican writings, but it rarely
does—and when it does, it is usually treated critically. Pettit offers numerous
insightful remarks about the potential role of exit in limiting domination in the
family (e.g., Pettit 2012, 158) and the market (e.g., Pettit 2007), but they are
scattered and never systematized; moreover, he rejects the idea that geographic
exit can limit state domination, for reasons that I will turn to in Chapter 4 (Pettit
2012, 161–2, 165–8). Lovett provides the only systematic and generally sympathetic
treatment of exit in the republican literature, one that I will reference throughout
the book, especially in Chapter 3 (Lovett 2010, 38–40, 49–52). Even in Lovett’s
works, however, exit plays a largely supporting role, and he focuses almost
exclusively on its potential to curb domination in the economic sphere, with no
sustained attempt to extend these insights to the domestic and political spheres.2
Other republicans are much more skeptical of the power of exit, whether in the
economic or political spheres. Nien-hê Hsieh, for example, contends that “as an
alternative to exit, workers need to be able to exercise voice—to have the capacity
2 He gives notice at one point that “I will not discuss . . . the applications of JMD [Justice as
Minimizing Domination] to questions of personal privacy, family, or gender equality” (Lovett 2010,
190). I must also mention in this context a piece by Mark Warren entitled “Voting with Your Feet:
Exit-based Empowerment in Democratic Theory” (2011). Although not a republican work,
Warren’s article persuasively argues that the freedom to exit political parties and other civil-society
organizations can reduce domination (684, 687). Like Pettit and others, Warren is highly skeptical of
the ability of geographic exit (mobility) to reduce state domination (684n1, 686); given that political
parties and pressure groups carry out most of their domination via the state, however, the mere
ability to, say, switch parties will only go so far in limiting arbitrary power, especially where parties
collude. I will return to these issues in Chapter 4.
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to express dissent without exiting,” which can only be accomplished if the state
“provides workers with the right to contest decisions within the context of the
decision-making process internal to economic enterprises,” e.g., via unions; he
worries that the various costs associated with exiting workplaces, including
search and transition costs and the risk of unemployment and poverty, will
suppress exit and thereby allow domination to persist if voice is absent (Hsieh
2005, 128–32, 134–5; cf. Dagger 2006, 162–3). Turning to the political sphere,
Richard Dagger argues that the size, fragmentation, and especially high mobility
associated with American cities threaten the conditions for democratic self-
government and thus for the reliable tracking of citizen interests and ideas. The
power of exit, rather than being a way to check arbitrary power, is instead its
principal enabler: mobility detaches and alienates citizens from the places where
they live and converts them into “citizen-consumers” who shop for cities as they
shop for clothes, unwisely depending upon the “supposedly apolitical profes-
sionals” who run cities to offer a wide range of public services at moderate prices.
Only a small, stable urban environment with public-spirited citizens can sustain
republican liberty (Dagger 1997, 154–72). I will address Hsieh’s and Dagger’s
concerns about exit in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively, but for now I should repeat
what I said above: exit’s effectiveness as a check on arbitrary power depends upon
certain conditions, ones that might require specific constitutional, legal, and
policy reforms to establish; absent these conditions, exit may fail to curb dom-
ination or even exacerbate it.
This idea that exit can be a double-edged sword, stifling voice and triggering
institutional failure in some contexts but amplifying voice and sparking reform in
others, is the dual thesis of Albert O. Hirschman’s seminal work Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty, the focus of my first chapter. The first part of his two-part thesis is much
better known: exit may stifle voice by disproportionately encouraging the most
motivated and advantaged parents, workers, voters, etc., to depart and thus
abandon their more vulnerable compatriots, whose voices will be less powerful
and effective as a result. His best examples of such a process are wealthier families
abandoning public schools for private ones and the black middle class deserting
inner cities in the wake of desegregation (1970, 45–6, 51–2, 100–2, 109–12). The
second part of his thesis, however, is less well known: voice is most effective when
it carries a threat (implicitly or explicitly) to impose a cost on the powerful, and
exit is one of the main things that makes such threats credible, especially when it
is properly resourced; potential exit can empower voice by diminishing its
threshold for efficacy and thereby encouraging it (1970, 55, 82–3, 85). Return
to the abused-wife example: is she not more likely to talk back to her domineering
husband when exit is feasible due to liberal divorce laws, etc.? The challenge is to
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determine the net effect of exit on the security of the most vulnerable, and there is
reason to believe that this relationship is fundamentally non-monotonic: it first
falls with the ease of exit, as the most advantaged leave and no longer raise their
voices against abuse, but then rises again as even the less advantaged are able to
depart or credibly threaten to do so (cf. 1970, 83). As I will argue in this chapter,
the key to protecting the most vulnerable is therefore not to thwart exit but rather
to “double down” on it, providing resources to the most vulnerable that make exit
easier for them (e.g., better information, travel and relocation vouchers, a basic
income, etc.).
Are there other policy initiatives to help the most vulnerable that the state
should pursue? Rather than empowering voice indirectly by resourcing exit, the
state could try to empower voice directly by a host of means. In the economic
sphere, for example, it could directly supervise and regulate labor markets,
blocking certain unconscionable contractual arrangements (e.g., perilous work-
ing conditions or very long workweeks) and generally rebalancing economic
power in favor of labor. Alternatively, it could strengthen labor’s voice by
requiring companies to have German-style works councils or other forms of
labor participation in managerial decisions; less radically, it could simply encour-
age the formation of unions to bargain with management over wages and work
conditions. I will argue against such policy initiatives in this chapter, not on the
grounds of efficiency or respect for property rights but rather for the purpose of
reducing domination, in this case by the state itself. As I will show, such policies
necessarily give a great deal of discretionary power to (quasi-)public agents,
power that can and will be frequently abused for non-public ends. With rare
exceptions, the state should only empower voice indirectly, whether by resour-
cing exit or by encouraging competition so as to expand the range of exit
options—though as I will show in Chapter 5, even these techniques can carry
certain risks for republicans.
Having established the preceding theoretical framework, I will then use it over
the course of the next three chapters to analyze domination and the best means
for reducing it in the spheres of family, market, and state, respectively. Turning
first to the family in Chapter 2, I examine the way that asymmetrical, gender-
based power relations within households make women vulnerable to abuse by
boyfriends and especially husbands. The principal line of defense against
such abuse is the legal possibility of exit as secured by liberal divorce laws
(e.g., the “no-fault” divorce laws in place throughout the USA), which have
been favored by republicans from John Milton (2010) to Philip Pettit (2012,
115). But such measures are insufficient: intimidation by husbands and the risks
of unemployment and poverty (especially for wives with limited job-market
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experience and poor marital prospects) may effectively deter exit and allow abuse
to continue even where there is a formal right to leave. Whether by enforcing
restraining orders, financing shelters, or offering vouchers for job (re)training,
the state can take additional steps to make exit more feasible and threats of it
more credible for the most vulnerable women. By contrast, directly enhancing
voice in this context is hard to imagine. Would it require micromanagement of
the household division of labor by connubial “regulators”? Legislating and then
enforcing internal democracy or at least a formal proceduralism (e.g., Antioch
College-style “intimacy contracts”)? Even if we suspended privacy concerns, such
measures would require that state enforcement agents be given a kind and degree
of discretionary power that would expose couples to abuse and simply replace
one kind of domination with another. If we want to minimize the sum total of
private and public domination in marriage, we will need to limit the state to
indirect methods of empowering women’s voices.
Next, in Chapter 3, I look at the conditions for republican freedom in markets,
especially labor markets. Republicans have historically been of different minds
about markets: some, such as Rousseau, reviled them, while others, like Adam
Smith, praised them. Present-day republicans have generally made their peace
with markets, but without much enthusiasm. I will argue in this chapter that the
proper republican attitude toward competitive markets is celebratory rather than
acquiescent and that republicanism demands such markets for the same reason it
requires the rule of law: because both are crucial institutions for protecting
individuals from arbitrary interference. In the context of labor markets, where
workers are vulnerable to domination from managers and capitalists, securing
competition and free exit requires what I call an “Anglo-Nordic” package of
policies, including informational campaigns, labor-market reform, aggressive
antitrust, capitalist demogrants, and a basic income. Alternative approaches of
the sort I surveyed above (e.g., labor-market regulations, works councils, and
unions), which try to empower voice directly rather than indirectly, run the risk
of increasing total domination by giving discretionary powers to public or private
agents: these powers are required to assess where voice is being silenced and to
redress it, but they can and inevitably will be misused in the pursuit of private
ends, be they financial (e.g., bribery), tribal (e.g., bureaucratic-class interests), or
ideological. Again, the safest approach from a republican point of view is one that
resources exit and promotes competition (Taylor 2013).
I move in Chapter 4 to the third and final sphere, the state. The role of exit in
minimizing state dominationmay seem quite limited due to its high cost, especially
at the national level. This might explain why mobility (geographic exit) has played
almost no role in republican defenses of federalism and political decentralization
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more generally, be they in the writings of Montesquieu, Rousseau, Kant, and
Publius or in contemporary works.3 However, the cost of exit is much lower
from political sub-units such as cities, counties, and states/provinces, and the
freedom to migrate between them is a characteristic feature of open societies,
especially federal ones; such relatively low exit costs and free movement even
describe some international systems such as the EU, apart from language barriers.
In such contexts, exit can offer a means of escape from state domination for both
citizens and businesses, as I argued earlier. Also, if political institutions are designed
so that exit imposes heavy costs on the leaders of those political sub-units—if they
lose tax revenue as a result, say, whether directly or via revenue-sharing systems—
then the voices of citizens and businesses will be indirectly empowered, and leaders
will find it in their interest to be responsive and pro-active about abuse. Some of the
policy initiatives discussed above, especially travel and relocation vouchers, can do
double or even triple duty across the three spheres, in fact, providing resources for
exit whether the source of abuse is domestic, economic, or political. To be sure, the
role of voice remains extremely important in the political sphere and increasingly
so as we move from local to state to national governments: at this point in time, at
least, escaping from abusive national governments is quite hard for all but major
corporations and a global elite; as a result of this, exit exerts little discipline on
nation-states, aside from narrow policy arenas (e.g., corporate taxation). Still, I will
argue in this chapter that, with good institutional design and resourced exit,
market-like mechanisms can play a larger role than normally thought possible in
disciplining the state and restraining arbitrary power, a role that becomes increas-
ingly important the lower we go in the hierarchy of political sub-units and the more
those sub-units resemble firms competing for mobile “citizen-consumers” in a
locational marketplace (cf. Dagger 1997, 154).
Even if policy instruments are well chosen, however, and focused on indirectly
enhancing voice through expanded choice and resourced exit, state domination
remains an ever-present risk, especially as the state grows in size and power. First,
even the policies I recommended above are liable to abuse because their execution
requires discretionary power: when we examine antitrust authorities or welfare
administrators, we will see their need for discretion in selecting targets for
prosecution or in determining eligibility for benefits, discretion that can be
3 Contemporary republicans are eerily silent on the issue of federalism. It receives favorable
mention by Pettit (1997, 179) and a few others, but with little explanation other than a repetition of
traditional republican concerns about the centralization of power as a threat to liberty. I should note
that, in contrast to the political-theory literature, mobility plays a key role in the economic literature
on federalism: see, for example, the important works of Buchanan (1996), Weingast (1995), and
especially Tiebout (1956), which I will discuss in Chapter 4.
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directed towards non-public ends. Second, even if these problems can be avoided
(by rendering benefits unconditional, for example), the state will still have to raise
revenues to fund the policies, and the more revenue it needs to raise, the more
difficult raising it will be due to tax avoidance and evasion, which will itself
require increasing the power and discretion of revenue agents. Lastly, the more
powerful a state becomes—the more it can command persons and resources via
taxation and regulation—the more attractive a target it ends up being for capture
by rent-seeking interest groups, who can then turn its public power to non-public
purposes. Greater state power, even for initially benign ends, can enable greater
domination and subsequent abuse of unorganized interests by organized ones.
Once republicans recognize these public-choice insights, they will see the need
to adopt a comparative-institutional method. If escalating state efforts to counter
private power with public power will at some point increase rather than decrease
total domination, then republicans will be forced to weigh the evils of private
domination against the evils of the public kind at the relevant legislative and
policy margins. Rawlsian “burdens of judgment” will inevitably come into play at
this point: even when republicans are assessing the same evidence, they will
disagree with each other about the required tradeoffs (Rawls 1993, 54–8).
Among the causes of disagreement will be their differing assessments of the
nature and extent of private domination, of the efficacy of state responses to such
domination, and of the possibility of keeping the state and its agents limited by
genuinely public purposes as state power grows. In short, even if republicans
share the very same normative and theoretical commitments, they will arrive
at rather different conclusions about the proper size and scope of state power:
some will be small-government republicans, like Friedrich Hayek (1960), while
others will be big-government ones, like Michael Sandel (1996, 2012). This
reasonable pluralism in republican policy commitments will be the subject
of Chapter 5.
These considerations suggest a modest approach to international republican-
ism, to which I will briefly turn in the Conclusion. Republicans of all stripes
should be able to coalesce around a minimal global republicanism dedicated to
free trade and free migration as means for checking arbitrary power, be it
economic or political, at the national level. Economic concentration and the
opportunities it creates for dominating consumers and employees are less prob-
lematic when trade and migration are free, as global competitors in product,
service, and labor markets will find it in their own interest to limit the market
power of would-be national monopolists and monopsonists. Free migration also
offers a refuge to the victims of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes around the
world, which remain the greatest threats to republican liberty internationally.
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Granted, this is a stopgap measure, but one that, in combination with political
criticism and economic pressure, can eventually encourage the internal political
changes that will finally allow these nations to be integrated into the global order
of open societies. Ever mindful of Kant’s warning that a world state would be a
“soulless despotism” and a “graveyard of freedom” (1996, 336 [8:367]), we can
instead focus our political energies on the less ambitious but also safer project of
fostering global competition and the free movement of products, people, and
ideas across borders, whose success would be a humble but worthwhile approxi-
mation of Kant’s own inspiring republican vision.
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Exit, Voice, and Credibility
Albert Hirschman’s Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970) was his single most influential
book, though its impact was much greater in political science and sociology than in
his home discipline of economics (Adelman 2013, 446–9). Over the decades, it has
received even more citations than his landmark study in development economics,
The Strategy of EconomicDevelopment (Hirschman 1958).1Whereas the latter work
questioned existing orthodoxies in that field, including its practitioners’ moves
toward more rigorous mathematical modeling, the former took broader aim at
the parent discipline. In it, Hirschman condemns “the economist’s bias in favor of
exit and against voice” and singles out Milton Friedman’s educational-voucher
scheme for special attention (Hirschman 1970, 16–17). Friedman, Hirschman
complains, sees “withdrawal or exit [from underperforming schools] as the ‘direct’
way of expressing one’s unfavorable views of an organization. A person less well
trained in economicsmight naively suggest that the direct way of expressing views is
to express them!” Relatedly, he also takes Friedman to task for denigrating
democratic alternatives to exit (which Friedman dismisses as “cumbrous political
channels” [1962, 91]), asking “what else is the political . . . process than the digging,
the use, and hopefully the slow improvement of these very channels?”
So far, so familiar to Hirschman’s readers. What may be less well remembered
is that he levels even stronger criticism at political theorists and practitioners for
their own peculiar sins:
But the economist is by no means alone in having a blind spot, a “trained incapacity”
(as Veblen called it) for perceiving the usefulness of one of our two mechanisms. In fact, in
the political realm exit has fared much worse than has voice in the realm of economics.
Rather than as merely ineffective or “cumbrous,” exit has often been branded as criminal, for
it has been labeled desertion, defection, and treason. (Hirschman 1970, 17; cf. 98, 109–12)
1 The former had 18,020 citations and the latter 9,990 as of June 2016 (http://scholar.google.com/);
they together make up over half of Hirschman’s Google Scholar citations. The Rhetoric of Reaction:
Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy (1991), which I will discuss at the end of this chapter, comes in a distant
sixth at 1,330 citations.
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For this reason, he announces that one goal of his book is to “demonstrate to
political scientists the usefulness of economic concepts” like exit (19).
In this chapter and throughout the remainder of my book, I hope to revive this
neglected aspect of Hirschman’s project by demonstrating to republican political
philosophers the utility of exit as a mechanism for limiting domination in the
domestic, economic, and political spheres. I will begin by reviewing the dual
theses of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: the first, better-known thesis that “the presence
of the exit alternative can tend to atrophy the development of the art of voice” as
well as the second, lesser-known thesis that “if voice is to be at its most effective,
the threat of exit must be credible, particularly when it most counts” (43, 85).
I’ll then go on to argue that the net effect of exit on the security of the most
vulnerable members of society, even if it is initially negative, can be made positive
by cutting exit’s cost to such a point that even the vulnerable can take advantage
of it or at least credibly threaten to do so. Finally, I will warn against the adoption
of policies that, rather than empowering voice indirectly by cutting exit’s cost, try
to empower it directly by a number of means. As I will maintain, such policies
necessarily give a great deal of discretionary power to (quasi-)public agents,
power that can and frequently will be abused in the pursuit of non-public ends.
If the state wishes to minimize overall domination (both private and public), it
should limit itself to empowering voice indirectly by resourcing exit and encour-
aging competition so as to expand the available range of exit options for the
vulnerable. Working with rather than against the grain of competitive markets
will prove to be the best means of advancing progressive republican ideals.
Hirschman’s Dual Theses
Hirschman’s first thesis is the best known and the one most frequently associated
with the book, especially by its many fans in political science and sociology. As he
declares in his pithiest rendering of it, “the actual level of voice feeds on inelastic
demand, or on the lack of opportunity for exit” (34). Hirschman’s central
concern here is that exit will undermine voice across a variety of social contexts
by encouraging the most motivated and advantaged participants to depart when
institutions start to fail, in the process abandoning their most vulnerable associ-
ates, whose voices will be less powerful and effective as a result.2 Whether we
2 Republicans are generally partial to a prioritarian interpretation of freedom as non-domination:
that is, they recognize the importance of providing greater protection for the more vulnerable
members of society (for example, Lovett 2010, 201; Pettit 2012, 89–90). For the purposes of this
book, I will also adopt this prioritarian reading. For a broader defense of prioritarianism, see
Parfit 1997.
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consider the customers of a bungling state-monopoly railroad or the stockholders
of an underperforming corporation, the lesson is the same: “those customers who
care most about the quality of the product and who, therefore, are those
who would be most active, reliable, and creative agents of voice are for that
very reason also those who are apparently likely to exit first in case of deterior-
ation” (44–7; cf. 55).
Hirschman’s most powerful—and disturbing—examples of this phenomenon
at work all involve deepening divisions of class and race. Consider first his
education example: specifically, parents choosing between public and private
schools for their children. If public schools begin to deteriorate for whatever
reason:
increasing numbers of quality-education-conscious parents will send their children to
private schools. This “exit” may occasion some impulse toward an improvement of the
public schools; but here again this impulse is far less significant than the loss to the public
schools of those member-customers who would be most motivated and determined to put
up a fight against the deterioration if they did not have the alternative of the private
schools. (45–6)
Given the expense of private education, these parents will likely be wealthier than
average, too, thereby increasing the existing income stratification between public
and private schools (45n2). Moreover, exit (or the threat of exit) will be a much
more effective disciplining device in private education than in public, further
exacerbating quality differences between the two: “exit is not a particularly
powerful recuperation mechanism in the case of public schools—it is far more
so in that of private schools which have to make ends meet” (52). Thus,
deterioration in public schools when private schools are an exit option can trigger
a runaway process, one characterized by ever-escalating quality and income
stratification caused by the most motivated and advantaged parents abandoning
the public sector.
Next consider his neighborhood-decline example, which involves a toxic
combination of class and racial division. Hirschman begins with an overall
description of the problem:
When general conditions in a neighborhood deteriorate, those who value most highly
neighborhood qualities such as safety, cleanliness, good schools, and so forth will be the
first to move out; they will search for housing in somewhat more expensive neighbor-
hoods or in the suburbs and will be lost to the citizens’ groups and community action
programs that would attempt to stem and reverse the tide of deterioration. (51)
Beginning in the 1960s, racial desegregation in the United States—residential,
occupational, and educational—started to provide educated middle- and upper-class
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black families a path out of the ghetto, but as certain members of the Black Power
movement noticed at the time, these improved opportunities for talented
individuals levied costs on the group: by removing their best educated, most
civically-active residents, integration helped place black-majority districts on
a downward-spiraling trajectory of neglect, decline, and further “black flight”
(109–12).3 In this case, at least, the promise of escape from racial apartheid was
both a blessing and a curse, though for different segments of the black population.4
These two examples and others Hirschman uses in his book diminish exit’s
appeal, but as I hope to show, what he takes away with one thesis he basically
gives back with the other. Given how little noticed this second thesis has been,
I shall start with Hirschman’s rendering:
The chances for voice to function effectively as a recuperation mechanism are appreciably
strengthened if voice is backed up by the threat of exit, whether it is made openly or
whether the possibility of exit is merely well understood to be an element in the situation
by all concerned. . . . [While] the effectiveness of the voice mechanism is strengthened by
the possibility of exit . . . the threat of exit must be credible, particularly when it most
counts. (82–3, 85)
In other words, voice is most effective when it (implicitly or explicitly) carries a
threat to impose a cost on the underperforming institution, one that will be
noticed by its managers, and exit is the key thing that makes such threats credible,
especially when it is properly resourced and therefore practicable. To put it
differently, exit can empower voice by lowering its threshold for efficacy and
thereby encouraging it. Consider divorce, for example: if a husband knows that
his wife can feasibly exit the marriage (due to “no fault” divorce laws, shelters,
restraining orders, good work and/or marital opportunities, and so on), he is
much more likely to listen to her complaints and modify his behavior—but if so,
that makes her voice more effective and consequently more likely to be put to
use.5 Thus, in cases such as this one, exit might very well be “off the equilibrium
3 This “black flight” was paralleled by “white flight” from the inner cities. Although racism played
the principal role in the latter, even a “moderate urge to avoid small-minority status” could
have triggered it (Schelling 1978, 154).
4 A very closely related phenomenon can be found in the precipitous decline of HBCUs
(Historically Black Colleges and Universities), whether in terms of student enrollment, endowments,
surviving institutions, or even SAT scores. As Charlayne Hunter-Gault (2014) explains, HBCUs
“once held a monopoly. Today, they struggle to compete with elite colleges that have stepped up
recruiting for the best and brightest black students.”
5 See Weinstock (2001, 81) for an application of this lesson to political secession: geographically-
based minorities are more likely to have their complaints about majority abuse heeded when they
enjoy an entrenched right to secede.
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path,” to use the language of game theory: if the threat of exit is credible and the
abusive parties therefore yield, the threat won’t have to be exercised, that is, no
exit will occur.6 As Hirschman himself notes, the threat may not even have to be
explicitly made: even if “the possibility of exit is merely well understood to be an
element in the situation by all concerned,” offenders may preemptively yield in
order to avoid the risk of potential exit (82). Thus, when exit is effectively
resourced and this fact is common knowledge, silence can sometimes speak as
loudly as words.
With Hirschman’s second thesis in view, we can now see that exit’s net effect
on voice is likely to be ambiguous in sign: exit may remove the best and most
driven backers of institutional change, depressing the overall exercise of voice
(first thesis), but it can also render the voices of those who remain behind more
effective, thereby encouraging their exercise (second thesis). For our purposes
here, however, we should be focusing on a slightly different desideratum: not
voice per se, but rather the security of those most vulnerable to institutional
failure. How is this likely to vary with the cost of exit? As I’ll suggest here and
argue throughout the book, the relationship will be a non-monotonic one: that is,
the security of the most vulnerable will initially suffer when the cost of exit falls
from a prohibitive level because the most advantaged will then leave and no
longer raise their voices against abuse, but it will rise again if the cost continues to
fall to a point that permits even the least advantaged (and therefore most
vulnerable) to exit or at least credibly threaten to do so. In short, a falling cost
of exit will first decrease and later increase the security of the most vulnerable,
holding out the possibility that at a low enough cost of exit their security may
actually be greater than it was when exit was prohibitively expensive and all
individuals, the most and least advantaged alike, were trapped together in
dysfunctional institutions.
As the earlier divorce example suggests, however, exit costs are not brute facts
of nature, outside our control; rather, their level is partly determined by public
policy, and legal and policy reforms can therefore potentially lower them. For an
abused wife, the right to unilaterally initiate divorce proceedings—and the
knowledge that the exercise of this right will be insulated through state provision
of various protective services (shelters, restraining orders)—will unambiguously
lower the cost of exit and thereby empower voice. Were the right merely a formal
one, we might wonder whether it would not redound to the benefit of abusive
6 Whether exit will be off the equilibrium path or not will depend upon many factors, including
whether information (for example, about the value of available actions to affected parties) is
symmetric, parties are rational, and so on.
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husbands, who could threaten to leave dependent wives in penury at a moment’s
notice, but so long as exit costs are sufficiently reduced through protective
services, “community property” rules that guarantee wives an equal share of
jointly acquired assets, state provision of welfare benefits and job retraining,
and so on, even a vulnerable wife can exit or credibly threaten to do so and be
better off than she would have been in a world where divorce was illegal. What
this suggests is that the solution to the problem of the suppression of vulnerable
voices by exit (first thesis) may bemore and better resourced exit, not less, because
if the cost of exit can be reduced enough, vulnerable voices will be empowered in
a manner that leaves them better off than they would have been in an exit-free
world. Hirschman’s second thesis, in short, has the potential to give exit back the
good reputation that his first thesis took away.
In light of this finding, let us now revisit Hirschman’s education example and
Friedman’s voucher proposal. If the most motivated and advantaged parents
abandon failing public schools, it is indeed likely that the least advantaged will
suffer—but why? On Hirschman’s reading, this occurs for two interrelated
reasons: first, the least advantaged lack the financial means to follow the most
advantaged out of the failing state schools and must therefore remain behind with
their diminished voices; second, state schools are much less responsive to exit
pressures than private schools are, so that the threatened departure of advantaged
parents will do little to improve them, further widening the income and quality
gaps between the private and public sectors. As I noted above, however, these are
not brute facts of nature; rather, they are the result of deliberate policy choices.
Suppose instead that the least advantaged did have the financial means to join the
most advantaged and that public schools were reasonably responsive to exit
pressures. How might this be brought about? Any policy reform that allowed
parents to exit underperforming state schools with their per-capita share of
educational expenditures for that school (or, better, with an income-scaled
share so that poor parents received much more than rich ones) would have this
tendency: it would give poor parents the means to escape bad public schools, and
it would make those bad schools pay the price in terms of reduced resources; this
latter effect could even be heightened by tying administrator and teacher salaries
to their available resources, putting every educational tub on its own bottom, as
with private schooling. Friedman’s voucher proposal would be one way to
achieve this, but other, less radical approaches are also available, including
public-school-choice systems that use charter and magnet schools in combin-
ation with free parental choice of schools to pluralize public provision and
encourage competition and accountability. Here, lowering exit costs and enhan-
cing responsiveness can place otherwise vulnerable parents and their children in
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an even better position than they would occupy in a world that denied exit to
both rich and poor.7
What if this last claim is incorrect, though? That is, what if the just-described
alternative world of universal “free exit” was actually worse than a “no-exit”
world? Perhaps a world where rich and poor are trapped together in public
schools is better for the poor than free exit because in a free-exit world income
and quality stratification will still exist (albeit in a more tempered form than in a
“partial-exit” system of escape for the wealthy alone), but in a no-exit system
everyone would be in the same boat and would consequently be properly
motivated to row together for the common good. Even if this idealized picture
of a no-exit world were accurate, we would have to ask whether it was politically
feasible, and in this case (and others to be discussed throughout the book), it is
highly unlikely to be so. First, the right to send one’s children to private schools
has been constitutionally entrenched for nearly a century (see Pierce v. Society of
Sisters [1925]), so the children of the rich cannot be dragooned into the public-
school system against their parents’ will. Second, even if they could be coercively
enrolled in public schools, their parents would still have the option of self-
segregation by income within the state system given (1) the very localized nature
of educational finance, at least in the USA, where per-pupil expenditures vary
enormously across school districts, and (2) free residential mobility across those
same districts, which is also constitutionally entrenched (see Saenz v. Roe [1999]).
Even in the unlikely case that educational finance became significantly more
centralized, there would still be a great deal of exit (whether to the private sector
or within the public sector via residential mobility) by the well-heeled. Thus, the
choice is not between free-exit and no-exit worlds; rather, it is between free-exit
and partial-exit worlds—between a world where everyone has the ability to exit
and a world where only the advantaged have that ability—and the former is
clearly preferable if we prioritize the protection of our most vulnerable citizens
against institutional failure.
We started this section by examining the legitimate concerns of both
Hirschman and his many devotees in political science and sociology about the
tendency of exit to silence vulnerable voices (first thesis). As we have seen,
however, exit can also empower those voices by rendering them more effective
(second thesis), and policy reforms that reduce the cost of exit for the most
7 The most respected analysis to date of charter-school performance, produced by Stanford’s
Center for Research on Education Outcomes (CREDO 2013), finds that charter-school students who
are in poverty and/or English-language learners enjoy “significantly stronger growth in reading and
math than their counterparts in TPS [traditional public schools]” (76–7). Similar results have been
found in randomized controlled trials: see, for example, Gleason et al. (2010, 9–12).
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vulnerable and improve the responsiveness of institutions via competition can
make their threats of exit increasingly credible and thus persuasive, whether in
the context of abusive marriages or deteriorating public schools. This potential
role of properly-resourced exit in improving security for the most vulnerable
against neglect and abuse at the hands of violent spouses, cosseted state employ-
ees, and others in positions of power should be of special interest to republican
political theorists, who seek to minimize domination by making interference by
authority figures track the avowed interests of those with whom they interfere. As
Hirschman’s second thesis demonstrates, exit can act as a complement to voice,
giving vulnerable citizens a persuasive means to sway and even check the exercise
of arbitrary power. . . . and failing this, it can provide a substitute for voice,
offering a means of escape from such power, if only it is properly resourced.
Defining and Differentiating Exit and Voice
Before discussing direct versus indirect strategies for empowering voice, I would like
to pause for a moment and turn to something that has been done only implicitly so
far: defining and differentiating exit and voice. I delayed this task until now because
our everyday understandings of exit and voice were sufficient to make Hirschman’s
examples intelligible. From this point on, however, we need to be a little more
precise in how we define them, distinguish them from each other, and differentiate
their subtypes so as to avoid confusion. Here are Hirschman’s definitions:
Management [of a dysfunctional organization] finds out about its failings via two
alternative routes:
(1) . . . some members leave the organization: this is the exit option. As a result, revenues
drop, membership declines, and management is impelled to search for ways and means to
correct whatever faults have led to exit.
(2) . . . the organization’s members express their dissatisfaction directly to management
or to some other authority to which management is subordinate or through general
protest addressed to anyone who cares to listen: this is the voice option. As a result,
management once again engages in a search for the causes and possible cures of members’
dissatisfaction. (1970, 4)
Exit, then, is separation: the attempt not simply to leave a dysfunctional organ-
ization but also to escape its authority and the various obligations of membership
in it. Voice, on the other hand, is standing one’s ground, staying and fighting for
change within an organization, which can take a variety of forms: speech (for
example, criticisms, reform proposals), organization (for example, rallies, cau-
cuses), voting (such as elections, recalls), and the like. As we saw previously, all of
these have their analogues in the spheres of family, market, and state.
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Moreover, in each of these spheres, exit and voice can take both legal and
illegal forms. Consider the political sphere, for example. (I will look at the
economic sphere [labor markets] in the next section.) Legal forms of exit include
emigration from a nation-state or internal migration across political jurisdictions
in a federal system; giving up membership in a political party might also qualify.
Legal forms of voice will include petitions, protests, running for office, and
voting. Some illegal forms of exit might be described as “exiting in place,” be
they complete or partial, violent or non-violent: a citizen might (partially) exit the
state (or one of its jurisdictions) without moving. Secession would generally be a
complete, violent form of “exiting in place,” as might a rebellion or revolution; at
the other extreme, civil disobedience would be a partial and non-violent form: the
peaceful, public, and conscientious refusal to obey certain laws because they (or
maybe other laws) are unjust. Pettit, despite his generally skeptical attitude
toward exit in the political sphere (2012, 161–2, 165–8), believes that these
illegal forms of exit can serve as a check on the abuse of state power: “to the
extent that the possibility of popular, successful resistance is on the cards—to
the extent even that it is on the cards as a matter of common belief—the influence
of the people over government can be established on a robust basis and
can constitute a real form of power” (2012, 173; cf. 137–40, 174, 202, 219–20,
223, 225).8 Illegal varieties of voice are also common in the political realm,
ranging from the overstepping of reasonable bounds on rights of speech, press,
and association (for example, unfurling an anti-capitalist banner from a corpor-
ate building during an Occupy protest) to the corruption of officials (by means of
bribery, blackmail, and so on).
It can be difficult at times to distinguish between exit and voice, especially in
the political sphere. For example, if a voter decides not to vote, or perhaps even
refuses to register, is that exit or voice? One could think of it as a sort of “exiting
in place,” because the voter decides to remain in a jurisdiction but reject the
responsibilities of active citizenship. Silence can often be a potent way of voicing
one’s opinion, however, not unlike a deliberately spoiled ballot, say, or a vote for
“none of the above.” This ambiguity may explain why some scholars treat voting
inconsistently. Mark Warren, for example, classifies the “right to vote” as a
“voice-based inclusion” at one point in a recent article (2011, 683), but then
deems “voting for a nonincumbent party or candidate” to be a “form of exit” ten
pages later (693). For simplicity, I will always regard voting as a kind of voice in
this book, but I do recognize that in certain contexts or given certain motives it
8 Strictly speaking, Pettit does not consider civil disobedience to be a form of “resistance,” but
instead a limit case of “contestation, a way of opposing laws within the system” (2012, 137–8).
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might be better treated as a type of exit. Similar things might be said of other
political actions, for example, revolt: is it violent, peremptory voice or an attempt to
escape from existing authority without moving? I will have more to say about these
myriad kinds of exit and voice, how they relate to one another, and their ambigu-
ities over the course of the book, but they are sufficiently delineated for now.
Direct versus Indirect Empowerment of Voice
I said earlier that voice is most effective when it (implicitly or explicitly) carries a
threat to impose a cost on an underperforming institution, one that will be noticed
by its managers, and that exit is the key thing that makes such threats credible,
especially when it is properly resourced and therefore practicable. Are there not
other means, though, of making threats credible? As the previous section indicated,
there are many illegal ways to empower voice through increasing the credibility of
threats, such as a history of violence when demands are not met, but set these aside
for the time being. In many societies, voice is directly empowered by the institu-
tions of electoral democracy: competitive elections, universal suffrage, freedoms of
speech, press, and assembly, public financing of campaigns, and the like. These
institutions give citizens a means to influence the state without exiting: if state
agents do not heed the public’s voice, they may be removed from office by angry
voters, whether directly (elected representatives) or indirectly (political appointees).
If this direct form of empowerment works in the political sphere, why not extend
it to the economic sphere, say, by various reform measures? More generally, why
can’t the direct empowerment of voice supplement, substitute for, or even entirely
replace the indirect empowerment exit offers?
The answer, in brief, is that such empowerment threatens even greater dom-
ination, not by private agents, but rather by public (or quasi-public) agents. As
Pettit warns, “while the state has to guard people against private domination . . . it
also needs to guard against itself practicing a form of public domination” (2012, 3).
He identifies “three dangers” that may lead to such domination:
The first is the danger of elected politicians usurping the influence of the people under
motives of self-interest. The second is the danger of private lobbies usurping that influence
out of a desire to push government in a direction that does not necessarily have popular
support. And the third is the danger that unelected authorities . . . might gain a hold over
government policy that is not sensitive to popular demands. (2012, 231–8, here 231)
The first two dangers will be familiar to students of public-choice economics:
legislators, in their pursuit of winning electoral coalitions and/or bribes, will do
the bidding of factions instead of the general public, commonly by passing
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inefficient laws that have concentrated benefits but diffuse costs, such as protective
tariffs, agricultural subsidies, and tax breaks (2012, 232–5; cf. Buchanan and
Tullock 1962, 283–95). In such cases, the state itself is effectively captured and
used by rent seekers as an instrument of domination and exploitation.
Even if legislators were saintly, however, the third danger would offer yet
another point of access for private interests of many sorts due to the discretionary
power necessarily possessed and exercised by unelected authorities. As Pettit
reminds us:
The fact that in practice many decisions will have to be left to government under the best
imaginable regime of popular control raises the spectre of abuse in this range of discre-
tion. Abuse might consist in the authorities smuggling some self-serving candidates into
the set of policies between which a decision has to be made in any area, or indeed keeping
some popularly acceptable candidates out of that set. Or it might involve the authorities
taking advantage of loopholes in the process available to resolve policy disputes in any
area for their own special benefit or the benefit of cronies. (2012, 176; cf. Lovett and
Pettit 2009, 23–4)
Even public-spirited legislation will need to be implemented by unelected
authorities—be they political appointees or bureaucrats with civil-service
protections—and that implementation will necessarily involve discretionary
power: the implementing authorities will have to interpret laws, pick enabling
policies, and decide how (and even whether) to enforce those policies in particu-
lar contexts, given limited implementation and enforcement resources (see
Hamburger 2014). Also, no amount of guidance and oversight by elected execu-
tives, legislatures, and courts can possibly ensure that this power will always be
used for its intended ends given the immense ambition and complexity of
modern legislation. Unelected officials will therefore often be able to abuse
their sizable discretion in pursuit of non-public ends, whether financial (for
example, bribes or offers of future employment from those they regulate), tribal
(such as the protection of bureaucratic-class interests by, for example, a mutual
agreement to slow down work in order to boost leisure and cut stress), ideological
(for example, the alleged harassment of so-called “patriot” groups by the Internal
Revenue Service [IRS]), and so on.
I want to emphasize here that it is their ability to abuse, not actual abuse, that
constitutes domination. As Pettit affirms, “the grievance I have in mind is that of
having to live at the mercy of another, having to live in a manner that leaves you
vulnerable to some ill that the other is in a position arbitrarily to impose” (1997,
4–5). Such vulnerability is wholly consistent with that other rarely or never
engaging in such abuse; even authoritarian political systems sometimes have
civil services that are rather clean (for example, Singapore). The problem is
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that so long as civil servants (such as police officers and tax officials) have the
kind of discretionary powers described above, those who are subject to their
authority are quite likely to fail what Pettit refers to as the “eyeball test,” that is,
the ability to “look others in the eye without reason for the fear or deference that a
power of interference might inspire” (2012, 84; for example, see Dewan 2014 on
IRS use of civil-forfeiture laws).
But how are these dangers related to the direct empowerment of voice?
Consider a labor-market example. Suppose we were to discover that workers in
a particular industry (such as hospital nurses) were subject to the monopsonistic
or oligopsonistic power of local employers and were therefore vulnerable to
domination and exploitation. One way of rectifying this would be indirect
empowerment of their voices by enhancing their exit options through travel/
relocation vouchers, antitrust laws, capitalist demogrants, a basic income, and so
on. Direct empowerment of voice would be another possibility, though, whether
as a supplement to or a substitute for indirect empowerment. It might take the
form of state supervision and regulation of workplaces in order to prevent abuse
(call this the “regulation option”) or of mandatory labor participation in
decision-making, up to and including labor representation on corporate boards
(call this the “participation option”).
Let us first look at the regulation option, which attempts to rebalance the
power of capital versus labor with the police powers of a democratic state. In
uncompetitive labor markets of this kind, capitalists and their managerial agents
will be in a position to exercise arbitrary power over their employees.
A democratic state may, through detailed workplace rules, counter such power,
but given that this conflicts with the interests of capitalists and managers,
workplaces will have to be carefully monitored to ensure compliance, and
regulatory agents will need powers to match in order to both assess (via surprise
inspections and video surveillance, say) and redress (by jail time, fines, or perhaps
just new or modified rules) the employer abuse that silences labor’s voice. But
such powers run the risk of increasing overall (that is, private plus public)
domination, because monopsonistic and oligopsonistic firms are now exposed
to the same sort of arbitrary power that they exercise over their own employees:
regulatory agents, given their wide remit to stop abuse, must be granted discre-
tionary powers of a kind that can themselves be readily abused, especially in light
of the complexity of the regulatory task and the limited ability of other state
authorities to provide effective oversight due to that complexity. Regulators
might use these powers to demand bribes from employers in return for leniency,
to pursue the interests of their bureaucratic class in future employment in the
industry as consultants, or even to harass employers as part of personal or
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ideological vendettas. Unsurprisingly, republicans are well aware of these risks.
Frank Lovett, for example, maintains that these “workplace regulations” and
other efforts to “regulate . . . social relationships,” while perhaps useful for stop-
ping certain “gross abuses,” will often just substitute one form of domination for
another:
There will always be discovered new and ever-more subtle means of converting material
advantage into domination. In the long run it is unlikely that public policy could ever keep
pace with, much less anticipate, such innovations—except perhaps with a regulatory
structure so dense and intrusive as to raise serious objections on other grounds. (For
starters, a state powerful enough to accomplish this task might itself become a great source
of domination.) (Lovett 2009, 825–6)
In contrast to intrusive workplace monitoring and intervention, government
delivery of resources that empower workers in labor-market choices can remain
largely aloof from relations within the firm, trusting instead that free exit will
discipline owners and managers and prevent them from dominating their
employees.
Turning now to the participation option, we can see the same logic at work,
leading to the same dangers. The democratic state can demand that monopso-
nistic or oligopsonistic employers include employees in their decision-making
processes (such as via German-style “works councils”), but because such inclu-
sion is contrary to their business interests, the state will once again have to give
regulators the necessary discretionary powers to monitor, assess, and redress
employer non-compliance. Else, employers will just create procedural “work-
arounds” to bypass the influence of laborers: managers are ultimately responsible
to the owners who hire, fire, and promote them, and thus in the absence of
effective state monitoring and enforcement they will follow their lead, not that of
labor.9 As we have seen, though, these same monitoring and enforcement powers
can be abused by regulators, threatening an increase in overall domination.
Again, state provision of resources that empower workers (for example, capitalist
demogrants that allow them to set up their own businesses, perhaps along
participatory lines, or at least credibly threaten to do so) offers a safer way to
protect them from the market power of monopsonists and oligopsonists.
9 This problem might be solved if workers were the owner, as in associational market socialism.
But the transition to socialism can itself create enormous risks of state domination, especially given
the likely resistance of capitalists and landowners to property confiscation: either the state must
become powerful enough to expropriate the expropriators, threatening everyone’s liberties, or it will
be recaptured by these ruling classes in a similarly dangerous reactionary backlash. (The 1973
Allende/Pinochet “transition” in Chile provides an instructive historical example of the latter.)
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Direct empowerment might take a third form, however, one in which the state
encourages (or perhaps just ceases to oppose) the creation of countervailing
forms of market power; call this the “privatization option.” In a labor market
with a monopsonist, for example, the state might try to encourage the formation
of a union monopolist to counter its market power. It could do this by no longer
applying antitrust laws to unions, by enforcing closed-shop and union-shop
agreements (which would otherwise be conspiracies in restraint of trade), by
requiring employers to engage in collective bargaining with their organized
employees, or even by turning a blind eye to union violence or threats of same.
The resulting bilateral monopoly would restrain discretion but leave wage deter-
mination to the relative bargaining power of the two sides (Nicholson 1995,
729–30). Such an arrangement would have the advantage of removing state
regulators with easy-to-abuse discretionary powers from the scene, but only if
rights to organize were protected across all labor markets: if workers needed a
state discovery of monopsony or oligopsony power in their industry in order to
unionize, then we would once again need state regulators with discretionary
powers of monitoring, assessment, permitting, and enforcement to make such a
determination and grant the required permissions—but as we saw with the
regulation and participation options, these powers are readily abused in the
service of non-public ends.
Therein lies the rub, however. The danger of directly empowering voice is not
necessarily decreased by replacing state power with non-state (here, union)
power: fighting fire with fire still risks burning all involved. This fact is apparently
why Pettit dislikes what he calls the “reciprocal power” strategy for minimizing
domination, which involves countering private power with more private power
(1997, 67–8). Pettit’s understandable concern with this kind of solution is that by
it “arbitrary interference and domination may be reduced, but it is not ever going
to be eliminated,” because the residual mutual interference involved fails to “track
the interests and ideas of those who are affected” (67). Even worse, systematic
government efforts to enhance the market power of one side against the other
may have the (net) effect of increasing domination, especially given that, as I just
noted above, the only way to avoid reintroducing state regulators with discre-
tionary powers is to allow workers to unionize across all labor markets, including
those where employers lack significant market power and where unionization
would therefore increase the capacity for domination and exploitation, in this
case of employers by employees.
The case I’ve just made against the regulation, participation, and privatization
options is preliminary and admittedly sketchy, so I will have more to say about
them in Chapter 3; I’ll also look at analogous options in the domestic and political
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spheres in Chapters 2 and 4, respectively. At this point, however, I should
indicate that if these three options were the only alternatives to doing nothing
and if we believed that the market power of employers was a much more serious
problem (actually and potentially) than that of employees, then we might be
justified in pursuing one or more of them with caution in the hope that the net
effect would be to reduce the scope for domination and exploitation. But as I’ve
argued so far in this book and will continue to argue in the chapters ahead, these
are not our only options, which is fortunate given the serious risks they involve.
The indirect empowerment of voice by promoting competition and resourcing
exit is an attractive alternative, one that involves substantially less risk of exacer-
bating the very problem it seeks to solve—though certainly not zero risk, a caveat
to which I will return in Chapter 5.
The Rhetoric of Reaction?
Given that this chapter began by trumpeting its concern for the most vulnerable,
readers may be forgiven for wondering whether the policy preferences expressed
throughout—including support for school choice and skepticism regarding labor-
market regulations, co-determination, and even unions—are really consistent with
such concern, especially in light of their association with political forces that often
appear more interested in the welfare of the most advantaged than that of the most
vulnerable. Even worse, I have helped myself (especially in the previous section) to
a form of argument that Hirschman has labeled “the single most popular and
effective weapon in the annals of reactionary rhetoric,” viz. the perversity thesis:
“any purposive action to improve some feature of the political, social, or economic
order only serves to exacerbate the condition one wishes to remedy” (1991, 7, 140).
Do these features of my book’s text hint at a darker, more reactionary subtext?
As for my employment of the perversity thesis, we should recall what Hirsch-
man himself repeatedly said about it:
To show how advocates of reactionary causes are caught by compelling reflexes and
lumber predictably through set motions and maneuvers does not in itself refute the
arguments, of course. . . . The fact that an argument is used repeatedly is no proof, to be
sure, that it is wrong in any particular instance. I have said so here and there already, but it
bears repeating quite bluntly and generally: there certainly have existed situations where
well-intentioned “purposive social action” has had perverse effects. . . . (1991, 164, 166)
I believe that existing institutions and current proposals for the direct empower-
ment of voice are in precisely these “situations”: as I have argued and will
continue to argue, direct empowerment runs the risk of increasing net
domination—and even barring this possibility, it is less effective at reducing it
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 12/12/2016, SPi
EXIT, VOICE, AND CREDIBILITY 
Comp. by: Vasanthi Stage : Revises1 ChapterID: 0002886570 Date:12/12/16
Time:06:11:16 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0002886570.3D
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 26
than indirect empowerment because it subdues private domination only at the
cost of inadvertently enabling a certain amount of the (quasi-)public kind.
Moreover, by making the case for indirect empowerment, I am making a case
for reform, not against it. Nor is indirect empowerment a recipe for laissez-faire;
rather, it demands specific forms of state action across a range of social
contexts—domestic, economic, and political. What is true is that these reforms
will require a redirection of state interventions so that they work with rather than
against the grain of competitive markets, and to this degree they may overlap
with the policy preferences of some on the political right. This overlap doesn’t
make the policies any less progressive, but it does make them more pragmatic,
and appropriately so: progressives should be open to adopting whatever policies
appear likely to improve the security of the most vulnerable, even if they rely
more heavily on market forces than progressive policies heretofore have. Much as
John Roemer thinks that “socialists have made a fetish out of public ownership”
and that “the choice of property rights over firms and other resources is an
entirely instrumental matter, which should be evaluated by socialists according to
their various propensities to induce the [equalities] with which socialists are
concerned” (1996, 307), I fear that progressives have made a fetish out of social
democracy and have as a result given insufficient attention to other means of
reducing domination and exploitation. This book is intended as a corrective,
then, to this tendency, for the benefit of progressives generally and progressive
republicans more specifically. The market may ultimately prove to be a better
friend to the most vulnerable than the forum, as counterintuitive as this possi-
bility will undoubtedly be for progressives of all stripes (cf. Elster 1986).
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2
Family
The family has long been used as a model for the state in Western political
thought, from Plato’s Republic (Plato 1991, 140–3 [461d–463e]) to Filmer’s
Patriarcha (Filmer 1991)—but it has long been seen as an anti-model as well.
As John Stuart Mill acidly remarked in The Subjection of Women, “the family is a
school of despotism”:
The law of servitude in marriage is a monstrous contradiction to all the principles of the
modern world, and to all the experience through which those principles have been slowly
and painfully worked out. It is the sole case, now that negro slavery has been abolished, in
which a human being in the plenitude of every faculty is delivered up to the tender
mercies of another human being, in the hope forsooth that this other will use the power
solely for the good of the person subjected to it. Marriage is the only actual bondage
known to our law. There remain no legal slaves, except the mistress of every
house. (1991, 518, 557–8)
This depiction of marriage may seem exaggerated to us, but it is a perfectly
accurate description of the status of married women throughout most of Western
history, including Mill’s nineteenth-century England, and in much of the world
today. The Roman paterfamiliasmodel, in which the male head of household had
absolute power over the persons and possessions of all other family members, be
they wives, children, or servants—including the power of life and death—has
been a persistent influence on family law in the West; though its most extreme
features were gradually curbed by legal reform and custom, the powers of the
male head of household were still immense until relatively recently (Frier and
McGinn 2004). Even in Mill’s England, “all [women’s] rights, all property, as well
as all freedom of action” were transferred to the husband upon marriage; the
husband was deemed as legally responsible for his wife’s actions as “for the acts of
his slaves or of his cattle” and was therefore permitted the use of physical
coercion to discipline his wife or to return her to his household were she to
flee; marital rape was not punishable; wives had no legal rights over their
children; and legal separation, much less divorce, was very difficult to obtain
for the rich and essentially impossible for others (Mill 1991, 503–6).
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The legal status of women, married or unmarried, has obviously improved
tremendously in the last century and a half, especially in the West. Nowhere is
this more evident than in trends in divorce laws. Divorces were rather rare in
Western society before the late nineteenth century, apart from a brief period of
legal liberalization during the French Revolution (Phillips 1988, xiii). Marital exit
for women in abusive (or simply loveless) relationships ranged from very difficult
to impossible depending upon time, place, and economic class. The twentieth
century saw a slowly accelerating liberalization in divorce laws, however, culmin-
ating in the move to no-fault divorce in most Western societies during the 1960s
and 1970s (Phillips 1988, 561–72). Women are now no longer legally trapped in
violent marriages, and their protections within such marriages have also sub-
stantially improved. As a result, domination of wives by husbands has been
sharply curtailed.
Curtailed, but hardly eliminated. First, violence against female partners in the
USA is still high: although such violence (excluding homicides) declined by
71 percent between 1994 and 2011, there were still 4.7 victimizations (involving
simple assault, aggravated assault, robbery, or rape) per 1000 females age twelve
or older in 2011 (Catalano 2013, 1). This violence, as well as the threat of it,
remain an important mechanism of control over married women. Second and
relatedly, the so-called “covenant-marriage” movement has tried, with only
limited success so far, to undercut the universal availability of no-fault divorce
and thereby increase the exit costs and diminish the bargaining power of women
in abusive relationships (Nock et al. 2008). Finally, even where no-fault divorce
endures, the marital-exit right is often merely formal: intimidation by husbands
and the risks of unemployment and poverty (especially for wives with limited
job-market experience and poor prospects for remarriage) may effectively dis-
courage exit and allow abuse to continue, even where there is a legal right to
leave—and the presence of dependent children can make this already difficult
decision still more so.
Against these ongoing opportunities for domestic domination, the repub-
lican tradition has long provided and continues to provide the intellectual
resources for resistance. John Milton, for example, offered one of the earliest
defenses of a form of no-fault divorce on the simple ground of incompatibility
(“unfitness . . . and contrariety of mind”) and in doing so linked marital freedom
to the political kind:
He who marries, intends as little to conspire his own ruin as he that swears allegiance: and
as a whole people is in proportion to an ill government, so is one man to an ill marriage. If
they, against any authority, covenant, or statute, may by the sovereign edict of charity save
not only their lives but honest liberties from unworthy bondage, as well may he against any
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private covenant, which he never entered to his mischief, redeem himself from unsupport-
able disturbances to honest peace and just contentment. (Milton 2010, 99, 370)
As Milton’s language indicates, however, his main concern was the marital
freedom of men who were, like himself, trapped in an “ill marriage” (Phillips
1988, 119–26). Two centuries later, his countryman John Stuart Mill turned his
attention to the plight of women within these marriages; his Subjection delivered
a scathing critique of marital despotism that is republican in spirit if not in letter
(Lovett 2010, 45, 54, 138; Pettit 1997, 139). Mill decries the legal servitude of
wives, who suffer under a masculine power more minute, extreme, and degrading
than that traditionally exercised by slaveowners. He acknowledges that the best
husbands, like the best slaveowners or dictators, will be led by sympathy and
affection to refrain from exercising their absolute power in an abusive fashion
(like Torvald in Ibsen’s A Doll’s House—see Pettit 2014, xiii–xv), but he also
hastens to remind us that:
laws and institutions require to be adapted, not to good men, but to bad. . . . It would be
tiresome to repeat the commonplaces about the unfitness of men in general for power,
which, after the political discussions of centuries, every one knows by heart, were it not
that hardly any one thinks of applying these maxims to the case in which above all others
they are applicable, that of power, not placed in the hands of a man here and there, but
offered to every adult male, down to the basest and most ferocious. (Mill 1991, 507, 509)
The vulnerability of women to such arbitrary marital power, and the need to
curtail it in order to promote freedom as non-domination within households,
continue to motivate republican thinkers to this day (e.g., Lovett 2010, 51, 54 and
Pettit 2012, 115, 158), but unfortunately this has not led them to engage in any
systematic theorizing about it.1 In the present chapter, I will try to fill this gap in
the contemporary republican literature.
I begin by reviewing the details of Pettit’s conception of freedom as non-
domination or antipower, focusing on both his understanding of power and the
institutions he regards as crucial bulwarks against it (Pettit 1996). I then turn in
the succeeding section to marital power versus marital freedom, i.e., those
conditions that facilitate domestic domination and exploitation versus those
that hinder them and, in the limit, even negate them. As we shall see, marital
freedom will require not only formal rights of marital exit but also methodical
efforts to enhance competition in dating and marriage markets, open labor
1 Lovett in fact explicitly says that “I will not discuss . . . the applications of JMD [Justice as
Minimizing Domination] to questions of personal privacy, family, or gender equality” (Lovett 2010,
190). Also, some partial exceptions to my claim of a “gap” in the literature here would include Costa
(2013, 923, 926, 929, 931–2), Laborde (2008, 165–6), and Phillips (2000, 288–90).
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markets to women by underwriting job retraining and fighting employment
discrimination, and resource exit by means of shelters, travel and relocation
vouchers, a basic income, etc. In the penultimate section, I argue that marital
freedom is itself a kind of antipower on Pettit’s own understanding of the term
and then respond to two objections: first, that direct empowerment of women’s
voices within households is to be preferred to indirect empowerment via
enhanced competition and resourced exit; second, that focusing on marital exit
threatens to further erode marriage and exacerbate social atomization. Finally, in
the conclusion I briefly look at the limits of the exit model for both wives and
household dependents (e.g., minor children and the elderly).
Freedom as Antipower
In his seminal essay “Freedom as Antipower,” Pettit contends that “one agent
dominates another if and only if he or she has a certain power over that other: in
particular the power to interfere in the affairs of the other and to inflict a certain
damage” (Pettit 1996, 578 [emphasis added]). More specifically, an agent has
power over another whenever three jointly-sufficient conditions are met, viz.,
when an agent has:
1. “the capacity to interfere
2. with impunity and at will
3. in certain choices that the other is in a position tomake” (Pettit 1996, 578, 581).
Liability to the exercise of such power is what republicans mean by the term
“vulnerability.”2
Let us review these three conditions in order. Pettit takes the “interference” in
“capacity to interfere” to be “a more or less intentional attempt to worsen an
agent’s situation of choice” by means of, for example, coercion or manipulation,
where “context fixes the baseline by reference to which we decide if the effect is
indeed a worsening” (Pettit 1996, 578–9). To interfere in this sense “with impun-
ity” is to do so without “penalty,” be it resistance by the victim, punishment by
2 See, for example, Pettit’s use of this term (1997, 5, 122–5, 145). Vulnerability in this technical
sense should not be confused with vulnerability more generally. For instance, the fact that certain
coastal residents might be vulnerable to hurricanes does not necessarily imply that they are vulnerable
in the republican sense—unless the first kind of vulnerability creates the second (e.g., their distress
after a hurricane makes them vulnerable to monopolistic pricing). Relatedly, I will maintain in
Chapter 3 that the fact that workers may be vulnerable to firing without cause does not necessarily
imply that they are vulnerable in the republican sense—unless they work within non-competitive labor
markets produced by employer collusion, the absence of affordable exit options, etc.
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some external authority, etc. (Pettit 1996, 580). To interfere “at will” is to do so “at
[one’s] own pleasure . . . [or] whim”; in other words, the interferer has the neces-
sary “discretion” to act as he or she chooses (Pettit 1996, 580, 587). Such a capacity
to interfere with impunity and at will, when “fully realized,” “amounts to an
absolutely arbitrary power” (Pettit 1996, 580). Finally, this capacity for arbitrary
interference will “vary in extent as well as in intensity,” i.e., it will differ by domain
(e.g., household, economy, government) and by degree (Pettit 1996, 581). Pettit
refers to all of this as the “procedural sense” of power (Pettit 1997, 55). This
procedural sense is later supplemented by a substantive one, viz., that what (also)
characterizes arbitrary interference is a failure to “track the interests and ideas of
the person suffering interference”; therefore, Ulysses’ sailors are not interfering
arbitrarily with himwhen they tie him to themast, because by doing so they “track
[his] interests and ideas.”3
In order to secure freedom as non-domination, we must seek immunity from
such power, i.e., antipower, by means of three related strategies. First, “we may
compensate for imbalances by giving the powerless protection against the
resources of the powerful” (Pettit 1996, 589). The most important institution
for doing so will be a “nonvoluntaristic rule of law,” in which laws must meet
criteria of “generality, transparency, nonretroactivity, and coherence,” so that no
individual or group can use the law manipulatively as a means to dominate others
(Pettit 1996, 590). Second, we might counter power “by regulating the use that
the powerful make of their resources,” whether in the spheres of family, market
(e.g., policy measures “against monopoly power”), or state (e.g., “limitation of
tenure, rotation of office, separation of powers”) (Pettit 1996, 589–91). Last, we
may compensate “by giving the powerless new, empowering resources of their
own,” including particular “welfare-state initiatives” (e.g., “universal education . . .
social security, medical care, accident insurance”) (Pettit 1996, 591–2). He con-
cludes by observing that these three categories of measures can and often do take
informal, non-state forms, including the pressures applied by various social,
economic, and political movements “and even competitive market forces” (Pettit
1996, 592). Although he mentions competitive markets merely in passing here,
I will argue in this chapter as well as the next two that encouraging effective
competition in marriage markets, labor markets, and even locational markets can
counter the dominating effects of marital, market, and political power, respectively.
3 Pettit 1997, 55; cf. 184. Pettit describes this elsewhere as a failure to “track the interests I am
disposed to avow” (Pettit 2006b, 135–6). Analogously, he states that arbitrary interference by the
state fails to track “the welfare and world-view of the public” (Pettit 1997, 56).
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Marital Power versus Marital Freedom
As I noted in the introduction, the power of husbands over wives was enormous
for much of Western history, coming shockingly close to Pettit’s “absolutely
arbitrary power” (1996, 580). Consider, for example, domestic violence.
Roderick Phillips, in his magisterial history of divorce in Western society,
points out that the Roman law “had originally given the husband the right to
kill his wife if she committed certain offenses, notably adultery”; in fact, as late
as 1907, French law “permitted a husband to kill his wife with impunity if he did
so on discovering her in the act of adultery” (1988, 324). In general, however, by
the early-modern period:
a husband no longer had the right to kill his wife, but his position as her superior did
endow him with the right, indeed the duty, to chastise or punish her using physical means.
In part this right was justified in terms of the legal obligations borne by the husband to
answer for his wife’s actions; because he was thus personally responsible for her misdeeds,
it was considered reasonable that he should have the right to control her behavior and to
repress her when necessary. . . . The notion of “moderate correction” developed, permit-
ting a husband to beat or otherwise physically chastise his wife “moderately,” as distinct
from excessively. Lethal weapons were ruled out, and a rule developed to the effect that if a
stick or rod were used, that it should be no thicker than a man’s thumb. (This is the origin
of the term “rule of thumb.”) (Phillips 1988, 324–5)
Not until the nineteenth century did Western nations begin to forbid such
“moderate correction,” and even at that time Mill remarked that “the vilest
malefactor has some wretched woman tied to him, against whom he can commit
any atrocity except killing her, and, if tolerably cautious, can do that without
much danger of the legal penalty” (Phillips 1988, 330–44; Mill 1991, 508). Given
this legal liability to moderate correction, in which wives could be corporally
punished by their husbands at will within loosely enforced limits, wives’ legal
liabilities in many other areas—for example, regarding property, children, and
so forth—are hardly surprising. They were effectively treated as minors by the
law until the twentieth century, in the custody of their husband-masters and
consequently subject to their every whim.
Given these aspects of the sexual contract, we may wonder why women
entered and then stayed in such relationships. At least in part, the answer was
a lack of options, be they economic or legal. First, women were exposed to formal
and informal labor-market discrimination, which severely limited their employ-
ment options and ensured continuing dependence on their fathers or husbands;
discrimination was usually even more extreme for married women, who were
assumed to have duties within their households that were inconsistent with
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employment (Lovett 2010, 54). For instance, labor-force participation for all
US women in 1890 was only 18 percent, and for married women it was a paltry
5 percent; for comparison, the female labor-force participation rate in Jordan is
now 15 percent, one of the lowest in the world (Phillips 1988, 615; World Bank
2014). Thus, the only real alternative to a poor, childless spinsterhood with heavy
if not complete financial dependence on the father was marital despotism,
entered with hope that the husband’s arbitrary power would be gently exercised
(Pateman 1988). Second and relatedly, only in the late nineteenth century did
rudimentary welfare states begin to emerge in the West, and not until well into
the twentieth did women in most Western countries have welfare support as a
potential alternative to dependence on fathers and husbands; of course, such
dependence on the welfare state created its own risks of domination and exploit-
ation (Brown 1995; Noble 1997). Third, as discussed earlier, divorce was very
difficult or even impossible to obtain for most of Western history; only in the past
century has no-fault divorce become the Western norm, giving women at least
the legal means of escape from abusive (or simply loveless) marriages (Phillips
1988, xiii, 561–72). Fourth, even if divorce had been obtainable, divorced wives
would until fairly recently have had no rights to alimony, community property,
or even their own children, so divorce would have meant the abandonment of
both their financial security and their progeny (Phillips 1988, 628). Last but not
least, for most of Western history women have been socialized to think that
marriage and motherhood are their highest callings in life, making exit from a
specific sexual contract or from the sexual contract in general a harrowing choice
(Mill 1991, 493–501; Pateman 1988).
The contemporary Western world is obviously a very different place now for
women, be they married or unmarried. A revolution has occurred in the realms
of occupation and education: in the United States, for example, women are now
the majority in managerial, professional, and related occupations, and they
receive approximately half of all law and medical degrees and the majority of
university degrees in general, from associate to doctoral degrees; there has even
been a convergence in earnings, and most of the gap that remains is better
explained by the structural features of certain kinds of jobs (viz., inflexible
hours and non-linearity of earnings with respect to time worked) than crude
employment discrimination (Goldin 2014). Welfare states have been founded
and expanded, divorce laws have been fully liberalized, and the aftermath of
divorce has been made much fairer in terms of support payments, property
division, and child custody. Even women’s socialization has undergone dramatic
change thanks to feminism, with career becoming co-equal with marriage and
motherhood (Goldin 2006). All of these changes have put women in a much
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better position to postpone marriage, to reshape its internal culture, and to exit it
when it no longer serves their needs.
In the wake of all this progress, however, there is a risk of complacency. As
I noted in the introduction, partner violence against women remains a problem,
despite dramatic improvements in the past two decades. Additionally, residual
labor-market discrimination and the still-gendered household division of labor
(e.g., on a typical day in 2013, only 19 percent of US men did housework,
compared to 49 percent of women [Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014, 2]) suggest
that at both work and home, men collectively retain certain historical privileges
and powers. Such inequalities continue to put women at a disadvantage in
entering, negotiating, and exiting marriages, and to the extent this is true, wives
are still vulnerable to domination and exploitation by their husbands. Marital
power remains a pressing social problem, in short, and we must seek solutions to
it if we hope to advance marital freedom.
The principal means of defense against such domination and exploitation is
still marital exit. As Pettit, abridging Milton, tells us, “marriage could be free only
if divorce was possible: that is, only if there was a possibility of release from the
marriage bond—and from subjection to the rights and powers of a spouse—in
the event of estrangement between the two parties” (Pettit 2012, 158). Recall
Hirschman’s second thesis: voice is most effective when it carries a threat (be it
implicit or explicit) to impose a cost, and exit is the key thing that makes such
threats credible, especially when it is properly resourced and therefore feasible. In
other words, exit can empower voice by lowering its threshold for efficacy and
thereby encouraging it. If a husband knows that his wife can exit the marriage, he
is much more likely to listen to her complaints and modify his behavior—but if
so, that makes her voice more effective and consequently more likely to be put to
use. The shift to no-fault divorce throughout the West during the 1960s and
1970s amplified women’s voices by giving them a right to end their marriages
unilaterally by simply leaving their husbands and living separately for a min-
imum specified period; they were no longer required to prove marital miscon-
duct, such as adultery or cruelty, to receive a divorce (Phillips 1988, 560–5). This
abandonment of moralistic divorce policies and the simultaneous transfer of
divorce powers from church and state to spouses themselves helped to liberate
married women, who now had the ability to either exit unhappy marriages or
credibly threaten to do so, thereby strengthening their voices within marriage as
well as promoting overdue changes in marital culture.
These revolutionary changes to divorce laws were accompanied by a dramatic
increase in the US divorce rate, which rose from 2.2 divorces per 1000 population
in 1960 to a peak of 5.2 in 1980, then fell back to 3.4 in 2009; a bit fewer than half
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of all marriages now end in divorce in the USA (Amato 2010, 651). The reasons
for this increase remain in dispute, though there is an emerging consensus that
no-fault divorce was a cause, but not a major one, and that its effect has faded
with time (Allen and Gallagher 2007, 1). Despite this, a worrying backlash against
no-fault divorce has occurred among numerous evangelicals, Catholics, and even
feminists. For example, when New York became the last American state to adopt
no-fault divorce in 2010, the opposition to it included not just the Catholic
Church but the state chapter of the National Organization for Women (Pappas
2010). I will address the concerns of feminists and religious conservatives about
no-fault divorce later in the chapter, but for the time being I want to focus on a
policy innovation at the state level that has been strongly supported by religious
conservatives: covenant marriage. Covenant-marriage legislation was adopted by
Louisiana in 1997, Arizona in 1998, and Arkansas in 2001, though its progress
has since stalled. Covenant marriages are a return to an older model of marriage
and divorce, but they now exist side-by-side with contemporary models of
marriage that retain no-fault divorce. In Louisiana, for example, couples may
choose a covenant marriage characterized by premarital and marital counseling
requirements as well as a higher threshold for obtaining a divorce, viz., either
fault (e.g., adultery, abandonment, and physical or sexual abuse) or a two-year
separation (as opposed to the six-month separation required in a standard
marriage) (Nock et al. 2008). The worry here is that, by increasing exit costs,
covenant marriage will silence women’s voices, especially in already unequal
relationships. Early studies of these marriages are not encouraging on this
score: covenant marriages are more likely to be characterized by gender domin-
ance and subordination than standard marriages, for example, although this may
largely be the result of self-selection by gender traditionalists into covenant
marriage (Baker et al. 2009). If we are interested in preserving marital freedom,
our first task should be to avoid policy changes such as this one, which runs the
risk of making already vulnerable women even more so.4
Even if no-fault divorce is, as I have argued, the most important means to
counter marital power, it is far from being a sufficient means, and it might in
some situations increase women’s vulnerability, which may explain some of the
feminist opposition to it. If the right to marital exit is merely formal and can be
unilaterally exercised by either spouse, then it may redound at times to the benefit
4 Even policy changes that may seem only tangentially related to power relations within marriage,
such as restricting access to birth control and abortion, are likely to disadvantage wives: if such
restrictions make it more probable that they will have unplanned pregnancies, then given the
burdens of pregnancy and early motherhood and the associated vulnerabilities both physical and
psychic, they are likely to become more dependent upon their husbands as a result.
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of abusive husbands, who could threaten to leave their dependent wives in
penury at a moment’s notice, thereby gaining enormous bargaining power within
their marriages. There is some evidence, in fact, that stay-at-home mothers were
especially disadvantaged by the shift to no-fault divorce (Grossbard-Shechtman
1995, 94–5; cf. Pappas 2010). The problem we face here is the same one described
in Chapter 1: non-monotonicity in the relationship between exit costs and the
welfare of the least advantaged. The welfare of dependent wives might at first
decrease, and only later increase, as exit costs fall; that is, the move from an
effectively no-exit world to a partial-exit one may hurt dependent wives, even if a
further move to a free-exit world would help them. The solution is also the same
as Chapter 1’s: shifting from a merely formal right of marital exit to a substantive
one, which would empower the voices even of dependent wives.5 In order to
accomplish this, we must not only promote competition in both labor and dating/
marital markets but also resource marital exit by means of various government
services and income transfers.
Consider first how stoking competition in various kinds of markets would
lower marital exit costs. As we discussed earlier on, gender discrimination in
labor markets can trap women in abusive marriages. Great progress has been
made on this front, but there is much left to do. For example, recent structural
changes in some professionals’ work (e.g., pharmacists, veterinarians, pediatri-
cians) towards increasing flexibility and greater linearity of earnings with respect
to time worked have disproportionately benefited women and helped close the
wage gap. These changes have been driven in part by economies of scale and
pressures to reduce labor costs, but they have also occurred due to employee
pressure (Goldin 2014, 1116–18). This evolution of the workplace could be
catalyzed by steering government contracts to firms with more flexible work
schedules, for example. Doing so would further diminish the wage gap and
therefore improve the prospects of currently dependent wives who are consider-
ing marital exit.
Enhancing competition in dating and marital markets themselves may be as
important, if not more so, than enhancing it in labor markets, especially for
dependent wives with little work experience. Consider the case of women within
insular ethnic and religious minorities who have been socialized from an early
age to marry within their communities, who face internal marriage “markets”
5 Rawls argues in a similar vein that in order to preserve the worth of the basic liberties (and
defend them against the charge of “radical democrats and socialists” that they are “merely formal”),
we must extend adequate material means for their exercise to all, including especially the least
advantaged (1993, 324–31).
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that are rigged against them, and who may be subject to emotional and even
physical coercion when choosing marriage partners. As Susan Okin has claimed,
multiculturalism may be bad for women, especially if it means insulating such
groups from liberal-rights enforcement and public education (Okin 1999). On
the other hand, efforts to open up such internal marital markets may fall afoul of
important associational rights guaranteed to all citizens, rights that may help to
protect minority groups and their members from other forms of domination
(e.g., domination by the majority or by other, more powerful minorities). Fortu-
nately, there are available policies that not only respect such equal associational
rights but also safeguard “minorities within minorities” (Eisenberg and Spinner-
Halev 2005). For example, reasonable requirements for civic education during
childhood can inform these women of their rights and make them aware of the
existence of, and the opportunities in, the larger society (Rawls 1993, 199–200);
additionally, the kinds of government services and income transfers discussed
below can limit coercion and offer means of escape. The challenges that insularity
and gender traditionalism pose for such dependent women have decreased over
time thanks to better education and law enforcement and to the tools made
available by the Internet (including dating sites such as Match.com and eHar-
mony, which can be secretly and therefore safely accessed), but more can be done
to provide these women a broader array of options, marital and otherwise.
In addition to advancing market competition, states can resource exit by
delivering both essential services and income transfers. First, given the ongoing
problem of partner violence, it is essential that the government protect women
from physical coercion, whether through the use of restraining orders and police
protection or by financing women’s shelters; without these services, exit may be
too dangerous for them (Pettit 2012, 115). Second, in the aftermath of divorce,
states must ensure a fair division of property and future income by enforcing
alimony and child-support payments and by instituting “community-property”
rules (including, perhaps, the 50/50 division required by California law); both
would help protect the financial interests of stay-at-home wives who by forgoing
employment limit their labor-market options and put themselves at a bargaining
disadvantage vis-à-vis their working spouses (Phillips 1988, 628; cf. Pappas
2010). Third, states could offer vouchers specifically designed to enhance exit
options, whether indirectly (e.g., ones for job retraining or vocational education
more generally) or directly (e.g., ones for travel and/or relocation, which will have
the side benefit of sustaining market and political freedoms, too—see Chapters 3
and 4). Finally, states could guarantee conditional or unconditional basic
incomes to allow dependent women with minimal job-market experience to
support themselves, at least for a while, without working (Lovett 2010, 199–203;
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Pettit 2007). All of these measures, both resource and competition related, can
operate together to make marital exit a feasible option for dependent wives.
Without them, the liberating potential of no-fault divorce will remain under-
developed for the most vulnerable class of married women.
Marital Freedom as Antipower
As I have indicated from time to time in this chapter, state efforts to promote
competition and resource exit are essential for creating vibrant marriage markets,
i.e., markets for spouses. If the state recognizes a formal right of marital exit but
does nothing to liberalize labor and dating markets or assist vulnerable women
with support services and income transfers, then dependent wives will be
excluded from the usual benefits of competitive markets: here, the effective ability
to pick and choose among a variety of potential partners and to exit relationships
and reenter the spousal marketplace if and when those relationships prove
unsatisfactory. Such marital freedom contrasts with the marital power that
characterized the rigged, monopsonistic marital markets of the past, where
masculine collusion—abetted by church and state—placed women at a dangerous
disadvantage, limiting their options and enabling their subordination and
exploitation. Tragically, such cartel-like behavior continues today both in trad-
itional societies and in certain insular ethnic and religious minorities within
liberal immigrant nations, and as the drive for covenant marriage makes clear,
there are some religious conservatives who would like to reestablish patriarchy,
this time masked by the pretense of marital pluralism.
Although I will have more to say in Chapter 3 about the domination-curtailing
effects of competitive markets in general, for the time being I want to emphasize
the ways that competitive marital markets in particular have this effect. In fact,
such markets are antipower in Pettit’s exact sense: specifically, their participants
have no ability to interfere at will and with impunity in the choices of the other
participants (Pettit 1996, 578, 581). They have no ability to interfere at will
because the ready availability of attractive alternatives (e.g., other spouses, or
independent living underwritten by gainful employment) narrowly confines this
interference: once-dependent wives now have many options, permitting them to
credibly threaten exit; husbands, aware of this fact, must show restraint and
consideration—and if they fail to do so, they will bear the costs of their wives’
exit, which is proof that they can no longer interfere with impunity. These
characteristics of competitive marriage markets make them antipower not just
in Pettit’s procedural sense but in his substantive sense as well: such markets
maximize “not the gain from marriage compared to remaining single for any
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particular marriage, but the average gain across all marriages,” thereby “tracking
the interests” of market participants in one important way (Becker 1973, 824–5).
This efficiency property of marriage markets hinges, of course, on a host of
conditions (including full information, the absence of collusion, etc.), which
explains why a republican state that prioritizes the interests of its most vulnerable
citizens must work diligently to maintain them (Becker 1993).
Given the challenge of preserving these conditions, though, we may wonder
whether the indirect empowerment of women’s voices through enhanced com-
petition and resourced exit will be sufficient to prevent domination. For example,
despite the advances of the last several decades in women’s capacity to exit
abusive marriages, domestic violence continues to be a serious social problem,
prompting feminists and other activists to criticize the police for being too
reluctant to intervene in domestic disputes. The 1994 Violence Against Women
Act was enacted in response to such concerns; among other things, it encouraged
states to adopt mandatory arrest policies that allow cases against domestic
abusers to move forward in the courts even without the cooperation of victims
(Cho and Wilke 2005). These policies are an example of what I called the
“regulation option” in Chapter 1: direct empowerment of women’s voices by
means of state supervision and regulation of households, in this case triggered
by complaints of domestic violence. The efficacy of the VAWA has been ques-
tioned by some, however (e.g., Koss 2000), and the 71 percent decline in intimate
partner violence between 1994 and 2011 may simply track the overall decline in
violent crime over the same period—or even be the result of increasingly credible
threats of marital exit, which may have stayed the hands of potential abusers
(Catalano 2013, 1). Still, few would deny any role whatsoever to direct empower-
ment. Even Frank Lovett, who is highly skeptical of state regulation of social
relationships as a solution to domination, acknowledges that it may well be
appropriate in cases of “gross abuse” like this one (Lovett 2009, 825–6). The
more vital question, however, is whether it can serve as a general solution to the
problem of marital domination, i.e., one that can mostly or even entirely replace
indirect empowerment via enhanced competition and resourced exit, and here
there is reason for doubt.
Consider first the regulation route for direct empowerment of women’s voices
within the household. Through direct supervision and regulation, the state could
try to counter the power of domineering husbands; one might imagine “marital
regulators” carrying out this task, somewhat akin to the social workers employed
by child protective services to perform household visits and check on the welfare
of mistreated minors. Though such an approach might raise few objections as a
temporary response to documented cases of domestic violence, as a more general
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solution to household domination it will likely prompt concerns about both
privacy and paternalism. Family privacy is an essential condition for creating
intimacy and trust within the family and cultivating a rich internal culture, be it
religious or secular (Peterman and Jones 2003); it is hard to imagine reconciling
such privacy with the pervasive presence of marital regulators. As for paternal-
ism, genuinely voluntary forms of domination among consenting adults, whether
S&M or religiously motivated (but reflectively endorsed) gender traditionalism,
ought to remain beyond the purview of state regulation, however uncomfortable
they may make us. Again, it is tough to conceive how marital regulators would be
able to show enough discernment to reliably distinguish between the voluntary
and involuntary varieties of domination. Better to rely upon the indirect
empowerment of enhanced competition and resourced exit—and to refuse to
enforce marital contracts that are likely to trap unwilling partners, such as
covenant marriage. With such policies in place, we can safely regard any dom-
inating relationships as voluntary and therefore reject marital regulators as a
paternalistic state intervention into the household.
Even if we set aside these worries about privacy and paternalism, however, we
would still have good republican reasons to be suspicious of the idea of marital
regulators. Remember that a republican state is tasked with minimizing total
domination, be it private or public in nature, but the regulatory approach to
direct empowerment would simply substitute the public domination of marital
regulators for the private domination of abusive spouses. Because the powers of
marital regulators will conflict with the interests of domineering husbands,
households will have to be carefully monitored to ensure compliance. Regulators
will therefore need broad powers to assess (via surprise inspections and video
surveillance, say) and redress (by fines, jail time, or maybe just new or modified
rules) the spousal abuse that silences women’s voices. But such powers run the
risk of increasing total domination, because dominating husbands will now be
exposed to the same kind of arbitrary power they exercise over their own wives:
marital regulators, given their wide remit to stop abuse, must be granted discre-
tionary powers of a sort that can themselves be readily abused, especially given
the complexity of their regulatory task and the limited ability of other state
authorities to provide effective oversight due to that complexity. Regulators
might use these powers to demand bribes from husbands in return for leniency
or even to harass them as part of personal or ideological vendettas. Again, public
domination does not require that these marital regulators actually abuse their
positions—they may, in fact, be highly conscientious—but only requires that they
have the ability to abuse, which they will certainly have given their broad powers
of monitoring and enforcement.
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These speculations about marital regulators may seem weirdly dystopian, like
something out of the pages of Orwell or Zamyatin, but in fact they were
perfectly common in medieval and early modern Europe: church officials,
Catholic and Protestant alike, monitored and regulated the marital affairs of
their congregants, with punishments ranging from excommunication to fines
or even jail. Although officials did pay some attention to the welfare of vulner-
able wives (including limited efforts to curb extreme marital violence—see
Phillips 1988, 323–30), their primary focus was enforcing couples’ obedience
to the laws of church and state. For example, many legal codes at the time
required married people to live together; if violations came to light, excommu-
nication by the church or prosecution by the courts might result. Local church
authorities were frequently called upon by superiors to monitor their congre-
gants and report any failures to cohabit (Phillips 1988, 283–4). Even liberal
Protestant reformers like Martin Bucer assumed that churches would play a
central role in enforcing rules of conduct within marriage and admonishing
violators, with the recalcitrant ones being handed over to civil courts (Phillips
1988, 71). Granted, most of these interventions had nothing to do with repub-
lican concerns regarding domination; in fact, many of them were intended to
strengthen domination, be it of husbands over wives or of church and state over
married couples. They nonetheless illustrate the dangers of handing wide
regulatory powers over marriage to officialdom.6
Turning now to the participation option, we can see the same logic at work,
leading to the same dangers. The democratic state can demand that domineering
husbands include their wives in their decision-making processes, but because
such inclusion is contrary to their interests, the state will again have to give
regulators the necessary discretionary powers to monitor, assess, and redress
spousal non-compliance. As we have just seen, though, such monitoring and
enforcement powers can be abused by regulators, threatening an increase in total
domination. Even if marital regulators stopped well short of requiring internal
household democracy—for instance, they only required that husbands follow
particular procedures before making important decisions, such as a waiting
period prior to buying a house—the same concerns would arise. Again, state
provision of resources to empower dependent wives offers a safer way to protect
them from their domineering husbands than monitoring and enforcement efforts
by marital regulators. Direct empowerment by state regulation is best limited to
6 For a witty but frightening literary examination of clerical control over family life, see Kingsley
Amis’s alternate-history novel The Alteration (Amis 2013), in which Martin Luther becomes pope
and religious authoritarianism has all of Europe in its grip.
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extreme cases of abuse or to situations in which rational agency has been
compromised in some way, a point to which I will return in the conclusion.7
Even if indirect empowerment is better than the direct kind at curtailing total
dominationwithinmarriages, wemay still worry about its side effects: domination is
just one amongst many social evils, after all, and ameliorating it may exacerbate
others. Religious conservatives are not alone, for instance, in their fear of family
breakdown and social atomization more generally, and as we saw earlier on, they
suspect that the very reforms that have eased marital exit over the past several
decades havemade these societal ills worse and that their principal victims have been
the children of broken marriages. The evidence for this claim is fairly weak—as
I noted earlier, there is an emerging consensus that no-fault divorce was a cause, but
not a major one, of the increase in divorce rates and that its effect has faded of late
(Allen and Gallagher 2007, 1)—but given the devastating costs of these ills, perhaps
further efforts to enhance competition and resource exit in this domain are too risky.
A republican might be tempted to reply here that, given the unique evil of
domination, we just have to accept these costs, however regretfully. I think a
better reply, though, is that insofar as greater ease of marital exit has been a cause
of these ills, this is due to an insufficient reduction in exit costs. The notion that
doubling down on exit can simultaneously diminish domination and enhance
social cohesion may seem outlandish, but consider the following: since the
divorce peak of 1980, the divorce rate for college-educated women has not only
been consistently lower than that for their non-college-educated peers but
increasingly so—a somewhat surprising fact, given that their marital-exit costs
should be lower due to better employment and spousal prospects and greater
mobility (Isen and Stevenson 2010). There are a number of possible explanations
for this result, including selection effects (maybe the characteristics that make
one more likely to finish a college degree also make one less likely to divorce) and
the fact that college-educated women search longer for a spouse, improving
matching. I strongly suspect that there is another factor at work here, though: a
more egalitarian marriage culture among the educated, one that has resulted in
part from credible threats of exit by educated wives with ever-increasing bargaining
7 I will pass over the third, privatization option in the main text, though I do want to mention
here the possibility that women might act jointly, formally or informally, to counter masculine
collusion. For instance, consider the Japanese phenomenon of so-called “parasite singles” (parasaito
shinguru), especially young women, who continue to live at home with their parents while they hold
down jobs, indulge in consumerism, and postpone marriage and childbirth (Lunsing 2003). One
might view this as an informal but collective response to the continued patriarchal nature of the
Japanese family, in which wives are expected to quit their jobs upon giving birth to take care of
children and elderly parents. It might also give us a partial explanation for why Japan has one of the
world’s lowest fertility rates (Central Intelligence Agency 2014).
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power. As I argued in Chapter 1, if the threat of exit is credible and the abusive
parties therefore yield, the threat will not have to be exercised, i.e., no exit will
occur, and this can be true even if the threat is entirely implicit, a background
condition created by the shifting advantages and disadvantages of the partici-
pants. Ever-lower exit costs for educated women have allowed them to redefine
the culture of elite marriage, forcing men to accept relationships built on equality
and mutual respect and stabilizing their marriages in the process.8
There is no reason for such beneficial changes to continue to be limited to
those of higher socioeconomic status, however. By enhancing competition and
resourcing exit for less-educated dependent wives, we can put them in a position
to bargain for better marital conditions. Even if a largely formal marital freedom
has made them vulnerable to divorce threats by abusive husbands and even
dissuaded others from marrying at all, leaving intact an inegalitarian marital
subculture, a more substantive marital freedom could help spread elite-marriage
values throughout the entire society.9 If this were to happen, we might have
reason to hope that Montaigne’s idealized portrait of Roman marriage could
actually be realized in our own society:
We thought we were tying our marriage-knots more tightly by removing all means of
undoing them; but the tighter we pulled the knot of constraint the looser and slacker
became the knot of our will and affection. In Rome, on the contrary, what made marriages
honoured and secure for so long a period was freedom to break them at will. Men loved
their wives more because they could lose them; and during a period when anyone
was quite free to divorce, more than five hundred years went by before a single one
did so. (Montaigne 1993, 698)
The Limits and Potential of Marital Freedom
I have argued in this chapter that the indirect empowerment of women’s voices
through greater competition and resourced exit in marriage and labor markets is
the safest, most effective way to check the arbitrary exercise of power within the
family, i.e., marital freedom is antipower in the domestic sphere. As I indicated
above, though, there are circumstances in which this mode of protection will
8 Some evidence for this process at work is provided by a recent Pew Research Center report. In
1965, for example, wives did four times as much child care, eight times as much housework, and less
than one-fifth as much paid work as their husbands, working a total of two hours per week more
than they did; by 2011, they were doing only twice as much child care, 80 percent more housework,
and a bit over half as much paid work, working a total of one hour per week less than they did
(Pew Research Center 2013, 1). Such convergence is even more striking within elite marriages.
9 This kind of top-down cultural diffusion has occurred in numerous other historical contexts:
see, for example, Elias 1983 and Clark 2007.
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prove inadequate. For example, when wives have been subjected to systematic
psychological, physical, and/or sexual abuse, their rational agency may be com-
promised (Walker 2006). Because marital freedom presumes such agency—
without it, wives will lack the ability to hold their husbands accountable and
defend their own interests through voice or exit—alternative means will have to
be found to protect them, including monitoring of households and the kind of
mandatory-arrest policies encouraged by the 1994 Violence Against Women Act
(Cho and Wilke 2005). In the end, we may be unable to avoid augmenting
indirect empowerment with the direct kind when abuse becomes severe enough
to threaten women’s agential capacities.10
I should also concede the difficulty, or even the impossibility, of extending my
preferred approach to household dependents, including minor children and even
elderly parents. Children will generally lack the rational agency that is needed to
exercise exit responsibly, though as they approach majority they may be able to
exit via emancipation by the courts; in their earlier years, exit will be possible only
through a transfer of custody, whether initiated by the parents or state author-
ities. As a result, they will have to rely upon the moral constraints governing their
parents’ behavior and the legal interventions of the state in extremis (e.g., in cases
of neglect or violence) to escape the arbitrary exercise of parental authority
(Ferejohn 2001, 82). For dependent elderly parents, the situation is far more
complex. If they are mentally incompetent, their condition may resemble that of
minor children. If they are mentally competent, on the other hand, exit may be a
real option, especially when alternatives are abundant (e.g., other relatives, elder-
care facilities) and exit is financially viable due to private savings or state aid;
again, effective competition and resourced exit are key here. When these condi-
tions are absent, though, direct empowerment may be required, whether in the
form of the regulation option (monitoring and supervision by relevant state
authorities) or the participation option (e.g., enforcing the rights of the elderly
to have some say in particular aspects of their care). Whether marital freedom
can become a model for familial freedom more broadly, then, is doubtful:
protecting household dependents from domination will frequently require direct
empowerment of voice in one form or another.11
10 Might patriarchal subcultures similarly degrade their agential capacities? Such false-
consciousness claims usually smack of paternalism, and as I argued earlier, many attractive
alternatives to the regulation option are available here.
11 Domination of dependents can be surprisingly indirect. For example, failure to take proper
account of the interests of future generations when we deliberate about government deficits or
environmental preservation might constitute a kind of intergenerational domination: see Bohman
2011 on this point.
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As I will argue in the following chapters, however, marital freedom can serve as
a model in many other contexts. Whether we consider the domination of workers
by abusive managers or that of businesses by corrupt regulators and politicians,
the kinds of policy instruments that were used to limit marital power through
resourced exit and enhanced competition can also be used to limit market and
political power. Marital freedom, in short, can act as a template for both market
and political freedoms—and by doing so, it can offer a fresh approach to
combating domination, one that is less dependent on social-democratic inter-
ventions than on empowered choice and free mobility in labor and locational
markets. As we shall see, JohnMilton’s divorcive conception of freedom promises
us liberation well beyond the domestic sphere.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 12/12/2016, SPi
FAMILY 
Comp. by: Vasanthi Stage : Revises1 ChapterID: 0002886572 Date:12/12/16
Time:06:18:04 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0002886572.3D
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 46
3
Market
Republicanism, though characterized throughout its history by certain core
beliefs and anxieties (e.g., an emphasis on active citizenship, a commitment to
the separation of powers and the rule of law, and an ongoing concern with
political venality), has been a diverse political tradition, especially in its assess-
ment of commercial society. Consider, for instance, the near-contemporary
republican authors Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Smith.1 Rousseau wrote
approvingly of the ancient Romans’ “contempt for commerce” and condemned
“pecuniary interest” as “the worst of all [interests], the vilest, the most liable to
corruption” (Rousseau 1997, 131, 226). His hostility to a monetized economy
with its complex division of labor even extended to tax payments as a substitute
for corvées:
It is the hustle and bustle of commerce and the arts, it is the avid interest in gain, it is
softness and love of comforts that change personal services [to the state] into money. One
gives up a portion of one’s profit in order to increase it at leisure. Give money, and soon
you will have chains. The word finance is a slave’s word. . . . In a truly free State the citizens
will do everything with their hands and nothing with money: Far from paying to be
exempted from their duties, they would pay to fulfill it themselves. (Rousseau 1997, 113)
Smith, by contrast, was not particularly disturbed by the fact that “it is not from
the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our
dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. . . . As it is by treaty, by barter,
and by purchase, that we obtain from one another the greater part of those
mutual good offices which we stand in need of, so it is this same trucking
disposition which originally gives occasion to the division of labor” (Smith
1 See Hanley (2008) and Rasmussen (2008) for a more systematic comparison of these two
thinkers on the topic of commercial society and Rousselière (2016) on Rousseau’s specific views. For
a broader history of republicanism’s conflicted attitude towards markets, see MacGilvray (2011).
Last, I should note that Pettit himself seems to question Rousseau’s republican credentials: “to those
in the older republican tradition—for example, to Machiavelli or to Harrington—Rousseau’s vision
would have appeared to celebrate a form of dependency on the will of the corporate whole—in effect,
the will of the majority—at odds with a vision of freedom as non-domination” (2014, 12).
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1981, 26–7 [I.ii.2–3]). Far from regarding the “hustle and bustle of commerce” as
slavery’s prelude, he saw competitive markets as a source of liberation from
feudal dependence: the modern “tradesman or artificer,” he pointed out, “derives
his subsistence from the employment, not of one, but of a hundred or a thousand
different customers. Though in some measure obliged to them all, therefore, he is
not absolutely dependent upon any one of them” (Smith 1981, 420 [III.iv.12];
Herzog 2016, 55–7). Whereas Rousseau saw the market order as a deadly threat
to republican values, Smith viewed it as an essential tool for their realization.
The recent revival of the republican political tradition raises anew this debated
question of how republicans should regard the market economy. Critics of this
revivalist republicanism, such as Gerald Gaus, have insisted that it is “profoundly
antimarket. . . . [In it,] the market is almost totally delegitimized” (Gaus 2003, 68),
in effect pegging Pettit and other neo-republicans as Rousseauean enemies of
commercial society. According to Gaus, Pettit believes that “markets are always a
clear threat to [republican] freedom” because:
unless checked . . . differential success at accumulating resources always involves domin-
ation. The wealthy always could use their resources to dominate others. Indeed, for Pettit
all market competition is a form of interference—“I interfere with you if I destroy your
custom by deliberately undercutting your prices.” Thus, an entrepreneur who could
destroy his rivals’ custom by cutting prices appears to dominate his competition. (Gaus
2003, 68–9)2
If all that is required to dominate others is simply the potential to interfere, Gaus
suggests, then republican opposition to market competition and the economic
inequalities that frequently result from it is assured.
Republicans such as Richard Dagger and Pettit himself have firmly pushed
back against this characterization. Dagger, for example, notes that “the ability to
engage in free exchanges in the marketplace enables people to be self-governing,”
a republican desideratum (Dagger 2006, 158). For his part, Pettit approvingly
mentions Adam Smith’s belief that “far from threatening republican freedom, the
market could reduce dependency and domination” (Pettit 2006b, 142). This
being said, republican support for markets can at times have a half-hearted
quality to it. Dagger grudgingly concedes that there is “at least . . . nothing
immoral” about free exchange and that “markets are fine in their place,” but he
simultaneously emphasizes the need to “protect communities against the ravages
2 The internal quote is from Pettit 1997, 54. Pettit indicates in the very same paragraph that such
interference may be “morally impeccable,” and as we shall see shortly, he later argues that under
competitive conditions, at least, such undercutting does not count as “arbitrary interference,” the
republican summum malum (Pettit 1997, 205).
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 12/12/2016, SPi
MARKET 
Comp. by: Vasanthi Stage : Revises1 ChapterID: 0002886572 Date:12/12/16
Time:06:18:05 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0002886572.3D
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 48
of market competition,” a concern to which I will return later in the chapter
(Dagger 2006, 158, 163). In a similar manner, Pettit writes of a justifiable
republican “complacency” towards even idealized market exchanges rather
than enthusiasm for them, and at times he treats economists’ arguments for
competition skeptically, even dismissively, describing them with such terms as
“allegedly” and “so it is argued” and at one point calling them a “sort of magic”
(Pettit 1997, 203, 225, 2006b, 142). Granted, these are frequently matters of tone
rather than substance, but they are consistent features of republican texts, and
they are noticed by critics such as Gaus.
In this chapter, I will argue that the proper republican attitude toward com-
petitive markets is celebratory, not acquiescent, and that republicanism demands
such markets for precisely the same reason that it demands the rule of law:
because both are essential institutions for protecting individuals from arbitrary
interference. A system of competitive markets achieves an economic constitu-
tionalism that parallels the more familiar political constitutionalism of the
separation of powers, bicameralism, federalism, bills of rights, and judicial
review. To be more specific, I will show how economic competition restrains—
and in the limit, eradicates—market power and how such restraint helps us
realize “market freedom,” i.e., freedom as non-domination in the context of
economic exchange. I believe this extension of republican thinking into exchange
relations is consistent with both the spirit and the letter of contemporary
republican theories, especially that of Philip Pettit, and I will make continuous
reference to them throughout the chapter. I intend this, in short, to be a friendly
amendment to contemporary republicanism, one that will enhance its appeal in
certain quarters (e.g., among economists) without compromising any of its
fundamental normative commitments.
This amendment will have the additional benefit of buttressing republicanism
against the charge (made by Christopher McMahon, among others) that it is
insufficiently determinate with respect to its policy implications (McMahon
2005; cf. Pettit 2006a). Pettit in particular has perhaps made himself vulnerable
to such charges by suggesting, for example, that “there is not much of interest that
can be said about republican economic policy in the abstract” (Pettit 1997, 163).
I hope to show here that an abstract commitment to competitive markets follows
quite readily from contemporary republicanism and that it generates a variety of
policy implications regarding labor-market reform, antitrust, basic income, cap-
italist demogrants, etc. Some of these policies will be ones that republicans
themselves have advocated, while others will be new to republicanism and
at times might require republicans to revise some of their economic-policy
preconceptions.
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I should note that a “celebratory” attitude towards markets does not necessarily
imply a commitment to libertarian or even classical-liberal policies. Market
freedom requires effective competition, and only the state can secure many of
its regulatory and institutional preconditions. More specifically, the republican
economic model that I will argue for in this chapter will resemble a modified
version of a common European social model, viz. the Nordic model, which
combines flexible labor markets (including ease of hiring and firing), free trade,
and bracing competition with high levels of social support in the form of
generous welfare benefits and job retraining; the Danish variant of this model
is sometimes called “flexicurity.”3 One problem with this model, however, is that
it tolerates both strong unions and employers’ associations, then depends upon
their mutual restraint—grace in the exercise of their economic power—to pre-
serve flexible labor markets. As I will also argue, this tolerance is inconsistent with
republicanism, which demands an aggressive, Anglo-Saxon approach to compe-
tition policy in all markets, including labor markets; republican economics rejects
the halfway house of “reciprocal power” in favor of purging power from eco-
nomic relations. The resulting hybrid, which one might call the “Anglo-Nordic”
model, is the key to realizing freedom as non-domination in the context of
economic exchange.
I will begin this chapter by exploring the meaning of market power, using labor
markets as a case in point. Concentrations of power on either side of the market
(be it monopoly, monopsony, or less extreme forms) make exploitation, discrim-
ination, and domination possible; introducing effective competition in such
contexts helps promote market freedom, understood as non-domination in
exchange relations. In the following section, I will argue that market freedom is
itself a kind of antipower on Pettit’s own understanding of the term; I then go on
to show that Pettit and other republicans anticipate this result in their own
writings. I conclude the chapter with some further reflections on the limits of
exit as a tool for curbing market domination as well as on how my findings
extend and reorient republican theory.
Market Power versus Market Freedom
As we saw in Chapter 1, market power gives leeway for exploitation, discrimin-
ation, and domination. To clarify these concepts, I will focus first on a labor-
market example—specifically, a labor market having a single employer. (Anaconda
3 For a discussion of the four canonical European social models (viz.Mediterranean, Continental,
Nordic, and Anglo-Saxon), see Sapir (2006).
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Copper Mining Company, which dominated the labor market of Butte, Montana,
during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, roughly approximated such a
labor monopsonist—see Mercier 2001.) First, a successful labor monopsonist will
exploit its workers: it will hire workers up to but not beyond the point where the
marginal revenue product of labor (i.e., the contribution to a firm’s revenues by
the last worker hired) just equals the marginal expense (i.e., the cost of hiring that
last worker plus the additional labor costs associated with raising the wage of
existing workers to the new, higher level required to attract the last worker
[assuming uniform wage rates]); under monopsony conditions, though, this
will typically result in a wage rate that is less than the marginal revenue product
of labor, meaning that workers as a group fail to be paid according to their
(marginal) contribution to the firm’s revenues, as they would under genuinely
competitive labor-market conditions (Nicholson 1995, 724–8). This is exploit-
ation in the neoclassical sense of the term. The firm might pay its workers more
than this monopsony wage rate, but it would do so as a kind of discretionary
charity, adding insult to the injury of exploitation.
The previous paragraph assumed a uniform wage rate, i.e., all workers (of the
same skill level) being paid an identical wage rate. If the monopsonist had perfect
information about each worker’s reservation wage (i.e., the lowest wage at which
he or she would be willing to work), however, it could practice perfect wage
discrimination, paying each worker no more than his or her reservation wage.
Monopsonists are rarely omniscient in this way, however, so their attempts at
wage discrimination will be imperfect: e.g., they will have to segment the work-
force according to certain readily observable characteristics (like race, gender, or
age) that have been found to correlate with the wage elasticity of labor supply (i.e.,
the responsiveness of workers to changes in wage rates) and pay lower wages to
parts of the labor force that are relatively unresponsive to wage cuts (Nicholson
1995, 728–9).
Finally, unless the monopsonistic firm can practice perfect wage discrimin-
ation (which is extremely unlikely), it will be driven by the profit motive to
employ fewer workers than it would under competitive conditions and thereby to
generate unemployment: unhired workers, after all, have no alternative employ-
ers to whom to turn. Those workers fortunate enough to be employed, however,
are placed in a highly precarious, vulnerable position, as they also have no
alternative employers to whom they can turn and are therefore subject to the
caprice of the monopsonist and his managers. This absence of meaningful exit
options for workers makes them liable to arbitrary exercises of economic power,
i.e., domination. Some aspects of this power we have already seen: the discre-
tionary power of the firm to pay above the monopsony wage rate as a form of
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charity (underwritten by monopsony rents, ironically) and to practice wage
discrimination according to morally irrelevant criteria. Other aspects are much
darker, as the early history of industrialization suggests, including sexual exploit-
ation and other forms of physical abuse (e.g., denial of lunch or bathroom breaks,
abysmal health and safety conditions, even beatings).
Such are the bitter fruits of labor monopsony, which is market power in
possibly its most extreme and disturbing form—a fact that has not gone unnoticed
by some republicans. Pettit, for example, in the midst of selling republicanism’s
virtues to socialists, describes Marx’s belief that workers are:
wage slaves . . . dependent on the grace and mercy of their employer . . . [and] exposed to
the possibility of arbitrary interference. . . . If the employers in any area are collectively
capable of blacklisting someone who displeases them, as many nineteenth-century
employers certainly were, and if unemployment effectively means destitution, then it is
clear why socialists should have thought that workers were nothing more than wage
slaves. (Pettit 1997, 141 [emphasis added]; cf. Pettit 2006b, 142, 2007, 5)
In this passage, Pettit illustrates that if an area’s employers act as a collective
monopsonist, i.e., a labor-purchasing cartel, then they can dominate their wage-
slave employees, just as Marx claims, and thereby deprive them of their (repub-
lican) freedom. To advance freedom as non-domination, the state must combat
such exercises of labor-market power—whether carried out by individual
monopsonists or employer cartels—by antitrust action and other policy inter-
ventions, including what Pettit describes as the “discipline of nondiscrimination”
in wage setting (Pettit 2006b, 142, 145 [“legislate against monopolies”]).
Labor monopsony may be market power at its most extreme, but it is also
relatively rare. Less extreme forms of market power on the employer side, however,
are more common (Bhaskar et al. 2002). The most studied example is probably the
market for hospital nurses. Even in metropolitan areas, the number of hospitals may
be relatively small;moreover, these hospitals often practicewhat they euphemistically
call “wage standardization” (i.e., oligopsonistic collusion). Collusion of this sort, be it
explicit or tacit, gives individual hospitals substantial market power, a power height-
ened by other market features (e.g., differentiation of hospitals by location, safety
records, etc.). Aswithmonopsonists, thismarket power gives individual hospitals the
ability to drive wages below the marginal revenue product of labor, practice various
forms of discrimination, etc. (Sullivan 1989). Any degree of market power may offer
opportunities for not just exploitation and discrimination but domination aswell and
may therefore justify policy responses of the kind mentioned above.
At the opposite extreme from monopsonistic labor markets (with oligopsonis-
tic as well as monopsonistically-competitive labor markets filling the space
between) are perfectly competitive labormarkets. Thesemarkets are characterized
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by both large numbers of (potential) employers and workers and frictionless exit
from employment relationships. Under these conditions, neither employers nor
workers will have the capacity to manipulate wages; as economists would put it,
they will be price-takers, not price-makers. More specifically, competition among
employers and workers will drive wages into equality with the marginal revenue
product of labor for each grade of labor: any employer who attempts to pay less
than this competitive wage will lose his workers to another firm; any worker who
tries to claim more will be replaced by another equally-skilled worker. As a result,
neoclassical exploitation will be eliminated, as will discrimination: no firm will be
in a position to pay lower wages to some segments of the workforce on grounds
unrelated to productivity, as other firms would simply bid their wages back up.
Finally, no firm will be in a position to dominate workers, given the possibility of
costless exit: as Pettit himself points out, “in a well-functioning labormarket . . . no
one would depend on any particular master and so no one would be at the mercy
of a master: he or she could move on to employment elsewhere in the event of
suffering arbitrary interference.”4
Given these valuable features of competitive labor markets, what public pol-
icies will best promote them? First, we should note that many existing public
policies undermine competition in labor markets; thus, promotion of competi-
tion will require us to abolish or reform these policies. For example, closed-shop
unionism and related “for cause” dismissal clauses in labor contracts create
market power for workers, making it harder for employers to hire and replace
workers at competitive wages and discouraging hiring. A move to right-to-work
laws and universal at-will employment would reduce these labor-market fric-
tions. Also, though private-sector union power has waned substantially since
WorldWar II, it has been replaced by an equally anti-competitive proliferation of
occupational licensing rules: in the 1950s, a mere 5 percent of workers required
state licenses, but now 35 percent do; by cartelizing professions ranging from
hairdressing and cosmetology to horse massaging and bartending, licensing has
made possible the exclusion of competitors, the exploitation of consumers, and
wage rates 18 percent higher ceteris paribus than those in unlicensed professions
(Kleiner and Krueger 2013). One example of the kind of exploitation and
domination that licensing rules enable is the relationship between dentists and
dental hygienists, which bears a striking similarity to the hospital/nurse relation-
ship discussed earlier: state licensing rules that require dental hygienists to be
4 Pettit 2006b, 142; cf. Lovett 2009, 820: “in a theoretically perfect market, all entries and exits
would be costless; it follows that, since no one would be dependent on anyone else, there’d be no
domination under these conditions.”
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employed and supervised by dentists result in higher earnings for dentists and
lower earnings (and employment) for hygienists relative to markets where
hygienists can work independently (Kleiner 2013, ch. 6). Shifting from licensing
to a less exclusionary screening process (e.g., state certification) would retain
most of the health and safety benefits of licensing without undermining labor-
market competition (Friedman 1962, ch. 9).
Anotherworry about licensing policies and similar anti-competitive interventions
is that theymay slow domination-curbing developments in technology and business
structure. Consider, for instance, how historic advances in communications, com-
puting power, and search algorithmshavemade it possible tomatch tasks to workers
in ways that circumvent hierarchically-organized firms. The most prominent
example is the creation of Uber, Lyft, and Sidecar to match riders to drivers and
bypass traditional taxi companies; by permitting drivers to be independent oper-
ators, they free them from potential domination within these firms. Private taxi
firms, though, currently benefit from city licensing requirements (e.g., New York
City’s infamous medallion system) that enable them to cartelize cab services and
exploit both drivers and riders, and they are suing Uber and other online platforms
in order to protect their monopoly profits (Dompe and Smith 2014). Here again,
unwise public policies stymie competition and inadvertently facilitate domination.
Many public policies, of course, can and do encourage competition. I discussed
antitrust action and related interventions (e.g., non-discrimination rules) above,
which make labor markets more competitive by either increasing the number of
competing employers or forcing incumbent employers to behave in a more com-
petitive manner (by, say, breaking up cartel arrangements). Recent revelations that
Google, Apple, Intel, and Adobe colluded in a scheme not to solicit one another’s
employees are a case in point; the resulting class-action suit is leading to an antitrust
settlement of hundreds of millions of dollars for the exploited engineers (Streitfeld
2014). Also, state agencies might educate employees about their contractual rights
and collect and disseminate information about other job opportunities, be they local
or national: ignorance can be a friction in its own right, leading workers to stay
in employment relations they would be better off leaving (Viscusi 1983, 156–62;
cf. Pettit 1997, 159: “ignorance of relevant standards and expectations”).
More radically, the state might pursue redistributive policies to make it easier for
workers to exit workplaces. Workers may have a tough time, for example, saving
up the money necessary to move to another place in search of work—an especially
pressing problem in impoverished and insular regions of the country like rural
Appalachia (Lowrey 2014). Governments could provide “relocation vouchers” to
enable just such moves, tightening local labor markets and disciplining abusive
employers in the process. The Trade Adjustment Assistance program already offers
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such help to displaced workers in the form of moving allowances and stipendiary
support to take up a job in a new city; unemployment insurance could be changed
to allow the long-term unemployed to take advances on their benefits for the
purposes of a move (Moretti 2012). In a similar fashion, states could empower
workers to seek alternative employment—including self-employment—by offering
“capitalist” demogrants, i.e., seed money to encourage the accumulation of phys-
ical, financial, and human capital; these might come in the form of small-business
awards, start-up cash for playing the stock market or buying an annuity to
subsidize a low-paying but rewarding career (e.g., topiary gardening), educational
vouchers, etc. Finally, as certain republicans have proposed, the state might deliver
an unconditional basic income, which would serve as a firm backstop against
employment exploitation, discrimination, and domination by making it possible
for workers to exit the labor market entirely (Pettit 2007; Lovett 2009, 825–8).
Up until now, I have focused exclusively on labor markets, but market power
can lead to exploitation, discrimination, and domination in other sorts of mar-
kets as well, all of which can be countered by the introduction of effective
competition. Consider, for example, Dagger’s example of someone whose “apples
are the only available source of food” and who consequently has an “effective
monopoly on that good”; as he points out, this will create a form of dependency
that is inconsistent with freedom as non-domination (Dagger 2006, 158). Policy
interventions analogous to those surveyed above can remedy this situation by
recreating competitive conditions or at least requiring market actors to behave in
competitive ways, for as Pettit rightly argues:
short of great differences in bargaining power, this arrangement does not mean that
anyone is exposed to the possibility of arbitrary interference by any other or any group of
others. One seller may be able to interfere with another by undercutting the other’s price,
but the second should be free, above the level of the competitive price, to undercut that
price in turn; thus there is no question of permanent exposure to interference. (Pettit
1997, 205; pace Gaus 2003, 68)
As Pettit suggests, and as I will argue more explicitly in the next section,
economic competition restrains—and in the limit, eradicates—market power
and helps us to realize “market freedom,” i.e., freedom as non-domination in
the context of economic exchange.
Market Freedom as Antipower
Competitive markets are antipower in the precise sense spelled out by Pettit:
specifically, in perfectly competitive markets, participants have no capacity to
interfere with impunity and at will with the economic interests of other participants.
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They enjoy no capacity to interfere at will because market prices are set by
impersonal forces of supply and demand, so there is no room for discretionary
price setting, i.e., arbitrary exercises of market power. Any attempt to deviate
from this competitive price (by, say, overcharging consumers or underpaying
workers) will lead to the loss of trade and the punishment of reduced profits;
hence, they also have no capacity to interfere with impunity. These features of
competitive markets are antipower not just in Pettit’s procedural sense but in
his substantive sense as well, because they “track the interests” of the participants
in at least one important way: under certain conditions, perfect competition
will generate a welfare optimum, securing productive and allocative efficiency
and thereby making the economic pie as large as possible—a result that is in
the interest of all participants, differ as they may on how that pie should be
divided up.5
Another way to see how competitive markets are antipower is to notice their
quality of, to use Pettit’s terminology, “non-manipulability.” Pettit uses this term
to describe a certain feature of institutional “instruments” (e.g., public law)
employed by the republican state:
Designed to further certain public ends, they should be maximally resistant to being
deployed on an arbitrary, perhaps sectional, basis. No one individual or group should
have discretion in how the instruments are used. . . . The institutions and initiatives involved
should not allow of manipulation at anyone’s individual whim. (Pettit 1997, 173)
He then proceeds to lay out “three broad conditions that a non-manipulable
system will need to satisfy.” I’ll describe them one by one, showing how com-
petitive markets meet them and thereby embody an economic constitutionalism
parallel to the political kind that is Pettit’s chief concern:
1. Empire-of-law condition: This condition demands that political power be
exercised in a manner consistent with the rule of law, i.e., laws “should be
general and apply to everyone, including the legislators themselves; they
should be promulgated and made known in advance to those to whom they
apply; they should be intelligible, consistent, and not subject to constant
change; and so on” (Pettit 1997, 174). Prices in a competitive market meet
some of these conditions, as they are general, apply to everyone, and are
public in nature (transparent). To be sure, they are subject to constant
change and are obviously not “promulgated,” being the product of a
spontaneous order rather than an organization, but they otherwise resemble
5 For a proof of this claim (the First Welfare Theorem) and the conditions under which it will
hold, see Debreu 1959.
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an economic rule of law, one that keeps the market from becoming “a
playground for the arbitrary will” of its participants (Pettit 1997, 174).
2. Dispersion-of-power condition: This condition requires that “powers
which officials have under any regime of law should be dispersed” by
familiar mechanisms such as the separation of powers, bicameralism, fed-
eralism, and international legalism (Pettit 1997, 177–80). This condition is
readily met by competitive markets because they are characterized by a
large number of (potential) buyers and sellers, which in combination with
the other features of such markets (e.g., perfect information, free exit)
turns all participants into price-takers rather than price-makers. Under
perfect competition, at least, economic power is not so much dispersed as
extinguished.
3. Counter-majoritarian condition: This condition insists that laws be insu-
lated from “excessively easy, majoritarian change” (Pettit 1997, 180). In
competitive markets, no group of buyers or sellers—including majorities of
either—is in a position to exercise arbitrary power. The “tyranny of the
majority” is ruled out, as is every other sort of economic tyranny.
This proposed analogy between economic and political constitutionalism is
admittedly imperfect. One important difference, already mentioned above, is
that the “economic law” of a competitive price is not “promulgated” in any
sense and therefore would “background, not foreground, reason”: i.e., competi-
tive prices are not the product of any reasoned democratic deliberation but rather
an emergent property of a certain type of economic order (Pettit 1997, 203,
cf. 224–5). Such backgrounding is essential, of course, given the staggering
complexity of the economic task that is involved and the gross inadequacy of
central planning as an alternative solution—even if such planning were delibera-
tive and democratic in nature—but the disanalogy nevertheless remains. Also, the
notion that freedom as non-domination is achieved in a perfectly competitive
market because its participants are powerless, individually and collectively, to
shape something as socially consequential as prices might strike some readers as
less of a realization of republicanism than a reductio of it.
Still, it would be a mistake to make too much of this disanalogy, as the
republican state itself requires some measure of such backgrounding owing to
the complexity of its own task. For example, administrative efficiency will often
require that state agents be permitted “a substantial degree of discretion,” lest we
forego “all possibility of fitting government action to the needs of particular cases,”
yet such discretion is unlikely to be wholly guided by democratic public reason
and may only with some difficulty even be constrained by it (Pettit 1997, 175–6).
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Perhaps even more to the point, a republican state may decide to make conscious
use of mechanisms, such as lotteries to assign spots in charter schools, that leave
allocative decisions to chance. So long as they meet certain conditions—e.g.,
reflective public endorsement, fair and impartial supervision, and the promotion
of the common good—such mechanisms are surely unobjectionable. I would
contend that competitive markets are similar mechanisms: so long as democratic
political organs sanction them asmutually advantageous (if individually risky), set
up their legal and institutional preconditions (e.g., property, contract, and tort as
elements of the private law), and maintain their competitive nature over time
(through antitrust and the various forms of redistribution catalogued above),
these markets can be understood as legislative products of a democratic will—
even if the vagaries of the price system are as little under direct democratic control
as the motion of balls in a lottery machine. From a republican perspective, the
important question to ask about markets is whether they protect their participants
from arbitrary interference and track their interests in both a substantive sense
(improving their life prospects) and a procedural one (submitting to both
their endorsement and their supervision through a democratic political process).
Competitive markets, at least, can meet these conditions and therefore realize
freedom as non-domination.
One objection that could be raised to my account so far is that free exit and the
associated conditions of perfect competition might sometimes fail to hold and are
consequently inadequate guarantors of non-domination. Nien-hê Hsieh, for
example, argues that “as an alternative to exit, workers need to be able to exercise
voice—to have the capacity to express dissent without exiting,” which can be
achieved if the state “provides workers with the right to contest decisions within
the context of the decision-making process internal to economic enterprises”
(Hsieh 2005, 134; cf. Dagger 2006, 163). Consider the Anaconda Copper Mining
example with which I began the last section. Perhaps at that time and place,
government efforts to promote competitive labor markets—by antitrust action,
laws against wage discrimination, and the provision of information, travel grants,
capitalist demogrants, and/or an unconditional basic income for all workers—
were either economically or politically infeasible. Under those conditions, the
best way to secure non-domination might have been to empower workers’ voices
by, for example, encouraging not just unionization but the “narrowly defined job
descriptions” and other varieties of worker protection (from “for cause” dismissal
clauses to German-style “co-determination”) that unions frequently demand
(Hsieh 2005, 135). In short, the regulation, participation, and privatization
options that I surveyed in Chapter 1 must remain on the table if we are to be
serious about curbing domination.
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While Hsieh is surely right to question whether an “exclusive reliance on the
right to exit” is sufficient under all circumstances to prevent workplace domin-
ation, “voice” carries substantial risks of increasing domination and should
therefore remain an exception to the rule of promoting free exit and effective
competition. Lovett, for instance, points out that “workplace regulations” and
other attempts to “regulate . . . social relationships,” while perhaps useful for
stopping certain “gross abuses,” may in the end simply substitute one form of
domination for another:
There will always be discovered new and ever-more subtle means of converting material
advantage into domination. In the long run it is unlikely that public policy could ever keep
pace with, much less anticipate, such innovations—except perhaps with a regulatory
structure so dense and intrusive as to raise serious objections on other grounds. (For
starters, a state powerful enough to accomplish this task might itself become a great source
of domination.) (Lovett 2009, 825–6)
In contrast to intrusive workplace monitoring and intervention, government
delivery of resources that empower workers in labor-market choices can remain
largely aloof from relations within the firm, trusting instead that free exit will
discipline owners and managers and prevent them from dominating their
employees.6 To be certain, discretionary power over workers will continue to
be exercised by owners and their managers, as such discretion (e.g., in task
assignment) is essential to maintaining a flexible and efficient production pro-
cess, but state empowerment of workers via antitrust action, resource transfers,
etc., will put them in a position to choose from among a menu of workplaces that
differ by kind and degree of managerial discretion exercised inter alia. Such
choice—including the limit choice of wholly exiting the labor market, which is
made possible by capitalist demogrants or an unconditional basic income—
guarantees that this residual managerial discretion is non-arbitrary, as it “tracks
the interests . . . of the person suffering the interference.”7 These choices will
typically involve tradeoffs (e.g., less discretion might mean lower wages), but so
long as workers have been empowered in the ways I described, such tradeoffs can
reasonably be viewed as tracking their interests.
Arguing otherwise has the weird implication that when I decide to order
omakase (chef ’s choice) at a sushi restaurant, I thereby problematically expose
6 As with the intervention of marital regulators into family affairs, worries about privacy and
paternalism arise here, too, though presumably with less force. Protecting privacy and preventing
regulatory paternalism on the job enable modes of communication and cooperation that transform
participants into self-governing agents in economic as well as political life, both of which are
republican desiderata. See Roberts (2014) for a more extended discussion.
7 Pettit 1997, 55; also, see my Chapter 2 discussion of Pettit’s “substantive” sense of power.
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myself to (potential) arbitrary interference. So long as I have a broad array of
affordable culinary options—set menus, chef ’s choice at other eateries, dining at
home, etc.—my choice of omakase suggests that the discretion consequently
exercised is not arbitrary (assuming that it stays within mutually understood
limits, of course: e.g., I am not served a burrito). My decision to submit to the
bounded discretion of a sushi chef is analogous to the decision (discussed earlier)
of a democratic people to submit to the bounded “discretion” of lotteries or
competitive markets: if such submission tracks their interests in both (1) sub-
stantive and (2) procedural ways, then the subsequent exercise of discretion does
not constitute arbitrary interference. In the sushi case, my interests are tracked if
(1) I anticipate benefiting from the discretion (i.e., the price plus the risks of being
disappointed are outweighed by the expected benefits of surprise and gustatory
satisfaction) and (2) I have exit options in case I do not benefit, and chef ’s
discretion is bounded by mutually understood norms. The same logic applies to
employment: when I submit to managerial discretion by accepting a job, subse-
quent exercises of such discretion are not arbitrary if (1) I anticipate benefiting
from it (i.e., the wages I receive outweigh the expected unpleasantness of being
ordered around and having to do tiresome tasks) and (2) I have numerous exit
options in case I do not benefit, and managerial discretion is circumscribed by
mutually understood customary and contractual rules. As a result, arbitrariness
within employment relations can—at least in principle—be prevented without
intrusive state monitoring and intervention in workplaces, which itself threatens
domination.
Unfortunately, the dangers of relying upon voice are not necessarily reduced
by replacing state power with non-state (e.g., union) power: fighting fire with fire
still risks burning everyone involved. This is apparently why Pettit dislikes what
he calls the “reciprocal power” strategy for achieving non-domination, which
involves countering private power with private power (Pettit 1997, 67–8). In the
labor market, for example, it may require countering the market power of a
monopsonist with that of a union monopolist; such a “bilateral monopoly” will
restrain discretion but leave wage determination to the relative bargaining power
of the two sides (Nicholson 1995, 729–30). Pettit’s understandable concern with
such a solution is that by it “arbitrary interference and domination may be
reduced, but it is not ever going to be eliminated,” because the residual mutual
interference involved fails to “track the interests and ideas of those who are
affected” (Pettit 1997, 67). Even worse, systematic government efforts to enhance
the market power of one side against the other may have the (net) effect of
increasing domination. For example, the National Labor Relations Act, by
protecting the ability of workers to organize and collectively bargain, may have
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reduced domination in those areas or industries in which the employer side was
monopsonistic or oligopsonistic but increased it in those in which it was com-
petitive: monopolistic unions, just like monopsonistic employers, have enormous
power to exploit, discriminate against, and dominate the weaker side—in this
case, unorganized firms. Consider the case of public (non-tertiary) education in
the USA. Here, a vast number of individual school districts compete for an
educated, relatively mobile teacher population; hence, the employer side is
reasonably competitive. The employee side, on the other hand, has oligopolistic
characteristics: teachers’ unions are organized at local, state, and even national
levels (under the umbrellas of the National Education Association and the
American Federation of Teachers) and coordinate their activities across school
districts and states. If there is market power here, it is mostly on the educator
side—an advantage made possible in large part by collective-bargaining rights for
public employees. If freedom is antipower, as Pettit argues, then market power
must be countered and if possible eliminated wherever it arises, and this com-
mitment will usually mean that the state should limit its market interventions to
promoting free exit and active competition.
A similarly skeptical perspective on unions can be found throughout Pettit’s
writings. He sometimes expresses concerns about union power, as when he asks
us to “think of the case of small entrepreneurs who are held to ransom by the
primary or secondary picketing of a powerful trade union that can put them out
of business” (2014, 91). When he lauds unions, it is invariably within the context
of monopsonistic or oligopsonistic labor markets and is generally historical in
nature (e.g., Pettit 1997, 95 [“industrial world of the nineteenth century”], 141–2
[“nineteenth-century employers”]). Additionally, he tends to favor exit over voice
as a means of dealing with domination; for example, he states that “other
protections, such as those that strong trade unions may provide, are possible
against such alien control [i.e., oligopsony]. But the most effective of all protec-
tions, and one that should complement other measures available, would be one’s
ability to leave employment and fall back on a basic wage available uncondition-
ally from the state” (Pettit 2007, 5). Finally, as the Pettit quotation at the close of
the last section shows, one seller undercutting another seller’s price, which may
lead to a painful loss of trade, does not qualify as arbitrary interference under
competitive conditions. The missing participant here, of course, is the buyer, who
dismisses one seller in favor of the other one. Pettit gives no indication that this
buyer arbitrarily interferes with the existing seller by dropping their services, nor
does he imply that the good in question must be a product or service—it could be
a factor of production, such as labor. If so, then an employer does not arbitrarily
interfere with an employee by firing him in a competitive context; consequently,
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 12/12/2016, SPi
 EXIT LEFT
Comp. by: Vasanthi Stage : Revises1 ChapterID: 0002886572 Date:12/12/16
Time:06:18:14 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0002886572.3D
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 61
republican economic policy need not resort to empowering workers via voice
(e.g., laws permitting closed-shop unions), except in cases where competitive
conditions prove very difficult to establish and/or maintain.
Before concluding, I should address a potential concern about my reading of
republican economic policy. Pettit says freedom as non-domination is an “inher-
ently communitarian ideal,” and as I noted in the introduction, Dagger empha-
sizes the need to “protect communities from the ravages of market competition,”
by which he means the instability and dislocation that can result from the
mobility of labor and capital (Pettit 1997, 120; Dagger 2006, 163). Doesn’t a
one-sided focus on exit, especially for employees, threaten to produce a deracin-
ated citizenry that lacks the durable relationships and other forms of social capital
that are necessary to resist domination in other domains? One thing to keep in
mind is that credible threats of exit will frequently not need to be exercised:
employers, aware of the rich exit options of employees in a republican state, will
anticipate exit and respond appropriately, by preemptively improving wages and
other conditions of employment; to use the terminology of game theory, exit will
be off the equilibrium path. For a variety of reasons, however—including the
irrationality of one or both parties and asymmetric information—an exit-
oriented republican economic policy will probably lead to greater, perhaps
much greater, labor mobility. Whether the net effect of this rise will be to increase
domination (as the objection implies) or decrease it (as I have maintained)
depends upon a number of factors. For example, will a more mobile labor force
merely shift their allegiances from local kinds of community to non-local kinds
(e.g., national professional associations, political pressure groups, and online
communities), and will these new kinds of community be just as effective at
resisting domination? If not, might it still be the case that increased mobility will
allow people to escape not only economic domination but also the domination
caused by local communities themselves (whether domestic, ethnic, or religious),
and might this dual reduction in domination outweigh the increased domination
resulting from the putative erosion of localized social capital? (Pettit himself
reminds us of the continuing vulnerability of women and minorities to domin-
ation by families and local majority communities—see Pettit 1997, 123–4,
138–40, 143–6.)
These are difficult questions to answer in the abstract, as they depend upon a
complex set of sociological assessments, and republicans are likely to divide on
this matter due to the burdens of judgment (Rawls 1993, 54–8). My own sense is
that the above questions can be answered in the affirmative and that an exit-
oriented republican economic policy is the best way of promoting freedom as
non-domination. Moreover, as I have argued throughout the chapter, I believe
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that such a policy is generally consistent with the vision of republicanism
presented by Pettit and does not depend upon a strained reading of his texts.
Even Pettit’s claim that freedom as non-domination is an “inherently commu-
nitarian ideal” is less about preserving local community and the social capital it
embodies than about encouraging solidarity among those groups (such as
women, racial minorities, immigrants, homosexuals, and the elderly) that are
vulnerable to domination, and it is unclear why mobility would undermine such
solidarity—it might even reinforce it if it weakened competing kinds of solidarity,
including localism (Pettit 1997, 120–6). Having said this, however, I recognize
that other republicans would be likely to answer the above questions in the
negative and thus reject, in part or in whole, an exit-oriented economic policy;
Dagger (2006, 163–4) and Michael Sandel (1996) would probably be among
them. What this divergence indicates is simply the continuing diversity of the
republican tradition, one that I noted earlier in this chapter and will discuss
further in Chapters 4 and 5: it has both individualistic and communitarian
strains, and they may generate somewhat divergent conclusions about economic
policy. In view of the centrality of Pettit’s theory to the neo-republican literature,
however, this chapter’s arguments should at least lead republicans of all stripes to
reconsider if not revise their economic-policy positions.8
The Limits and Potential of Market Freedom
I have shown over the course of this chapter how economic competition
restrains—and in the limit, eradicates—market power and how such restraint
helps us to realize “market freedom,” i.e., freedom as non-domination in the
context of economic exchange. This finding means that a republican economic
program should be primarily focused on promoting competitive conditions
(including a plurality of informed buyers and sellers, free entry and exit, and
price-taking rather than price-making behavior) and pursuing the policy
8 Gourevitch (2013), echoing the claims of others (e.g., Krause 2013), has argued that Pettit’s
conception of freedom as non-domination “lacks an adequate conception of structural domination,”
viz., the domination of workers by their capitalist masters, and that nineteenth-century labor
republicanism’s more solidaristic conception of freedom entails labor’s right to control the work-
place (596, 609–10). As I argued above, though, the Anglo-Nordic package of policy instruments
required by Pettit’s neo-republicanism includes capitalist demogrants, which in combination with
other, related policy tools (e.g., inheritance taxation) provides the means for democratizing owner-
ship of private capital; by giving workers the option of exiting employment relationships and
becoming capitalists if they choose to do so, such demogrants allow us to attack structural
domination without having to wield the double-edged sword of voice. (See Taylor 2014, especially
453–4, for an elaboration of this argument in a non-republican context.)
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innovations that would help us attain these conditions, such as informational
campaigns, labor-market reform, aggressive antitrust, capitalist demogrants, and/
or a basic income. These Anglo-Nordic reforms and the competitive conditions
that they would support constitute an economic constitutionalism as important
as the political constitutionalism with which republicans have traditionally been
identified: perfect competition is a translation of the rule of law into the economic
sphere.9 Once republicans take this lesson to heart, they will (like their
commercial-republican forefather Adam Smith) look upon competitive markets
with enthusiasm, not mere “complacency” (Pettit 2006b, 142).
Republicans may worry, however, that perfect competition is a lofty ideal that
real-world markets will rarely approach, much less attain, even if the republican
economic program outlined above were fully implemented. This concern is a
reasonable one, but it applies no less strongly to the other components of
republicanism. The rule of law, the separation of powers, bicameralism, federal-
ism, and international legalism are also demanding ideals that real-world political
systems at best approximate rather than achieve, because political actors motiv-
ated by various sectional, economic, and ideological interests work persistently to
sidestep and even undermine them. Both perfect competition and the rule of law
are regulative ideals for republicans, ones that motivate and guide principled
political action—and the closer we can approach them, the closer we will be to
achieving non-domination in economic and political life.
This being said, we must always be alert to a problem first discussed in
Chapter 1: non-monotonicity in the relationship between exit costs and the
welfare of least-advantaged workers. If government does nothing but protect
formal rights of movement and occupational choice, then abusive employers will
prompt an exodus of their most advantaged employees, diminishing the voices of
those they leave behind and perhaps realizing Hirschman’s worst fears. To
prevent this eventuality, governments must transform partial-exit worlds into
free-exit ones by making use of the full panoply of Anglo-Nordic economic
policies; they must not only promote competition in labor markets but also
resource exit through various government services and income transfers. Relat-
edly, we should be aware that these policies are not à la carte: they must be
implemented in tandem, because pursuing merely a subset of them may increase
rather than decrease domination. For instance, a sharp attack on union privilege
without similar efforts to limit employer collusion in particular labor markets
(e.g., hospital nursing and dental hygiene) and enhance labor mobility may just
9 As Michel Foucault notes, the German Ordoliberals similarly demanded “the application to the
economy of what is called Rechtsstaat in the German tradition . . . ” (2008, 167–8).
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make workers more vulnerable to the market power of capitalists, a point Smith
himself made long ago (Smith 1981, 83–5 [I.viii.11–14]). We must always bear in
mind that deregulation and liberalization can be spurred as much by rent-seeking
behavior as regulation and protection. This fact is not an argument for main-
taining anti-competitive practices but rather a reminder that as we approach
these tasks we ought to keep a wary eye on what Jeremy Bentham referred to as
“sinister interests.”
Even if this Anglo-Nordic policy package were implemented in full, though, it
would not entirely solve the problem of market domination due to both natural
and legal limits on economic agency. Market freedom presumes such agency;
workers without it would lack the ability to hold their employers accountable and
defend their own interests through voice or exit. In some cases, however, it will
either be absent (e.g., the severely mentally disabled) or present only in a limited
way (e.g., many of the elderly); exit will have to be supplanted by voice here, be it in
the form of the regulation option or perhaps the participation option. Far less
extreme forms of compromised psychological agency are imaginable andmay also
justify regulatory interventions. To cite Smith again, he worried that a minute
division of labor, though efficient, might be mentally deadening for laborers:
The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations, of which the
effects too are, perhaps, always the same, or very nearly the same, has no occasion to exert
his understanding, or to exercise his invention in finding out expedients for removing
difficulties which never occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and
generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to
become. . . . But in every improved and civilized society this is the state into which the
labouring poor, that is, the great body of the people, must necessarily fall, unless
government takes some pains to prevent it. (Smith 1981, 781–2 [V.i.f.50]; cf. Mill
1991, 254–5 [“drive a quill”])
If workers’ psychological agency is hobbled by such production methods, they
may be less likely to take advantage of policies that resource exit and more likely
to require regulatory assistance, be it in the shape of working-time directives or
compulsory, state-subsidized education for their children, as Smith himself
suggests (1981, 785–8 [V.i.f.54–61]).
More disturbingly, there are often legal limits on economic agency that may
call for voice as a second-best corrective. Consider the case of California farm-
workers who are in the country illegally. It would be difficult to resource their exit
from abusive employment relations because deportation fears would make them
hesitant to apply for such state support in the first place; also, because a small
group of families has often owned farmland in certain areas for a long period of
time, collusion is not only likely but also hard to police due to codes of silence
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(Daniel 1981). As a result, the privatization option of the United Farm Workers
union, while far from perfect, might be better than no action at all. A far better
solution, of course, would be to legalize these workers, aggressively pursue
antitrust action against the colluding farm employers, resource exit via travel
and relocation vouchers, and so forth, but these actions may simply be politically
infeasible. We therefore have to remain open to the direct empowerment of voice
in extremis, despite its many serious drawbacks.
In closing, I’d like to point out that my friendly amendment to neo-
republicanism, which I believe to be consistent with not only its spirit but its
letter, helps bring it into tighter alignment with various other approaches to
political economy. Economists promote perfect competition for the sake of
welfare, libertarians and liberals for the sake of autonomy and (expanded) choice,
and republicans (so I have argued) for the sake of non-domination. Each shares a
commitment to the same mediating institution but sees different ultimate values
at stake in its achievement. Such an overlapping consensus clearly strengthens
the case for competitive markets, but it also helps neo-republicanism appear
more modern and moderate and therefore more attractive to adherents of
competitor doctrines. If republicanism retains the whiff of austere anti-
commercialism thanks to earlier republicans like Rousseau, then nothing will
better dispel it than a wider realization that true republicanism celebrates com-
petitive markets.
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4
State
Republicans have long been focused on the problem of arbitrary political power
and have explored a variety of solutions, most notably constitutional ones that
safeguard citizens by means of the dispersal of political power, such as the checks
and balances associated with the separation of powers, bicameralism, inter-
national legalism, and especially federalism (Pettit 1997, 177–80). Earlier repub-
lican supporters of federalism, including Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Kant,
viewed confederal interstate arrangements as a way to combine the virtues of
small republics with those of large monarchies (viz., political non-domination
and military power, respectively) and secure international peace (Montesquieu
1989, 131–3; Rousseau 2005, 53–60; Kant 1996, 311–51).1 The authors of The
Federalist Papers developed these ideas further, applying them to an interlocking
federal arrangement among the American states. Hamilton, quoting Montes-
quieu in Federalist 9, emphasized the way that dividing sovereignty between the
states and federal government would protect citizens from domination by
the authorities at either level; Madison echoes this thought in Federalist 51:
“the different governments will control each other, at the same time that each
will be controlled by itself” (Publius 2003, 35–40, 251–5).
Contemporary republicans, on the other hand, have had little to say regarding
federalism, and what they have had to say has been surprisingly flat and unre-
vealing (e.g., Pettit 1997, 178–9; Bohman 2009, 60, 73). This reticence is in
striking contrast with the contemporary revival of federalism among liberal
multiculturalists, who see in it a solution to the problem of “how rival minority
and majority nationalist projects can be accommodated within the democratic
structures of a single (federal) state” (Norman 2006, vii; also see Norman 1994,
Kymlicka 2001, Weinstock 2001, de Schutter 2011). One of the contributors
to this literature, Iris Marion Young, even steals a march on republicans by
1 I set to one side the heated debate over Montesquieu’s republican credentials; for some
contributions to this debate, see Pangle (1973), Rahe (2009), Douglass (2012), and de Dijn (2014).
Pettit, for one, labels him a republican (1997, 19; 2012, 7).
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defending her unusual form of “horizontal federalism” (which aims to protect
both minority groups and minorities within minorities) on the republican
ground of non-domination—and this despite her criticisms of republicanism
elsewhere (Young 2005; cf. Young 1989).
Contemporary republicans (and liberal multiculturalists, for that matter)
have failed to see that federalism, in addition to providing participatory and
constitutional checks on the exercise of arbitrary political power, offers a more
market-oriented approach as well, an economic model of political republican-
ism that harnesses both competitive markets and resourced exit in the service
of non-domination.2 In this model, a mobile citizenry places political sub-
units—cities, counties, and provinces—into vigorous competition with each
other for residents and businesses; far from a race to the bottom, this compe-
tition can, if properly regulated and resourced, constrain arbitrary power and
force sub-units to track citizen preferences. In the limit, such competition can
not only complement but even to some degree substitute for political voice,
lessening our reliance on the vagaries of democratic control and providing an
alternative path to realizing Pettit’s desiderata of individualization, uncondi-
tionality, and efficacy, as we shall soon discover (Pettit 2012, 166–79). This
economic model of political republicanism can never entirely displace the
participatory and constitutional approaches, of course, especially as we ascend
the hierarchy of political sub-units and exit becomes increasingly costly in
ways that cannot be finessed by constitutional, legal, and policy reforms. Still,
even if exit cannot substitute for voice in the political realm to the degree that it
can in the domestic and economic realms, I shall argue in this chapter that its
potential role in promoting political freedom has been underappreciated,
especially by neo-republicans.
I start, as I have in the previous two chapters, by contrasting political power
and political freedom, with the former understood here as a condition of
political domination and exploitation made possible by the absence of demo-
cratic control, constitutional checks and balances, and/or a meaningful exit
option, and the latter understood as the limitation and even negation of this
kind of power. Holding fixed participatory and constitutional remedies to such
power, which are types of voice, I explore the alternative, economic remedy that
I sketched above, which relies upon exit instead, here in the form of citizen
mobility. As I’ll show, the success of this alternative approach depends upon
not only formal freedom of movement across political sub-units but also efforts
to augment competition between these sub-units by means of both subsidiarity
2 Spitz (2009, 296) is a partial exception to this claim, to which I shall return below.
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and fiscal federalism and resource exit through policy reforms as varied as
health-insurance portability and relocation vouchers. In the next section,
I demonstrate that this market model of political freedom is a kind of antipower
on Pettit’s own understanding of the term: first, because it limits the ability of
local political leaders to interfere with impunity and at will in the interests of
their local residents and businesses and even forces them to promote these
interests; second, because it realizes the equal popular control Pettit prizes,
characterized by individualization, unconditionality, and efficacy. I also
respond in this section to Pettit’s own doubts about exit’s potential as a form
of antipower in political contexts and, more generally, to his concern that such
reliance upon market mechanisms in politics might objectionably “background
reason” (Pettit 1997, 203); I confront too the worries of communitarian repub-
licans like Richard Dagger, who think that high levels of citizen mobility may
undermine the conditions of republican self-government (Dagger 1997,
154–72). Finally, in the conclusion I emphasize that a successful defense of
political freedom requires an optimal mix of participatory, constitutional, and
economic means, one that will vary across time and levels of government but
will rarely be all voice or exit, and moreover that the very implementation of an
economic model of political republicanism will demand participatory and
constitutional means.
Before beginning, however, I would like to pause to say a few words about my
use of the term “political freedom.” This term has tremendous historical
resonance, yet my use of it might seem idiosyncratic, perhaps even deliberately
misleading, so it is not enough for me to say that I am just using it as a term of
art. In both everyday and academic use, political freedom (or liberty) is gener-
ally understood to mean what it means to Rawls: the rights to vote and hold
public office, i.e., rights to democratic political participation (Rawls 1993, 4–7,
284, 327–31, 417). This voice-oriented understanding of political freedom,
however common, is not the only one available, and in the republican political
tradition it has taken on a wider meaning: freedom as non-domination (Pettit
1997, 25; Lovett and Pettit 2009, 13). Democratic political participation is
certainly one way to advance political freedom so defined, but then so are
constitutional means, including ones that restrain the voice of the people,
such as written bills of rights, judicial review, etc. Thus, my use of political
freedom in this chapter, which widens it even further so as to include market-
like mechanisms that reduce domination by forcing political sub-units to
compete for mobile citizens, is consistent with the spirit if not the letter of
contemporary republican usage, even as it deviates to some degree from
common usage.
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Political Power versus Political Freedom
In Chapter 3, I suggested that labor monopsony is market power in its most
extreme and disturbing form. The totalitarian state is its analogue with respect to
political power. Such a state, in its “ideal” form, superintends a completely closed
society lacking any democratic participation or institutional checks and balances
on its one-man or one-party rule. North Korea is the closest contemporary
approach to this ideal: Kim Jong-un’s control over his subjects is exactly the
kind of power Pettit has in mind when he says that a capacity to interfere with
impunity and at will, when it is “fully realized,” “amounts to an absolutely
arbitrary power” (Pettit 1996, 580; Demick 2010). For our purposes, though,
the German Democratic Republic (i.e., the former East German communist state)
will offer a more illuminating, albeit historical, example.
The GDR was ruled de facto by the Politburo of the Socialist Unity Party; this
one-party (or one-committee) rule morphed into one-man rule under Erich
Honecker, general secretary of the Politburo from 1971 until 1989. Party leaders
monopolized all significant state posts, keeping the state apparatus under the
control of the Party and eliminating any possible internal checks on its power.
Some external checks existed—Honecker craved international respect, depended
upon West German transfers to keep his bankrupt state afloat, and took march-
ing orders from Moscow on important matters due to the continuing presence of
Soviet troops in the country—but these either did little to reduce Party domin-
ation of East German citizens or, in the case of the Soviets, actually reinforced it.
The Ministry for State Security, known as the Stasi, was the instrument of this
domination, running a system of surveillance and terror that destroyed trust
among citizens, including families; over the lifetime of the regime, 250,000 people
served as full-time Stasi staff while another 600,000 served as informants—and
this in a country of only 17 million. This cruel, pervasive system of arbitrary
power facilitated forms of exploitation more commonly associated with criminal
gangs than states. For example, the Party allowed the West German government
to purchase the freedom of separated family members, political prisoners, and
others (about 33,000 from 1963 to 1989) according to an established schedule of
prices euphemistically called “transit sums”: 4,500 Deutschmarks for a separated
family member, 96,000 for a political prisoner, etc. (Sarotte 2014, 6–14). The East
German state quite literally took its own citizens hostage.
Unsurprisingly, one of the Stasi’s primary jobs was border control, as no
comprehensive system of state terror can long survive if people are free to exit
it. The West German state offered East Germans who could reach its soil an
immediate right to a passport and social services, and the Party therefore realized
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relatively early that limiting citizen mobility would be a sine qua non of its
continued power. The construction of the Berlin Wall starting in 1961 was
prompted by the flight of large numbers of working-age citizens; these efforts
were extended to other parts of the border, where electrified fences, armed guards,
attack dogs, and even antipersonnel mines were used to deter potential “deserters.”
Numerous factors played a role in the eventual collapse of the East German regime,
including Gorbachev’s reform agenda and the protests in Leipzig, Dresden, and
East Berlin in 1989, but the exodus that followed Hungary’s decision to allow East
Germans to transit through their country to Austria and the unintended opening
of the Berlin Wall a mere two months later were crucial, as they sharply intensified
pressure on a weakened regime (ibid.). Voice and exit worked in tandem here to
undermine a totalitarian dictatorship, with exit not only draining the state of
workers (and potential hostages) but also amplifying the voices of those who
remained behind: only accession to citizens’ demands for civil liberties and free
elections would stanch the flow of East Germans to the West.
This example illustrates how mobility can be a threat to those holding political
power and can potentially serve as a tool for those pursuing political freedom.
Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes have long recognized this fact, imposing
restrictions on not just emigration but internal movement as well. China’s
household-registration (hukou) system is a case in point: by limiting the ability
of rural residents to migrate to coastal cities, it disperses dissent and thereby
enhances the stability of Communist rule (Wallace 2014, ch. 6). Conversely,
enabling mobility should limit political power, both by allowing the oppressed
to escape its influence and by making their threats to exit unless they are
accommodated more credible to their oppressors. If mobility could be made
frictionless and political sub-units could be incentivized to compete with each
other for residents in the same way that firms in a perfectly competitive market
compete with one another for customers, political power at the local level, at least,
could be extinguished. Granted, such a scenario is an ideal type that can be
approached but never fully attained in practice; moreover, as we shall see, its very
operation is dependent upon participatory and constitutional supports, so it
could never be a comprehensive substitute for political voice. Nevertheless, this
economic model of political republicanism can serve as a regulative ideal, one
that guides policymaking and helps lessen our reliance on readily corruptible
democratic mechanisms of control.
The canonical statement of this model—which was made in an intellectual
context utterly unconnected with academic political philosophy, much less
republicanism—is Charles Tiebout’s seminal “A Pure Theory of Local Expend-
itures” (Tiebout 1956). This article, a response to Paul Samuelson’s even more
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influential “A Pure Theory of Public Expenditure” (Samuelson 1954), is an
attempt to prove that, contra Samuelson, there is a decentralized, competitive
solution to the free-rider problem in public-goods provision for a certain class of
public goods, viz., local public goods, such as “police and fire protection, education,
hospitals, and courts” (Tiebout 1956, 418). Tiebout envisions a continuum of local
communities offering different mixes of public goods at different prices (i.e., tax
rates), which fully mobile and fully informed “consumer-voters” choose among,
picking the communities that best satisfy their preferences for public goods.
Competition between these communities for residents drives them to produce
their particular mix of goods at the lowest possible cost; threat of entry by new
communities also disciplines the pricing behavior of existing communities, even
those with an apparent monopoly on their public-goods blend.3 A variety of other
assumptions round out the model: there are no negative or positive “spillovers”
across communities (e.g., pollution and pest control, respectively); due to the
presence of a fixed factor, such as land, there exist optimal community sizes at
which average costs are minimized; communities try to attain their optimal size
through various policies, such as tax breaks for new residents and zoning restric-
tions to limit growth; and so forth (Tiebout 1956, 419–20).
One relatively undertheorized aspect of Tiebout’s model is the production side:
how and why do communities produce the particular mix of public goods that
they do? Here is what little he has to say about the matter:
On the production side it is assumed that communities are forced to keep production
costs at a minimum either through the efficiency of city managers or through competition
from other communities. . . . In this model and in reality, the city manager or elected
official who is not able to keep his costs (taxes) low compared with those of similar
communities will find himself out of a job. (Tiebout 1956, 422)
His comments here are consistent with at least a couple of understandings of how
production and budgetary decisions are made: what Wallace Oates refers to as
the “entrepreneurial version” and the “collective-choice version” (Oates 2006,
29–32). The first, which relies entirely on the power of exit and is consequently
most in the spirit of Tiebout’s overall model, treats communities as private
developments started by profit-seeking entrepreneurs who employ managers to
run them. This version turns “consumer-voters” into consumer-movers who vote
solely with their feet, just as consumers in normal markets use choice instead of
voice to pick the kind of product or service they want; democracy is dispensed
3 That is, these communities operate in a “contestable market,” characterized by an absence of
entry/exit barriers and sunk costs and by universal access to public-goods production technologies
(Baumol et al. 1982).
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with entirely, at least internal to the communities themselves. (See, for example,
Sonstelie and Portney 1978 and Henderson 1985.) The second version, on the
other hand, assumes that residents in these communities will be able to vote at
the ballot box as well as with their feet, correcting city managers with both voice
and exit. But as William Fischel has pointed out:
Tiebout’s neglect of local government politics requires only modest amendment of his
model. In most local governments one just has to replace Tiebout’s invisible municipal
managers with the median-voter model. The median voter will want to do most of the same
things that an entrepreneurial private manager would want to do. (Fischel 2001, 96;
emphasis added)
If this is true, however, then political voice will add little to the entrepreneurial
model: we could do away with democratic participation at the local level and end
up with a very similar outcome, but one without the various risks of politics (e.g.,
interest-group “capture” of city managers). In other words, just as workers have
no need for industrial democracy so long as labor markets are perfectly com-
petitive and exit is resourced, so consumer-movers have no need for local
political democracy so long as the locational market is perfectly competitive
and mobility is frictionless.4
To see how this economic model advances republicanism’s objective of non-
domination, consider the case of a denizen of some community on the con-
tinuum who is exposed to arbitrary power exercised by the city manager or some
other functionary. Because mobility is frictionless and communities offering the
same or similar mix of public goods without such arbitrary power either exist or
could freely enter, this denizen and others in the same situation could either exit
or credibly threaten to do so; the dominating community would therefore have to
cease to dominate or, if it refused, lose its population to other communities.
Community officials who try to exploit their residents (e.g., by demanding bribes
or charging extortionate fees for standard services) will suffer the same fate:
perfect competition between communities combined with a mobile citizenry will
tend to drain exploitative jurisdictions of residents (Epple and Zelenitz 1981).
Finally, return to the example with which I started this volume: stop-and-frisks
by police engaged in illicit racial profiling. Under the hypothesized conditions,
such discriminatory actions would also lead to an exodus of residents, this time
4 As Pettit reminds us in a different context, “the second element [voice] is not strictly necessary
for the absence of domination. Even if the exercise of the power—the interference practiced—were
not otherwise under the control of the interferees, the fact that they could set aside the arrangement
at will [e.g., by migrating] would make for a certain sort of control; it would give them the power of
exit” (2014, 221n62).
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racial minorities and those non-minorities outraged by racist cops and complicit
officials. Tiebout’s pure theory of local expenditures, just like the theory of perfect
competition in product and factor markets, is therefore properly described as an
economic model of (political) republicanism.5
None of this is to say, of course, that community officials in the Tiebout model
will lack discretionary power. As I pointed out in the previous chapter, admin-
istrative efficiency will often require that government agents be permitted “a
substantial degree of discretion,” lest we forego “all possibility of fitting govern-
ment action to the needs of particular cases” (Pettit 1997, 175–6). Discretionary
power need not be arbitrary power, however. The Tiebout model puts citizens in
a position to pick from a continuum of communities differing by kind and degree
of administrative discretion exercised inter alia. Such choice guarantees that this
residual administrative discretion is non-arbitrary, as it “tracks the interests . . . of
the person suffering the interference” (Pettit 1997, 55). These choices will typic-
ally involve tradeoffs (e.g., less discretion may mean higher taxes or a lower
quality of service), but so long as the market in communities is perfectly com-
petitive and mobility is frictionless, such tradeoffs can reasonably be viewed as
tracking citizen interests.
Given the Tiebout model’s radical and at times unrealistic assumptions (e.g.,
the absence of spillovers between communities and the existence of fully
informed/mobile citizen-movers), it may appear distressingly unrelated to the
world that we actually inhabit. As decades of empirical studies have shown,
though, jurisdictional competition does in fact operate in much the way that
the Tiebout model describes. For example, an early article by Oates (1969)
noticed an important implication of Tiebout’s model: if mobile households really
do shop for local public goods at the lowest possible price, then the differential
between local public outputs and local taxes should be reflected in local property
values. Oates tested for this “capitalization” by using a sample of New Jersey local
governments and discovered that increased spending on public schools paid for
with local taxes led to higher property values, precisely as he predicted. Literally
dozens of follow-up studies on capitalization have confirmed Oates’ original
conjecture (Fischel 2001, 39–71). Such shopping around by consumer-movers
5 Though Tiebout does not directly address issues of domination, exploitation, and discrimin-
ation, he does point out that “non-economic variables will also be considered” by citizen-voters in
picking their home, and these three issues would surely play a role in that choice (Tiebout 1956,
418). Moreover, one might convert these non-economic issues into economic ones by seeing them as
just an informal price or tax imposed on residents by dominating, exploitative, and/or discrimin-
atory communities. In either case, though, my attempt to appropriate Tiebout’s theory for repub-
lican purposes is consistent with the spirit of his theory and even, I believe, its letter.
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should also force local governments to be more efficient, and there is a substantial
literature confirming this Tiebout hypothesis as well. Hoxby (2000), for instance,
finds that local public-school competition (as measured by the number of public-
school districts in a student’s metropolitan statistical area) has a significant
positive effect on test scores. Robert Inman sums up the numerous empirical
tests of the Tiebout model as follows:
Though piecemeal, the econometric evidence is uniformly supportive of the Tiebout
conjecture. Households demand local public goods in a manner consistent with utility
maximization. Local governments supply local public goods in a manner consistent with
cost minimization. Local fiscal competition within large metropolitan areas control local
government costs and appears to provide sufficient choice to households to ensure overall
allocative efficiency. (Inman 2006, 52)
These studies might leave the false impression that jurisdictional competition and
citizen mobility are important primarily for their ability to deliver good public
educations to the children of well-heeled homeowners, but they are even more
important for the benefits they deliver to the most vulnerable members of our
nation. Historical examples abound of disadvantaged minorities who have fled
domination, exploitation, and discrimination in one part of the country for a
better life in another, in the process generating pressure for change both in their
new homes and in the places they left behind. The most famous of these were the
various phases of the Great Migration of African Americans out of the South
during the Jim Crow era (Wilkerson 2010). This exodus to the North, West, and
more tolerant parts of the South not only enriched the cultures of these regions
and catalyzed political change there but also forced especially intolerant Southern
cities and states to modify their oppressive policies (e.g., by cracking down on
lynching and improving property protections and educational opportunities) so
as to retain their cheap supply of domestic and agricultural labor (Somin 2010,
218). A similar, if less dramatic, process can be observed in the internal migration
of gays and lesbians to more tolerant cities and states (Clark 2003).
What these examples indicate, however, is not just the promise of Tiebout
sorting and the interjurisdictional competition it induces but also their limits, at
least under historical conditions. The ongoing liberation of African Americans,
gays, and lesbians from various forms of localized oppression, although certainly
helped by foot voting, has mostly been driven by participatory and constitutional
means (e.g., the various referenda, legislative votes, and court decisions to legalize
gay marriage, usually over local objections). These apparent limits of the Tiebout
model are due not to intrinsic problems with it but rather to a failure to secure its
preconditions: viz., resourced exit and robust competition. The right to exit local
jurisdictions remains formal, not substantive, and interjurisdictional competition
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has been suppressed by various characteristics of federal and state constitutions,
laws, and policies. The tragic consequences of the failure to resource exit can be
seen most clearly in the historical “black flight” example from Chapter 1 and the
related but contemporary controversy about police abuse in minority communi-
ties, ranging from the kind of profiling discussed above to racially-motivated
assault and even murder. The African Americans who remain trapped in these
dysfunctional inner-city communities lack the resources to move on and, even if
they had them, may be misinformed about opportunities elsewhere, whether in
terms of superior policing and other local services (such as schools) or better
job markets. In order for jurisdictional competition to play a constructive role in
the lives of our least-advantaged citizens, more will have to be done to enable their
exit from abusive—or simply neglectful—communities and to cause the leaders of
these communities to anticipate the fiscal and economic pain of their departure.
Consider first the issue of mobility. Interstate freedom of movement has been
recognized as a fundamental constitutional right at least since Corfield v. Coryell
(1823), which was an early circuit-court decision, but the US Supreme Court case
Saenz v. Roe (1999), which relies upon the Constitution’s “privileges and immun-
ities” clause and its Fourteenth Amendment citizenship clause, rendered it
official.6 This constitutional entrenchment of the right to enter and exit local
jurisdictions is merely a formal protection, however, not a substantive one:
ignorance or poverty may seriously undermine one’s willingness or ability to
exercise this right. Certain actions by the federal government, like its interstate
transportation-infrastructure investments, may have helped the least advantaged
exercise it, but on the whole moving has remained a do-it-yourself project, one
that the educated and the affluent have historically found easier to accomplish.
In this context, it is important to note that mobility rates in the United States
have been falling since the mid-1960s, from about 20 percent of the population
switching residences each year to a little over 11 percent today (Ihrke 2014, 1).
There has been ample speculation about the fundamental causes of this secular
trend, especially demographic ones (e.g., an aging population and increase in the
number of two-earner households, both of which should depress mobility),
though other, less noticed changes to the economy might be the true culprits,
including increasing homogeneity in labor markets and better, more readily
available information about those markets (Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl
2013). For our purposes, though, what is most disturbing about these mobility
6 Similar protection for the liberties of movement and residence was effectively provided by
Article 12 of the Treaty of Rome (European Union 1957), which established the European Economic
Community.
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statistics are the differences across socioeconomic groups. Consider just two
striking examples: about half of college graduates leave their birth states by age
thirty, but only 27 percent of high-school graduates and 17 percent of high-
school dropouts do (Moretti 2012, 157); among intercounty movers in 2013,
those earning under $30,000 per year were about 30 percent less likely to make
a “national” move (over 500 miles) as those over $30,000 per year (US Census
Bureau 2013). This relative lack of both interstate and interregional mobility
among the less educated and poor can be traced in large part to financial
factors, such as the expense of a long move and the need to remain close to a
network of family and friends who can be relied upon for support in hard
times, but also to difficulties in accessing and evaluating information
about work opportunities, housing costs, and the quality of public services in
distant cities.
Such immobility is costly. At the Great Recession’s peak, for example,
unemployment in Detroit reached 20 percent, but just 500 miles to the west in
Iowa City it was a mere 4 percent (Moretti 2012, 157). The ability to move
in search of work can yield large dividends in the face of this degree of variation
in unemployment rates. Moreover, as Enrico Moretti has argued in his recent
book The New Geography of Jobs, job creation—both skilled and unskilled—is
highly concentrated in a handful of national “innovation hubs,” including places
like the San Francisco Bay Area, Austin, Raleigh-Durham, Boston-Cambridge,
San Diego, New York City, Washington (DC), Seattle, and Portland (Moretti
2012, especially chs 2 and 3). Getting to these areas is essential—and not just for
work: they are also characterized by better health and longevity, lower rates of
divorce, higher rates of political participation and charitable giving, and greater
intergenerational income mobility, with the last driven in part by higher-quality
public education (Moretti 2012, 107–20; Chetty et al. 2014, Chetty et al. 2015,
Chetty and Hendren 2015).
Increasing mobility rates for the least advantaged is a daunting task, one that
will have to proceed along a variety of different policy dimensions. One of the
most important dimensions is informational: getting high-quality, easy-to-digest
data about employment opportunities, housing costs, and school quality in
different metropolitan areas into the hands of the poor. Although the various
government statistical bureaus will have to play a central role in this, such an
effort will be for naught unless the poor can access the place where such
information is most easily posted: the Internet. The so-called “digital divide”
places the poor at a great disadvantage in access to the Internet: only 40 percent
of those earning under $30,000 per year have broadband at home, compared to
87 percent of those earning over $75,000 per year (Jansen 2010). Bridging this
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divide might be done directly, through home-broadband subsidies, or indirectly,
by improving Internet access at public libraries.
Even if the poor were fully informed about such opportunities, though, various
obstacles to moving remain in their way. One that has been mostly removed by
the Affordable Care Act is the absence of health-insurance portability. Another is
the risk of losing various kinds of welfare support: unless these are portable
too, the poor will be resistant to moving, especially when such moves will take
them far away from the support networks of friends and family. Welfare reforms
that gave the states greater discretion in designing programs, determining eligi-
bility, etc., have been fruitful in many ways, but the federal government still has a
key role to play in coordinating these efforts so that mobility among recipients is
not discouraged, perhaps by assuring a decent social minimum that is invariant
across states (Spitz 2009, 296). Another obstacle that will occur to anyone who is
familiar with the innovation hubs listed above is housing costs: these are very
desirable locations and have correspondingly pricey rental markets. Rental vou-
chers for the poor are one way of dealing with this problem, but so are efforts to
increase the supply of affordable housing in these places, whether by modifying
zoning laws to allow denser growth or improving public transit so the poor can
commute more easily (Moretti 2012, 176–7; The Economist 2016).
The most direct and radical approach to improving the mobility of the poor—
but also the most promising, I think—is relocation vouchers that cover some or
all of the costs of an intercity move, including moving expenses proper (moving
van, air flights, etc.), security deposits on new apartments, and so on. The federal
Trade Adjustment Assistance program, which helps workers who have lost their
jobs to foreign trade, already offers relocation assistance; such aid could and
should be extended to the entire pool of disadvantaged workers (Moretti 2012,
163). The results of an experiment run in the 1990s suggest that relocation
vouchers could offer significant benefits for the uneducated and the poor. In
the Move to Opportunity (MTO) program, randomly-selected residents of public
housing in Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York were offered
mobility counseling and a housing voucher to move to a different, less impover-
ished part of the city. Five years later, the experimental group had made sub-
stantial improvements over the control group in terms of both obesity reduction
and mental health (distress, depression, anxiety, sleep, and calmness); unfortu-
nately, adult economic self-sufficiency (earnings, welfare support) was unaffected
(Kling et al. 2007). One reason for this last result, however, is relatively easy to
discern: MTO only enabled moves within cities, but as Moretti remarks, “today it
is differences across cities that are more likely to be the source of mismatch
[between where the poor live and where the jobs are]” (Moretti 2012, 163–4;
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cf. Chetty et al. 2015; Wilson 1987). So my proposed relocation voucher might
best be restricted to intercity moves, as I originally suggested, in order to
encourage resettlement in places with better job prospects, public services, etc.
As we have seen, increasing mobility among our least-advantaged citizens is a
promising way to reduce their vulnerability to arbitrary power and improve their
welfare. Cities vary widely in the quality of their public services (especially their
schools and policing) and job markets, so converting the poor’s merely formal
right of geographic exit to a substantive one offers them the same kinds of
opportunities the more affluent have to restart their lives in richer, safer, and
more progressive places. But this only deals with the demand side of the problem,
so to speak. In order for our economic model of political republicanism to reach
its full potential, we must also make sure that cities face the proper incentives to
supply the most attractive mixes of public services at the lowest possible prices
(i.e., tax rates). In other words, we must do everything in our power to intensify
jurisdictional competition for a newly mobile citizenry; we can then reasonably
hope to approach if not reach the ideal of a perfectly competitive locational
marketplace, one that purges power from the political system and thereby
establishes full political freedom, at least at the local level.
How might this interjurisdictional struggle be amplified? The most effective way
to do so is with subsidiarity, i.e., “the principle that a central authority should have
a subsidiary function, performing only those tasks which cannot be performed
effectively at a more immediate or local level” (OED Online 2015). The form of
subsidiarity that is most relevant in our context is fiscal federalism, which decen-
tralizes tax-and-spending decisions for local public goods to the relevant level of
government (city, county, state, etc.), leaving the federal government to handle
spillover effects across jurisdictions (by means of policy coordination, compensa-
tory taxes and subsidies, etc.), deliver truly national public goods (e.g., national
defense), ensure macroeconomic stability, and engage in income redistribution
(Oates 1999, 1121–2). As Oates explains, doing so will best promote social welfare:
By tailoring the outputs of [local public] goods and services to the particular preferences
and circumstances of their constituencies, decentralized provision increases economic
welfare above that which results from the more uniform levels of such services that are
likely under national provision. The basic point here is simply that the efficient level of
output of a local public good . . . is likely to vary across jurisdictions as a result of both
differences in preferences and cost differentials. (Ibid.)7
7 Oates (1972, 35, 54–63) provides a “Decentralization Theorem” that enumerates the sufficient
conditions for fiscal federalism to be welfare-enhancing.
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Because Tiebout sorting will make jurisdictions more homogeneous in terms of
demand for local public goods, it will tend to increase the welfare gains of fiscal
decentralization (Oates 2006, 40). For our purposes, though, the greatest advan-
tage of fiscal federalism is its effect of putting every fiscal tub on its own bottom,
i.e., forcing every local jurisdiction to pay for its own public goods. As a
consequence of this, local government will have a robust incentive to attract
and keep both residents and businesses, lest its tax base vanish and its public-
goods mix become unaffordable. This induced competition for a mobile citizenry
will constrain the ability of local governments to exploit, dominate, and discrim-
inate against their residents—even, in the limit, wholly eliminating it. Fiscal
federalism, by offering supply-side incentives to complement our demand-side
mobility resourcing, completes the economic model of political republicanism.8
Throwing every jurisdiction on its own resources may appear unfair, given that
some are likely to be poorer than others. The solution to this problem, however, is
not redistribution from one jurisdiction to another, much less a return to fiscal
centralism, but rather redistribution from rich to poor individuals on a national
basis. As I remarked above, fiscal federalism assumes that income redistribution
will have to be organized at the federal level: otherwise, local governments that
engage in substantial redistribution will attract poor residents and cause richer
ones to flee, leading to fiscal insolvency.9 That such “social dumping” might
occur is no argument for overall fiscal centralization, though: as Robert Inman
wryly points out, “to combat hunger, we subsidize the poor’s purchase of food; we
do not shut down the marketplace and centralize food production and allocation”
(Inman 2006, 53). In fact, general fiscal centralization tends to create a version of
the so-called “resource curse” (Auty 1993): local governments, as dependents
of the central state that finances them, have no incentive to attend to the needs of
their own residents and businesses because foot voting has no effect on their
bottom line—unless the central state attempts to mimic the pressure of foot
voting in the Tiebout model by linking fiscal disbursements to population or
business counts.
8 So far, I have assumed that geographic exit is done by individuals or households, but we could
also imagine entire jurisdictions exiting, i.e., secession. Entrenching such a collective exit right might
help geographically-concentrated minorities resist domination by leaving or threatening to do so.
See Weinstock (2001, 80–1) for further discussion.
9 Note that federal organization of redistribution is not necessarily inconsistent with a certain
degree of local or state discretion in carrying out federal mandates: the informational advantages of
such discretion (e.g., allowing a degree of experimentation and learning that, if successful, can be
observed and copied by others) might compensate for any disadvantages, such as somewhat unequal
support for the poor across jurisdictions. This was presumably part of the justification for certain
Clinton-era welfare reforms.
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This last example raises the question of what residual role participatory and
constitutional checks may have in our proposed economic model, especially at
the local level. Quoting Fischel, I noted earlier that if “entrepreneurial private
managers” of cities want to do much the same thing as the median voter, then the
entrepreneurial and collective-choice versions of the Tiebout model will generate
similar results, rendering local democracy superfluous or even contraindicated.
The success of this claim depends upon the assumptions of the Tiebout model
being met, though, and there are reasons to believe that they will not be met and
that the ideal of a perfectly competitive locational marketplace will be harder to
approximate than I have implied so far. On the demand side, frictionless mobility
will be difficult to approach, much less achieve, even with the kind of resourcing
that I suggested above: quitting your job, selling your house, and leaving your
family and friends behind to relocate to a distant city is likely to have major
professional, financial, and psychic costs that will discourage many, especially the
risk averse. On the supply side, difficulty in establishing new jurisdictions or
changing the operation of existing ones will limit competitive pressure on
incumbents, creating enough space for arbitrary power to creep back into the
system. The analogy I have been relying on throughout this chapter—namely,
that locational competition between jurisdictions for a mobile citizenry is like the
competition between businesses in product and factor markets for customers—is
problematic, because it is considerably easier to stop using one business in favor
of its nearby competitor than it is to move to another city with better public
services than your own, and it is much simpler to open a new business to compete
with cossetted incumbents than it is to start a new city or take over an old one.
Political freedom cannot simply be reduced to market freedom.
Consequently, participatory and constitutional checks will be required to
complement the kind of pressure that resourced exit and enhanced competition
can bring to bear on local political leaders, whether in the form of local elections
or federal supervision and regulation of these local authorities. More generally,
what we must do in order to minimize political domination is find an optimal
mix of accountability mechanisms, one that will vary by level in the hierarchy of
federal institutions. Such variation should follow a predictable pattern: the lower
we go in the hierarchy, the more we will be able to rely upon exit and the less we
will have to rely upon voice—though we will never be able to dispense with voice,
despite its challenges. As I have argued throughout the chapter, the closer we
get to the level of the city or neighborhood, the easier it is to move and the
more nearby options we have for moving; this increases competitive pressures,
especially if mobility is properly resourced and fiscal federalism is in place.
Conversely, the closer we get to the level of the state or nation, the harder it is
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to move and the fewer options we have for moving away; consequently,
competitive pressures are weak, and participatory and constitutional checks
will become increasingly important, even dominant. At the national level, in
fact, the economic model of political republicanism loses most its force as an
accountability mechanism: emigration is just too difficult and expensive to serve
as an effective check—except for wealthy individuals and multinationals—and
this fundamental limitation cannot be finessed with mobility vouchers and the
like, at least at this time. Note, moreover, that only this federal framework can
make our economic model an effective accountability mechanism at the lower
levels of the hierarchy, that only it can offer the various resources for intercity and
interstate mobility and provide state and local governments with the proper
incentives to compete. Political voice at the national level, in other words, turns
out to be a crucial condition for successful political exit at the state and local
level—a point to which I shall return in the chapter’s conclusion.10
Political Freedom as Antipower
For a moment, however, I want to set to one side these limitations of the
economic model in order to explore more thoroughly its capacity for curbing
arbitrary power. The political model, after all, has monopolized attention in the
republican literature until now, with Pettit’s two major republican texts relying
very heavily on it. As a consequence, I do not believe we are sufficiently
cognizant—or even conscious at all—of the economic model’s advantages
vis-à-vis the political model. For this reason, I will continue for now to discuss
10 My Tiebout-inspired market model of political freedom may remind some of the apparently
similar models found in Nozick (1974, 297–334) and Kukathas (2003). Both feature a minimal
political framework within which citizens found, enter, and leave voluntary associations of diverse
kinds—cultural, religious, and so on—with the state’s job being largely limited to ensuring peaceful
coexistence (and friendly competition) among associations and protecting the right of citizens to
exit from them. However, unlike my model, which is motivated by a desire to secure freedom
as non-domination, these models are motivated by a specifically libertarian concern for freedom as
non-interference, which explains why the exit rights they offer are entirely formal (Nozick 1974,
320–1, 333; Kukathas 2003, 107–14). As Kukathas himself states, his theory “does not place any great
weight on choice, and emphasizes not so much the importance of decisions (to associate or
dissociate) being voluntary as the value of their not being forced” (112). The “minimalist . . . view
of the right of exit” found in both Nozick and Kukathas leads to worrying results, as associations
would be permitted to “bring up children unschooled and illiterate . . . enforce arranged marriages . . .
deny conventional medical care to their members (including children) . . . and . . . inflict cruel and
‘unusual’ punishment” (Kukathas 2003, 109, 134). Such FND-inconsistent associations would be
ruled out by the much more substantive right of exit found in my model as well as by the ongoing
constitutional and participatory restraints of the supplemental political model. In sharp contrast to my
model, their models ignore and even exacerbate the fundamental problem of arbitrary power.
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the ideal form of the economic model, as doing so will allow us to see much more
clearly its unusual strengths, even if it requires us to overlook its weaknesses
temporarily.
The perfectly competitive locational market ensured by the economic model is
antipower in the precise sense spelled out by Pettit: specifically, participants in
this market have no capacity to interfere with impunity and at will with the
political interests of other participants. They enjoy no capacity to interfere at will
because equilibrium tax and spending mixes across jurisdictions are set by the
impersonal forces of supply (courtesy fiscal federalism) and demand (thanks to
the frictionless mobility of citizens); consequently, there is no room for discre-
tionary manipulation of these fiscal tools, either legal (e.g., exploitative taxes) or
illegal (e.g., bribery), and therefore no leeway for the arbitrary exercise of political
power. Any such attempt to deviate from these equilibrium mixes will lead to an
exodus of citizens and, given fiscal federalism, the punishment of reduced
revenues and fiscal insolvency; hence, participants also have no capacity to
interfere with impunity. These features of a perfectly competitive locational
market are antipower not just in Pettit’s procedural sense but in his substantive
sense as well, because they “track the interests” of the participants in at least one
important way: under the admittedly counterfactual conditions of the ideal form
of the economic model, interjurisdictional competition will generate a welfare
optimum, securing both allocative efficiency (optimal sorting of citizens across
jurisdictions) and productive efficiency (lowest-cost production of each jurisdic-
tion’s particular public-goods mix) and thereby making the shared political pie as
large as possible—a result that is in the interest of all participants, differ as they
may on how that pie should be divided up.11
Another way to see that competitive locational markets are antipower is to
show that they bring about (equal) popular control of government. As Pettit
argues, “if the citizenry control state discretion in a suitable manner—in a way
that parallels your control over the person who holds the key to your alcohol
cupboard—then the imposition of social order on those citizens will not take
away from their freedom and will count as fully legitimate” (2012, 160). What is
11 For a proof of this claim—the Tiebout Theorem—and the conditions under which it will hold,
see Wooders 1989. This theorem is just the political equivalent of the First Welfare Theorem, first
proved in Debreu 1959. Here would also be a good point to acknowledge the existence of a Tiebout
(sub)literature that focuses almost exclusively on the productive-efficiency advantages of interjur-
isdictional competition: the so-called “competitive federalism” strand, including such seminal pieces
as Buchanan (1996), Epstein (1992), Qian and Roland (1998), and Weingast (1995). Buchanan
frankly acknowledges his use of a “Tiebout-like regime” (1996, 261), but others in this subliterature
(e.g., Weingast 1995, 88) engage in more product differentiation without really showing that they
have moved beyond the Tiebout framework.
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required to make such control operative, though? Pettit identifies three precon-
ditions for meaningful popular control of the state: individualization, uncondi-
tionality, and efficacy. I will describe each of these in turn, showing how the
economic model meets them and thereby promotes political freedom:
1. Individualization: Pettit contends that “a system of control will have to
guard against the domination of individual citizens, not just the domination
of the collective citizenry,” and will consequently have to grant “a
comparable role to each of the individuals involved in the exercise of
control” (2012, 167–8). He remarks that such individualized control
might take two forms—a “personal” control in the form of an “individual
veto” or “equal right of exit,” or an equal share in a form of “joint” control—
but he dismisses the possibility of the former for reasons to which I will
return below. Notice, however, that the economic model we have been
examining in this chapter offers control of the former, personal type.
Such control is individualized in the strictest sense possible: each citizen
has a unilateral power to change the kind of government under which he
lives by simply moving to a new jurisdiction, and thanks to both resourced
mobility and the numerous options available in a competitive locational
market, he will be able to choose the form of government that he wants.
Clearly, no system of joint control can offer this degree of individualization,
even if it happens to be perfectly transparent, contestable, and impartial
(2012, 209–18).
2. Unconditionality: Pettit also requires that this control be “unconditioned
in the sense of being robust over changes in the will of the controlled
government, or indeed of any party other than the controlling people”
(2012, 167). In other words, the ability of the people to get the government
to do what they want must not be dependent upon “the willingness of
government to go along . . . [or] of the willingness of any other agency [like
“an effectively independent army, a group of moneyed supporters, or even a
foreign power”] to have the government go along” (2012, 172). He goes on to
argue that such unconditionality will best be achieved if political society has a
“resistive character,” such that “government is likely to be resistance-averse,
and . . . the people are likely to be resistance-prone” (2012, 218–29). The
economic model gives society just such a resistive character, though not by
the usual political means: the government is made resistance-averse not
through a “mixed constitution” that divides powers but rather through fiscal
federalism, which makes every jurisdiction as financially self-supporting as
possible and thus anxious to retain residents and businesses; the people, on
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the other hand, are rendered resistance-prone not by means of their virtuous
vigilance and the collective agency of their social movements but rather by
resourced mobility, which makes them willing and able to abandon abusive
jurisdictions or credibly threaten to do so (ibid.).
3. Efficacy: Finally, Pettit insists that control “be effective or efficacious
enough to impose a popular direction on government that nullifies the
intrusion of alien will” from the likes of elected politicians, private lobbies,
or unelected bureaucrats; their abuse is enabled by the “range of discretion”
that accompanies the crafting, application, and interpretation of laws and
policies (2012, 175–6, 229–38). Pettit offers a “tough-luck test” to judge
whether such groups use their discretionary powers to take advantage of the
citizenry: “the point of legitimacy is to ensure that you and your fellow
citizens are not subject to an alien, controlling will, despite the fact that
there may be a good deal of discretion exercised by those in power. Such
legitimacy will be adequately ensured . . . to the extent that you and your
fellows have good grounds to think that any unwelcome results of public
decision-making are just tough luck” (177). Again, the economic model can
be judged efficacious by this tough-luck test. As I pointed out earlier,
discretionary power exercised within the Tiebout model is not arbitrary
power because jurisdictions are constrained by both robust competition
and mobile citizens, who choose from a continuum of communities differ-
ing by kind and degree of administrative discretion exercised inter alia.
Because the number of viable jurisdictions has to be (substantially) less than
the size of the overall population, it might be the case that citizens cannot
find jurisdictions that perfectly match their ideal, whether in terms of
administrative discretion, public goods, taxation, etc., but this need to settle
for good-enough matches can be reasonably ascribed to tough luck rather
than the machinations of some alien will.
As I acknowledged at the close of the last section, our economic model will
fully possess these antipower characteristics only if all its assumptions are met,
but there are many reasons to think they will not be: mobility will be far from
frictionless, even if generously resourced; limits on the creation of new jurisdic-
tions and on the capture of old ones (via “strong-mayor” systems or some species
of receivership) will take the edge off interjurisdictional competition, etc. Before
we summarily dismiss the economic model’s antipower potential, though, we
should realize that the alternative, political model to which it must be compared
will itself fall short of its ideal form in a variety of ways, as Pettit frankly admits:
even with participatory and constitutional checks in place, majoritarian tyranny
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will remain a danger, as will legislative gridlock, executive abuse of power,
bureaucratic empire-building, judicial overreach, and interest-group rent-
seeking (2012, 176, 211–13, 232–8). Moreover, because rational voters will
grasp that the likelihood of casting the decisive vote is exceptionally small, they
will invest little time and effort in becoming politically informed, making rational
ignorance the norm and degrading the quality of democratic oversight in the
process (Downs 1957, ch.13). Finally, the problem of free-riding behavior will
make the formation of broad-based social movements a challenge and may limit
their effectiveness as checks on arbitrary power (Olson 1971). So once we
compare the economic and political models in the full light of their particular
limitations, we will begin to understand the need for a mix of accountability
mechanisms, one that takes into account their respective strengths and weak-
nesses and their tendency to vary by level of government. As I argued at the end
of the last section, the economic model is at its strongest at the local and
neighborhood level, though even there it must be supplemented by participatory
and constitutional checks; as we move up the hierarchy of the federal system, it
becomes decreasingly effective, leaving little but the political model to rely on at
the national level. Regardless of its limitations, however, exit still has a vitally
important role to play in promoting political freedom.
As I mentioned above, Pettit seems to deny this role to exit: he says that
“citizens will not be able to think of themselves as exercising a personal control
over the state. . . . [E]stablishing a general right of veto or exit would be
inconsistent with the state’s continued existence as a corporate agent that can
reliably generate and implement law, since it would put it at the mercy of
individual whim” (2012, 167–8; cf. 161–2, 165–6). Federal systems, however,
call this claim into question, because they protect freedom of movement across
their constituent self-governing sub-units—be they neighborhoods, cities, coun-
ties, provinces, or (within the European Union’s Schengen Area) nation-states—
without placing the legal authority of either the federation or its sub-units in
jeopardy. In fact, our economic model demonstrates that resourced mobility,
when combined with fiscal federalism, can help federations promote their citi-
zens’ welfare and reduce their vulnerability to domination. In this case, at least,
exit enhances state capacities rather than threatening them. Interestingly, Pettit
does recognize exit’s potential to constrain domination in a different political
context: he sees threats of “resistance,” which he associates with “revolution or
rebellion,” as a means of disciplining the state and making popular control
truly unconditional, and such resistance could be viewed as an illegal “exiting
in place,” an extraconstitutional check on the power of the state that might
(paradoxically) be enabled through constitutional provisions, such as the US
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Second Amendment (2012, 137–40, 173–4; Halbrook 1984). Pettit follows in the
footsteps of the republican luminary John Locke here, as he is the first to
recognize (Locke 1988, 406–28; Pettit 1997, 202, 2012, 173, 292). This conception
of exit, however, remains within the bounds of the political model, working by
analogy with constitutional checks and balances, and is profoundly different
from the economic model’s understanding of exit as resourced mobility within
a perfectly competitive locational market.
There is one other way in which the economic model I have defended in this
chapter may appear at odds with some of Pettit’s claims. In Republicanism, Pettit
is highly critical of interest-group pluralism, which he accuses of “backgrounding
reason” in the following fashion: “it would argue that the best way to organize
things in public life is to have a framework which means that things will happen
according to reason—in particular, things will happen so as to produce max-
imum preference satisfaction—if people within that framework each look only to
furthering their own interests” (1997, 203–4). In short, it reduces politics to
economics, sidelining the public decision-makers who have to “make their
decisions, and . . . make them transparently, on the basis of certain neutral con-
siderations” and putting in their place an “invisible hand” that promotes the
welfare of all by means of interest-group competition within a political market-
place (ibid.). This critique of interest-group pluralism looks like one that would
apply equally well to my economic model. I would suggest, however, that Pettit’s
later writings offer a way to avoid this conclusion. In On the People’s Terms, Pettit
points out that “the influence exercised in control” need not be “active,” i.e.,
involving “positive input on the part of the controller”; it may instead be
“virtual,” such that the controller is “poised to intervene, but only if the inter-
vention is needed to keep the [system] on track” (2012, 156). That is, automatic
stabilizers may be in place to keep a system in proper operating order, though
these stabilizers may fail at times; so long as a controller has the power to
intervene when such failures occur, we may think of him as being in virtual
control of the system even when he is doing nothing. Pettit himself applies this
insight to political “systems of shared control” that “include systems in which
voting plays only a subsidiary part, or perhaps no part at all,” as “we have seen
that control may be exercised on the basis of . . . virtual influence” (2012, 168).
Our economic model is just such a system: the combination of resourced mobility
and fiscal federalism creates a framework within which individuals pursuing their
own interests will unintentionally advance certain public ends (e.g., the general
welfare, non-domination), but that framework is itself originally created and
continuously monitored by popular controllers (or rather their representatives)
who are empowered to intervene should the system fail to do its job. Pettit
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therefore has the theoretical resources available to incorporate our economic
model into his preferred form of republicanism without serious tension.12
Even if this economic model can be successfully incorporated into Pettit’s
republicanism, however, the question remains of whether it should be, and more
communitarian republicans are likely to think not.13 In fact, Richard Dagger has
explicitly criticized the Tiebout model, calling it a “cafeteria or shopping-mall
conception of metropolis” and condemning its implicit treatment of politics as
“merely another form of market activity” (Dagger 1997, 154). Dagger worries that
the size, fragmentation, and especially high mobility associated with American
cities jeopardize the preconditions of democratic self-government and thus of the
reliable tracking of citizen interests and ideas. The power of exit, rather than
being a way to check arbitrary power, is instead its principal enabler: mobility
detaches and alienates citizens from the places where they live and converts them
into “citizen-consumers” who shop for cities as they shop for clothes, unwisely
depending upon the “supposedly apolitical professionals” who run cities to offer
a wide range of public services at modest prices (154, 159). Only a small, stable
urban environment with public-spirited citizens—something more closely
resembling the city-state of classical antiquity than the sprawling, anonymous
metropolis of modernity—can sustain republican liberty (155–6). He goes on to
suggest a host of reform measures to create and sustain such urban environ-
ments, including greenbelt legislation, restrictions on expressways and intercity
rail, “redistributing population” to “small, stable, well-defined cities,” and using
“the selective incentive of coercion to encourage men and women to join in
community affairs” via “compulsory voting schemes” and mandatory commu-
nity service (168–9). Dagger, in short, offers a vision of urban life that is a
photographic negative of the Tiebout model: stability in place of flux, voice in
place of exit, and civic duty in place of private freedom.14
Many if not most of Dagger’s concerns here are reasonable ones, but I have
doubts about whether they lead to his particular policy conclusions. For example,
under current circumstances, I agree with Dagger that mobility is likely to have
12 Also see Pettit’s earlier work on active versus virtual discursive control (1995; 2001, 38–9, 76–7,
91–3). I set aside the question of whether Pettit should revise his critique of interest-group pluralism in
light of what I have said here.
13 I focus here on Dagger (1997, 154–72), but what he argues would almost certainly be seconded
by Michael Sandel (1996, 2012), though admittedly he does not address the mobility issue directly.
Interestingly, even Pettit complains that urban livability rankings “treat residents as consumers of
cities . . . not properly as citizens” (2014, 109).
14 The one point of overlap between the two is political decentralization, though in Dagger’s
model it serves to build familiarity and solidarity with fellow citizens rather than efficiency and a
business-like responsiveness among urban managers (168–9).
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some pernicious consequences, including ones that make certain forms of
domination more likely. As he points out, the well-educated are most likely
to move, yet they provide much civic leadership, and their flight from failing
communities can accelerate their decline (163). Moreover, continuing and
substantial fiscal subsidies to cities insulate them to some degree from the
pressures of interjurisdictional competition, creating space for various kinds
of discrimination, exploitation, and domination. I would contend, however,
that the problem here is not the Tiebout model itself but rather a failure to
secure its preconditions. As I have argued throughout the book, resourced exit
and heightened competition are essential to making a market-oriented
approach to curbing domination successful, and in the current context that
would require better resourced mobility—especially for the poor and less
educated—as well as a stricter fiscal federalism. So while it is true that, within
a certain range of mobility, more of it can be counterproductive, the trick is to
get beyond that range, and only by doubling down on a market-oriented
approach can we do so.
Dagger, of course, has given us another approach. Rather than moving from a
partial-exit to a free-exit world, he says that we should revert to something closer
to a no-exit world: double down on where we live now, build community there,
and fight forces that would undermine it. I admit to seeing the appeal of this
strategy and can imagine situations where it would work, but I have concerns
about its general applicability and even feasibility, especially in a modern, liberal
society where citizens are rightly free (not) to associate, advocate, etc. For the sake
of argument, though, let us assume that it is generally applicable and feasible. Is it
desirable? I would maintain that it is not for the one group republicans should be
most concerned about: the least advantaged. Poverty in the United States, as in
many countries, is geographically concentrated, in our case in such places as the
inner cities, rural Appalachia, and the Mississippi Delta. These communities have
seen their most affluent, educated, and active citizens leave; it is simply too late to
stop an exodus that has already occurred. Urging residents of these localities to
build community where they live, even if it were promoted and resourced by state
authorities, is unlikely to lead to major changes in their life prospects or those of
their children: the jobs have gone and are not going to return, and folks left in the
wake of deindustrialization and the decline of small-scale agriculture generally
lack the skills and connections to effect such transformations. I think the best
approach in these dire circumstances is the alternative outlined in this chapter:
mobility vouchers, perhaps combined with “nudges” of the sort advocated by
Thaler and Sunstein (e.g., allowing recipients of state aid to receive large advances
on their support if they agree to move to one of America’s innovation hubs)
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(Moretti 2012, 163–4; Thaler and Sunstein 2009).15 The results of the Move to
Opportunity program I discussed above suggest that such vouchers would
substantially improve the mental and physical health of adult recipients and
the educational and employment prospects of their children (Kling et al. 2007;
Chetty et al. 2015). Unattractive as it may be, the best solution to the problem of
entrenched poverty and the ills, political and otherwise, that accompany it may
be the resourced abandonment of the communities in question. This is an
expensive proposition, to be sure, but given that the federal government alone
spends over $13,000 each year per person in poverty—and even that figure only
includes support via means-tested programs—much of this can be accomplished
by reallocating rather than increasing spending (Haskins 2012, 1–2).
Having said all this, I agree with Dagger about one of his central claims: the
importance of voice in constraining political domination. Even at the local level
we cannot entirely dispense with participatory and constitutional approaches,
and at the national level they are essentially the only tools at hand. Where
I disagree is over the part that geographic exit, i.e., mobility, can play. As we
have seen in the East German example and throughout the book, exit can act not
simply as a substitute for voice but as a complement to it, empowering voice by
increasing the credibility of citizen threats. Moreover, as we move down the
hierarchy of federal institutions, it can take on a greater and greater role in
curbing domination so long as it is properly resourced and combined with fiscal
federalism. Far from being a danger to republican liberty, mobility is—or at least
can be—its most important guarantor at the local and neighborhood level.
The importance of political voice at the national level raises a question that
I sidestepped during my discussion of Hirschman in Chapter 1: what part, if any,
does loyalty have to play in a republican theory? Hirschman defines loyalty as a
“special attachment to an organization,” such that it will discourage exit; in other
words, he conceives of loyalty as an extra psychic barrier to exit, a price that must
be paid to leave—and one that increases the more loyal one is (1970, 77). How
important could loyalty be, then, at the national level, where exit is already quite
costly and unlikely to occur? Critics of Hirschman have frequently complained
about the narrowness of his conception of loyalty as psychic exit-barrier. Con-
sider the following passage from Brian Barry’s review of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty:
Loyalty does not normally mean a mere reluctance to leave a collectivity but rather a
positive commitment to further its welfare by working for it, fighting for it, and—where
one thinks it has gone astray—seeking to change it. Thus, voice (as well as other forms of
15 A recent Obama housing-voucher initiative in Dallas nudges with both carrots and sticks: see
Appelbaum 2015.
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activity) is already built into the concept of loyalty. Reluctance to leave is not central. . . .
We can check this by noticing that typically “disloyalty” is predicated of someone
who acts contrary to the interests of the collectivity . . . while remaining a member
of it. Someone who leaves is usually described as disloyal only if there is some special
factor, for example that he has defected to another country carrying military secrets
with him. (1974, 98; italics mine)
Barry’s comments suggest two things. First, loyalty can be demonstrated not just
by voice but by exit as well. Actions can speak louder than words, and escaping
from a dysfunctional system can be intended to put additional pressure on that
system in the hope of effecting change, especially if doing so sets an example for
others and heightens public consciousness of the system’s failure. The East
German example is again pertinent: the image of Czechoslovak parking lots filled
with the abandoned cars of fleeing East German citizens offered as eloquent a
testimony to the GDR’s moral bankruptcy as the image of protesters in the streets
of Leipzig (see Sarotte 2014, 31 v. 73).
Second—and setting aside extreme cases such as East Germany, Cuba, North
Korea, etc., for a moment—the importance of loyalty at the national level is difficult
to understand unless we expand its meaning in the way that Barry recommends.
Except where conditions are horrendous, citizens are unlikely to abandon their
country in droves, meaning that exit will usually have little role to play at the
national level. But this does not mean that loyalty, properly understood, has no role
to play. In order for citizens to be willing to exercise voice at the national level,
whether by protesting, lobbying, voting, or serving in public office (elective or
otherwise), they must have a “positive commitment to further [their country’s]
welfare,” at least where their voice is not being exercised for parochial purposes.
Thus, in order to limit political domination at the national level, we must inculcate
a sense of national loyalty via civic education both formal (e.g., civics classes) and
informal (e.g., speeches, parades, wreath-laying ceremonies). The economic model
presented in this chapter can go some way in compensating for deficits in demo-
cratic virtue at the local and neighborhood levels, but no such compensation is
possible at the national level, and none will be for the near future.
The Limits and Potential of Political Freedom
Republicans have traditionally promoted political freedom by political means,
relying on participatory and constitutional checks to avoid (or at least limit)
arbitrary rule. Such efforts have borne impressive fruit: the foundation of con-
stitutional democracies worldwide, beginning with Great Britain and the United
States but spreading in waves over the past two centuries to every corner of the
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earth, is testimony to the power of republican ideas (Huntington 1993). What
I have tried to show in this chapter is that another, economic model exists that
promotes republican ends just as effectively, one that uses both federalism and
the free movement across political sub-units that generally accompanies it to
limit political power and thereby advance political freedom. This market-
oriented approach to political republicanism cannot just supplement but even
substitute for the traditional political model, lessening our reliance on the
vagaries of democratic control.
As I have also acknowledged throughout the chapter, though, such substitu-
tion can never be complete. Even at the local level the political model has a role to
play, and as we move up the federal hierarchy that role becomes increasingly
prominent. Indeed, the very political framework that makes the economic model
possible can only be established through the exercise of voice at the national level:
for instance, the mobility vouchers I have relied upon to make my case have to be
a product of both political entrepreneurship and coalition-building in national
politics. I have expended so much effort promoting this economic model not
in order to reduce political freedom to market freedom but rather to show that, in
order to minimize political domination, we must try to find an optimal mix of
accountability mechanisms, one that will vary by level of government and even
across time but will rarely if ever be all voice or all exit.
At the same time, we should also not underestimate the value of a distinctively
economic approach to the problems of domination. Consider again the mobility
vouchers that have played such an outsized role in this chapter’s argument. These
vouchers can do triple duty by restraining domination across the three spheres of
family, market, and state: they can help wives escape their abusive husbands,
workers flee their overbearing employers, and citizens exit their dysfunctional
communities. Republican freedom demands that we minimize domination across
the private and public realms, and the pairing of markets and mobility can create
synergies over the whole range of human relations. More ambitiously, we can
hope that in the years to come, the spread of open societies, advances in
education, and reductions in transportation costs will make an application of
the economic model to global society possible—a point to which I will return at
book’s end.
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5
Republican Policy Pluralism
Over the last three chapters, I constructed a case for an economic model of
republicanism that contrasts with the currently dominant political model, argu-
ing that indirect empowerment of voice by means of enhanced competition and
resourced exit is a safer and more effective way to curtail total domination
(private plus public) than direct empowerment by either participatory or consti-
tutional means. I conceded that this claim is more persuasive in the domestic and
economic spheres than the political one but that, even there, a greater reliance on
market-like mechanisms to constrain the exercise of arbitrary power by public
agents would be advisable. Whether we are confronting domination in the family,
market, or state, policy instruments that promote divorcive liberty can play a
substantially greater role in advancing republican objectives than contemporary
republicans have previously acknowledged.
This economic model would be accurately described as ideologically center-
left. It entails an exit-oriented state interventionism, one that would require an
activist government to enhance competition and resource exit from dominating
relationships within markets of all types, be they marital, labor, or locational. The
substantial intervention and redistribution required by such an approach make it
leftist, while its tendency to work with rather than against the grain of markets
makes it centrist. It is, in short, a contribution to progressive republican political
thought, but one that is less social-democratic than market-democratic in char-
acter (cf. Tomasi 2012).
Republicans further to the right—e.g., center-right, limited-government
republicans like Friedrich Hayek, whom I will discuss in greater detail below—
might worry, however, that even if these interventions were well chosen
and focused on indirectly enhancing voice as demanded by the economic
model, public domination would remain an ever-present peril, especially as
the state grew in size and power in order to secure the preconditions of effective
exit. I have argued throughout this volume that social-democratic solutions to
the problem of domination themselves risk exposing citizens to increased
domination—or, setting aside this possibility, that they subdue private
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domination only at the cost of inadvertently enabling a lesser quantity of the
public kind. Right-wing republicans might suggest, though, that even the more
modest vision of exit-oriented state interventionism I have sketched may be
susceptible to such charges, too, albeit to a reduced degree. If so, then the range
of reasonable republican policy commitments might be wider than I have so far
suggested, including not just an exit-oriented state interventionism but also a
limited-government stance more commonly associated with classical liberalism
than with republicanism.
A Right-Wing Critique of Exit-Oriented
State Interventionism
Before we can explore the possibility of such a republican policy pluralism,
however, we must first try to understand why right-wing republicans believe
that even an exit-oriented policy strategy might run the risk of increasing
domination. First, notice that many measures that would boost competition
(e.g., antitrust action) or resource exit (e.g., welfare support) are open to abuse
because their implementation would require discretionary power: antitrust
authorities as well as welfare administrators require discretion in order to select
targets for prosecution and determine eligibility for benefits, respectively, discre-
tion that can be directed toward non-public objectives. Consider the European
Commission’s recent resumption of its antitrust case against Google, for example:
the restart of this case was done at the discretion of the new competition
commissioner, Margrethe Vestager, and bears the telltale signs of being driven
more by the uncompetitiveness of rival European platforms than the anticompe-
titive behavior of Google (The Economist 2015). Antitrust powers necessarily rely
upon a prosecutorial discretion that can be used just as readily to shield firms
from foreign competition or burnish the reputation of a prosecutor with ambi-
tions for higher office as it can to safeguard consumers from predatory business
practices or workers from monopsonistic employers.
Even more troubling—especially for a prioritarian republicanism stressing the
security of the most vulnerable citizens (Lovett 2010, 201; Pettit 2012, 89–90)—is
the kind of discretionary power that is often placed in the hands of welfare
administrators. Nearly all state redistribution is conditional, whether on educa-
tional enrolment (e.g., job retraining), looking for work, work itself (e.g., the
Earned Income Tax Credit or “workfare”), or other policy objectives
(e.g., immunizing and educating children, as with conditional cash transfers in
Mexico, Brazil, and elsewhere) (The Economist 2013). Verifying that the poor
meet these conditions requires that discretionary power be given to welfare
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agents, both to determine whether the conditions are being met (assessment,
including investigatory powers of various sorts) and to cut off aid if they fail to be
met (redress). Certain limitations can be put on such powers, such as rights of
appeal to quasi-judicial bodies if benefits are cut, but there will remain an
ineliminable degree of bureaucratic discretion that can and inevitably will be
used for non-public purposes, be they financial (e.g., bribery), tribal (e.g., pro-
tecting the bureaucratic-class interests of welfare officials), or ideological (e.g.,
punishing or “liberating” the poor, depending on the official’s political leaning).
The state’s dominant position in the charity market, which is guaranteed not only
by its size and scope but also by the fact that public charity tends to “crowd out”
private charity, will only make this problem worse.1 Welfare officials will have a
degree of arbitrary power over recipients that private benefactors rarely do.
Republicans are well aware that benefit conditionality and its accompanying
bureaucratic discretion can compromise the poor’s freedom (as non-domination)—
even when the condition in question is just a means test (i.e., an income-based
eligibility rule). As Frank Lovett argues:
It is doubtful whether means testing can be carried out in a suitably non-arbitrary
manner: practical experience suggests that state welfare agencies must inevitably employ
extensive bureaucratic discretion in carrying out such policies, and that the particular
vulnerability of persons in need of public assistance renders the usual sorts of constraints
on such discretion more or less ineffective. From a domination-minimizing point of view,
it will not do to replace the arbitrary charity of private individuals and groups with the
arbitrary charity of state welfare agencies, for this would merely substitute one form of
domination for another. (2010, 198–9; cf. Pettit 1997, 162 and White 2003)
Both he and Pettit have therefore advocated an unconditional basic income
(UBI), which would dispense with the need for such bureaucratic discretion
(Lovett 2010, 199–203; Pettit 2007).
One problem with such an approach, however, is that administrative discre-
tion would not only continue to be exercised in other realms (e.g., antitrust
actions) but might even be amplified in those realms in unintended ways because
of its reduction in the realm of public charity. To see why this might be the case,
first notice how colossally expensive it would be to implement even a modest
UBI. In the USA, for instance, a $5000 per year UBI—which is not even halfway
to the poverty threshold for a single person—would consume nearly half the
1 A series of articles (starting with Andreoni 1993) has found evidence of substantial but
incomplete crowding out of voluntary contributions to public goods, such as charity, by tax
financing. Lovett notes this effect but does not see its implications for bureaucratic domination
(2010, 206n30).
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 12/12/2016, SPi
 EXIT LEFT
Comp. by: EElangovan Stage : Revises1 ChapterID: 0002886574 Date:12/12/16
Time:14:56:13 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0002886574.3D
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 95
federal budget (Health and Human Services 2015).2 Even if we were to take into
account certain compensating reductions in other entitlement programs, such a
UBI would necessitate a substantial increase in taxation, and this very push to
raise more revenue would itself increase state domination. The reason for this is
simple: higher taxes, ceteris paribus, will lead to more tax evasion; therefore, more
discretionary powers will have to be granted to revenue agents for enforcement
purposes, whether to discover evaders by requisitioning documents, interrogat-
ing suspects, and so on (assessment) or to impose penalties (redress).3 As with the
antitrust and welfare officials I discussed earlier, revenue agents will be able to use
this enhanced discretion in pursuit of non-public ends—and even if they never in
fact did so, the vulnerability of citizens subject to such authority would make
them quite likely to fail what Pettit calls the “eyeball test,” i.e., the ability to “look
others in the eye without reason for the fear or deference that a power of
interference might inspire” (2012, 84). Even IRS agents with adamantine profes-
sional integrity will inspire fear and deference because it is their ability to abuse,
not actual abuse, that constitutes domination: as Pettit says, “the grievance I have
in mind is that of having to live at the mercy of another” (1997, 4–5; also, see
Dewan 2014 on IRS use of civil-forfeiture laws, which has struck fear into the
hearts of many small-business owners).
Even if we ultimately decided that these increases in public domination could
be justified by the even greater reductions in private domination that they
brought about, we would still have to worry about the long-term consequences
of such a choice. The more powerful the government becomes—the more that it
can command persons and resources through taxation, regulation, and so forth—
the more attractive a target it becomes for capture by rent-seeking interest
groups, who can then use its power for non-public ends such as preventing the
entry of competitors, enforcing cartel-pricing arrangements, and obtaining tax
breaks and subsidies. The more authority the state is given, even for initially
beneficial ends, the more it can be redirected by organized interests to dominate
and exploit unorganized interests, and this is true whether these organized
2 My calculation here is for 2013. The total US population in 2013 was 316,497,531 (US Census
Bureau 2015). (Many basic-income supporters include children, so I use total population: see van
Parijs 2006, 7.) Multiplying this by $5000 gives a figure of about $1.582 trillion. Total federal
spending in 2013 was approximately $3.5 trillion, so a UBI of this size would have eaten up a bit
over 45 percent of the budget that year (Congressional Budget Office 2014).
3 A long series of books and articles (including Ali et al. 2001; Cebula 2004; Clotfelter 1983; Feige
1994; Klepper et al. 1991; Tanzi 1982) has confirmed that tax evasion is an increasing function of tax
rates. Lovett maintains that “JMD [Justice as Minimizing Domination] demands that we set the
[UBI] as high as we possibly can,” but he does not include the resulting increase in domination by
revenue agents in his calculus (2010, 202–3).
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interests are hijacking old powers or acquiring new ones by bargaining with
legislators and regulators, whom they can offer bribes, campaign contributions,
and post-government jobs as inducements. As one of the originators of
regulatory-capture theory, George Stigler, states in his seminal article on the
subject: “as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and
operated primarily for its benefit” (Stigler 1975, 114; cf. Laffont and Tirole 1991
and Levine and Forrence 1990). The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
and Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) were for many decades the canonical
examples of regulatory capture in action: these agencies controlled routes,
entry, and pricing in the railroad, trucking, and airline industries and did so,
not in the interest of consumers, but in the interest of the producers themselves
(see Huntington 1952 on the ICC and McCraw 1986, ch. 7, on the CAB). Their
abuses were so egregious that both of them were ultimately abolished (the ICC in
1995 and the CAB in 1985), but not before a century and a half-century,
respectively, of state-enforced cartelization had elapsed. As extreme as these
two cases are, less extreme examples are ubiquitous in the annals of tax and
regulatory policymaking (e.g., the European antitrust case against Google that
I mentioned earlier), and though it is the case that concerted efforts by public-
spirited journalists, advocacy groups, and legislators can reduce such behavior
(e.g., by exposure of “pay-to-play” schemes and adoption of campaign-finance
reform), the enormous, varied, and consequently difficult-to-monitor powers of
the modern administrative state combined with the inevitable corruptions of
democratic politics will continue to make rent-seeking an attractive activity. This
ugly political reality should at least make us pause before we rush to increase state
power in response to private domination. The twentieth century was a time of
accelerating growth in the size and powers of the state, with each new crisis (war,
depression, etc.) ratcheting them up ever higher, and whether such growth served
to diminish or enlarge total domination is a matter of debate (Higgs 1987).
The picture I have just painted is a stark one, of course, presented for effect and
reflecting a classical-liberal narrative about the state that right-wing republicans
also ratify. Although I find the narrative persuasive at certain points, I also think
it is unconvincing in this extreme form and too skeptical of the possibility of
ameliorative state action, including those actions demanded by my economic
model of republicanism. Consider the following two points. First, the state may
be able to redistribute income in a way that avoids or at least minimizes the
negative side effects of conditionality. For example, Social Security makes receipt
of payments age-conditional without risking domination, largely because these
conditions are readily verifiable through public records and therefore not vul-
nerable to manipulation by bribe-seeking or otherwise abusive officials. To a
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lesser extent, the same may be said of the Earned Income Tax Credit and other
wage subsidies, whose work conditions can be checked through the ordinary tax-
reporting system. (Contrast this with big public-employment schemes of the kind
used in India, for instance, where the scope for abuse is much larger.) Much
depends upon how specific government programs are designed and imple-
mented, and republicans could design them to minimize the risk of domination.
Second, the state might also be able to raise revenue in a way that avoids or at
least minimizes the possibility of domination by revenue agents. For instance,
payroll withholding for income taxes has reduced such domination by having
firms act as middlemen between the state and citizen, redirecting the IRS’s
discretionary power from vulnerable citizens to better-insulated corporate bur-
eaucracies. A fair assessment of the effects of state intervention on total domin-
ation will reveal a more nuanced picture than that painted by classical liberals
and their republican sympathizers.
However, my judgment that the beliefs of right-wing republicans are incorrect
(or at least overstated) does not imply that they are unreasonable. As I will
suggest below, their ideas cannot be so easily dismissed, because they are part
of a range of reasonable historical and policy views. The conclusion we should
therefore draw from them is not that a minimal state is best, but rather that a
minimal state might be best, contingent upon our beliefs about the threat of
private versus public domination. Neo-republicans, in short, should adopt a
comparative-institutional approach (Stigler 1975, ch. 7): they should recognize
that states as well as markets can be dominating, that perfect states are no more
likely than perfect markets, and therefore that escalating efforts to counteract
private power with public power will at some point increase rather than decrease
total domination, which is the very thing neo-republicans are trying to minimize.
The Burdens of Judgment and Reasonable
Policy Pluralism
The central question, then, is: what extent of public power minimizes total
domination? Or to make the continuous dichotomous for the sake of simplicity:
is total domination minimized with a minimal state or rather with a more
extensive state, one guided by the sort of exit-oriented policy strategy that
I have advanced throughout this book? I am asking this question not in order
to provide a definitive answer—that would be too ambitious for the modest scope
of this chapter or even this book—but rather to show that different answers to
this question can be reasonable in light of the “burdens of judgment” under
which all conscientious deliberators operate. Again, my own judgment is that an
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 12/12/2016, SPi
REPUBLICAN POLICY PLURALISM 
Comp. by: EElangovan Stage : Revises1 ChapterID: 0002886574 Date:12/12/16
Time:14:56:16 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0002886574.3D
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 98
exit-oriented state interventionism best minimizes total domination, but I also
acknowledge the difficulty of the question at hand and consider it worthy of
further study.
When trying to answer a question such as this, we necessarily bear Rawlsian
“burdens of judgment,” constituted by “the many hazards involved in the correct
(and conscientious) exercise of our powers of reason and judgment in the
ordinary course of political life” (Rawls 1993, 56). The first three hazards Rawls
discusses are especially relevant in our case; he describes them as follows:
a. The evidence—empirical and scientific—bearing on the case is conflicting
and complex, and thus hard to assess and evaluate.
b. Even where we agree fully about the kinds of considerations that are
relevant, we may disagree about their weight, and so arrive at different
judgments.
c. To some extent all our concepts, and not only moral and political concepts,
are vague and subject to hard cases; and this indeterminacy means that we
must rely on judgments and interpretations (and on judgments about
interpretations) within some range (not sharply specifiable) where reason-
able persons may differ (ibid.).4
Each of these hazards has an important bearing on how different neo-
republicans will answer the question of how extensive public power should be.
Even when assessing the same evidence, they will invariably differ amongst
themselves about which approach better reduces total domination. Among the
causes of disagreement will be their divergent assessments of the nature and
extent of private domination, the efficacy of government responses to such
domination, and the possibility of keeping the state and its agents constrained
by truly public purposes as state power expands.
4 In the main text I ignore the last three hazards he discusses, as they are less relevant to our case.
Hazard (d), which as with the first three applies “mainly to the theoretical use of our reason,” is that
due to the unavoidable diversity of modern life, “citizens’ total experiences are disparate enough for
their judgments to diverge, at least to some degree, on many if not most cases of any significant
complexity” (1993, 56–7). Because my focus here is on neo-republican political philosophers, this
consideration appears less relevant: due to similar educations and career trajectories, their “total
experiences” are likely to overlap considerably, though differences in family, gender, race, etc., will
continue to produce divergences. Hazards (e) and (f), by contrast, are of a moral character: hazard
(e) is that “often there are different kinds of normative considerations of different force on both sides
of an issue and it is difficult to make an overall assessment,” and hazard (f) is that, due to a “limited
social space,” we are “forced to select among cherished values . . . [and consequently] face great
difficulties in setting priorities and making adjustments” (57). Because neo-republicans all share an
overriding commitment to minimizing domination defined in a particular way, these hazards again
seem less relevant.
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Consider first the nature and extent of private domination. As I have
remarked numerous times throughout the book, it is the ability to abuse, not
actual abuse, that constitutes domination: those who have a “capacity to
interfere with impunity and at will in certain choices that the other is in a
position to make” dominate that person, even if they decide never to exercise
that capacity (Pettit 1996, 578). Consequently, when we are trying to evaluate
the nature and extent of private domination, we cannot simply count up
instances of abuse; instead, we must assess the structural aspects of relation-
ships to determine whether they involve domination, and such assessments can
and typically will vary substantially across different assessors. Recall my dis-
cussion in Chapter 3 of levels of labor-market competitiveness, ranging from
perfect competition to monopsony. Even for a given labor market, empirical
estimates of employer power are likely to differ for a number of innocent
reasons, including the investigator’s choice of a foundational theoretical
model (from among the many rival models of oligopsony, for example) and
its econometric specification, the variety and quality of data with which to test it
(e.g., are close substitutes available for employers and/or employees?), etc.
Relatedly, how should we weigh the relative danger of employer versus
employee power in such markets? Ideally, this decision would be data-driven,
but given that the empirical evidence is likely to be “conflicting and complex,”
as Rawls says, we may be forced to fall back on broad readings of labor history
or more systematic theoretical considerations (about, for example, the relative
bargaining power of different socioeconomic classes) in order to assign weights.
Reasonable assessors will disagree about these readings and theoretical consid-
erations, however, and so we should expect differences in weights assigned and
conclusions reached. We should also keep in mind differences of opinion about
conceptual matters, such as the meaning of domination and its definitional
components, and the effects these might have on our judgments regarding the
nature and extent of private domination. For example, Pettit’s definition of
power, which I reproduced earlier in the paragraph, associates it with “impun-
ity.” I argued in Chapter 3 that competitive labor markets, at least, punish
abusive employer behavior with a loss of workers and profits, but some repub-
licans may deny that this is punishment, strictly speaking, because it fails to
meet certain essential criteria (e.g., being imposed by a public enforcer accord-
ing to rules that citizens have understood and explicitly endorsed, either in
person or through their legislative representatives) and would therefore “back-
ground, not foreground, reason” (Pettit 1997, 203). I responded to such con-
cerns in Chapters 3 and 4, but they are based upon a reasonable alternative
interpretation of Pettit’s definition, one that would have ramifications not
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simply for the narrow question at hand but indeed for my entire economic
model of republicanism.
Turn now to the efficacy of government responses to private domination and
the prospect of such responses increasing rather than decreasing total domin-
ation. A major theme of this book has been that social-democratic policies, be
they participatory or constitutional, are unlikely to be effective and that even if
they are they will generally be less effective than exit-oriented policies, which
should therefore be a preferred approach of republicans to limiting total domin-
ation. As I discussed earlier, however, even an exit-oriented strategy has its risks,
assessments of which will vary among reasonable observers. First, reasonable
people will differ regarding the effectiveness of these policies, again owing to the
“conflicting and complex” empirical evidence; for example, labor economists
continue to disagree about the efficacy of minimum-wage laws as a mechanism
for checking exploitation and redistributing income to the most vulnerable
workers, though most are skeptical (see Card and Krueger 1997 and Neumark
andWascher 2008). Even if we assume that such policies are effective at reducing
private domination, we still have to worry about their tendency to increase public
domination by bolstering the administrative discretion of the police, antitrust
officials, welfare bureaucrats, and revenue agents, but even impartial observers
will put different weights on the relative risks here, weights that will be informed
in part by the empirical evidence but also by certain historical and theoretical
concerns. For instance, some assessors will worry more about private power, in
light of the rising influence of corporations and the tendency of the capitalist class
to utilize its political pull for self-enrichment, than about public power, due not
only to the public spiritedness of state employees but also to the success of various
forms of oversight (administrative, judicial, and legislative) in making their
actions track “the welfare and world-view of the public” (Pettit 1997, 56). Others,
however, will be more concerned with public power than private: the state, after
all, claims a monopoly on the use of physical coercion, and no degree of
governmental oversight can guarantee that such coercive powers will only be
deployed for public purposes (Pettit 2012, 176; Lovett and Pettit 2009, 23–4);
private power, by contrast, is forever vulnerable to unpredictable shifts in the
competitive landscape and distribution of wealth and is therefore less to be
feared. Throw competing narratives about twentieth-century expansion of public
power into the mix—was it a liberating force that freed us from the tyranny of
private capital or an oppressive force that threatened our civil and economic
liberties?—and you will see why we should expect even neo-republicans to differ,
sometimes dramatically, regarding our key question: what extent of public power
minimizes total domination?
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Michael Sandel versus Friedrich Hayek
Such intramural disagreement is nicely illustrated by the conflicting political
programs of Michael Sandel and Friedrich A. Hayek, both of whom can be
understood as republican political theorists. Sandel explicitly endorses republic-
anism in Democracy’s Discontent (1996), in which he argues for a “republican
theory [that, unlike interest-group pluralism,] does not take people’s existing
preferences, whatever they may be, and try to satisfy them. It seeks instead to
cultivate in citizens the qualities of character necessary to the common good of
self-government” (25). He views private domination, whether of employees by
employers or of the poor by the rich, as the greatest barrier to the cultivation of
these distinctively republican virtues. For example, he offers a highly sympathetic
portrayal of mid-nineteenth-century labor republicans, who complained of being
“wage slaves” and bristled at the “purse-proud insolence” of their employers
(1996, 153, 172–4; cf. Gourevitch 2014). More recently, he has reminded us that
“market choices are not free choices if some people are desperately poor or lack
the ability to bargain on fair terms,” which he claims is the case with transactions
as various as ticket scalping and kidney sales (2012, 36, 112). These abuses at the
hands of powerful private actors call for state action in defense of equality, he
avers, because “the republican tradition teaches that severe inequality under-
mines freedom by corrupting the character of both rich and poor and destroying
the commonality necessary to self-government” (1996, 330). In these ways, at
least, Sandel’s republicanism overlaps with the exit-oriented economic model
that I offered in prior chapters, which also sought to limit the abuses of mono-
psonistic and oligopsonistic employers and empower the most vulnerable in
diverse market settings, and it consequently appears to be within the range of
reasonable republican views on the danger of private domination and the desir-
ability of state action to counter it.
Unfortunately, this initial appearance is deceptive, and upon closer examin-
ation Sandel’s views are at variance with an exit-oriented state interventionism
and closer to social-democratic approaches that I have consistently targeted for
criticism. First, Sandel grounds his republicanism on participation rather than
non-domination: “republican political theory teaches that to be free is to share in
governing a political community that controls its own fate” (1996, 274; cf. 202).
This definitional commitment to what I have called the political model leads
unsurprisingly to a very laudatory portrait of labor-republican advocates of a
“cooperative commonwealth,” one in which “the wage system” would be
replaced, by means of both “political action” and “strikes and trade unions,”
with “a scheme of cooperatives in which workers would share in the profits of
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labor and govern themselves” (1996, 186–8, 190). As I argued in Chapters 1 and
3, however, these social-democratic responses to the problem of private domin-
ation risk increasing overall domination, whether by enhancing the quasi-public
power of labor cartels or of the state itself in its pursuit of industrial democracy or
even associational socialism. The narrowness of Sandel’s republicanism excludes
the economic model by definitional legerdemain, hiding from us the possibility
that the very private domination he condemns might best be addressed by
resourcing exit and enhancing competition in labor markets. Participation,
after all, is just one means among others to the true end of republicanism, viz.,
freedom as non-domination, and one more appropriate in the political realm
than in the domestic and economic realms.
More troubling than this social-democratic commitment to universal participa-
tion across social spheres—to what Nancy Rosenblum has called “congruence”
(1989, 38–40)—is Sandel’s pronounced suspicion of economic exchange and
commercial society more broadly. We can see it in his condemnation of
consumerism, where he says in a Rousseauean vein that “consumption, when it
figured at all in republican political economy, was a thing to be moderated,
disciplined, or restrained for the sake of higher ends. An excess of consumption,
or luxury, was often seen as a form of corruption, a measure of the loss of
civic virtue” (1996, 224–5). This worry leads quite naturally to his more recent
“corruption objection” to markets: “we corrupt a good, an activity, or a social
practice whenever we treat it according to a lower norm than is appropriate to it”
(2012, 46, 110). He raises this objection in a dizzying array of settings, ranging from
surrogacy markets to programs that incentivize childhood reading and obesity
reduction (2012, 59, 61, 71). Sandel’s solution to these evils of market corruption—
as well as to what he takes to be the related evils of unfairness in exchange to which
I alluded above—is whatMichaelWalzer refers to as “blocked exchanges,” i.e., state
regulations that prohibit certain sorts of trade (Walzer 1983, 100–3).
Such regulatory intervention, though, is vulnerable to criticism on the repub-
lican grounds of anti-paternalism and anti-moralism. If certain instances of
economic exchange are truly unfree because some participants “are desperately
poor or lack the ability to bargain on fair terms,” then the solution is not to block
the exchanges but rather to empower those participants by providing them with
material resources or by heightening competition in the relevant markets (2012,
112). Blocking these exchanges without seeking to empower their disadvantaged
participants not only prevents them from making the most of a bad situation—in
a second-best world, being exploited may be better than not being exploited
(e.g., sweat-shop labor may be preferable to the available alternatives, such as
unemployment)—but obstinately insists on treating the unsightly symptoms
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instead of the underlying disease, which is asymmetric power relations. If, on the
other hand, the disadvantaged participants are properly empowered, then block-
ing such exchanges would qualify as an unwarranted paternalism: so long as all
participants are sufficiently informed and resourced and no spillovers happen,
the state has no business forbidding “capitalist acts between consenting adults”
(Nozick 1974, 163). To quote Frank Lovett on this point:
The most reliable and least intrusive way to discourage people from trading away their
freedom from domination is to have the public meet the basic needs of those unable to do
so for themselves. Not having to trade away their freedom from domination in order to
meet their basic needs, few would probably choose to do so. . . .Moreover, unlike either the
blocked exchange or the regulatory approach, this approach would continue to respect the
choices that people make, and thus not fall afoul the paternalism objection. (2010, 198;
cf. Pettit 2012, 98)
As for Sandel’s belief that some kinds of economic exchange are inherently
“corrupting,” in that they “treat [the thing exchanged] according to a lower
norm than is appropriate to it,” it is simply a blatant form of moralism and, as
such, inconsistent with republican neutrality towards (justice-respecting) con-
ceptions of the good, a trait it shares with some species of liberalism (e.g., Rawls
1993, 190–4).5 As Pettit confirms:
Like the liberal project, our proposal—our republican proposal—is motivated by the
assumption that the ideal is capable of commanding the allegiance of the citizens of
developed multicultural societies, regardless of their more particular conceptions of the
good. . . . [I]n seeking a relatively neutral brief for the state—a brief that is not tied to any
particular conception of the good—republicanism joins with liberalism against commu-
nitarianism. (1997, 96, 120; cf. Lovett 2010, 162)6
5 Another, related difficulty with Sandel’s position is that, assuming that the allegedly corrupting
exchanges occur in properly competitive markets, their inconsistency with “appropriate” norms may
call into question not the exchanges but rather the norms themselves. Competitive markets are,
among other things, tools for sustaining domination-free relationships, so if these norms call for
blocking exchanges within such markets, they obstruct the republican goal of minimizing domin-
ation and should therefore be reformed or rejected. On this point, see Brennan and Jaworski 2015.
6 More recent work by Lovett might appear to call into question these claims about republican
neutrality, but in truth it does not. Lovett believes that republicans may be permitted or even
required to favor conceptions of the good that make room for civic virtue, patriotism, etc., as these
are by assumption necessary for the success of republicanism; otherwise, states might become
dominating because they are inadequately monitored, resisted, etc., by their citizens. He suggests
that this favoritism could be inconsistent with neutrality. But even liberal theories of justice like that
of Rawls stipulate that their support for neutrality applies only to justice-respecting conceptions of
the good; no theory of justice, republican or liberal, can be neutral with respect to the preconditions
of its own efficacy. It is therefore no surprise when Rawls states that “even though political liberalism
seeks common ground and is neutral in aim, it is important to emphasize that it may still affirm the
superiority of certain forms of moral character and encourage certain moral virtues. Thus, justice as
fairness includes an account of certain political virtues—the virtues of fair social cooperation such as
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Sandel’s attack on surrogacy markets, for example, hinges upon his controversial
conviction that “trafficking in the right to procreate promotes a mercenary
attitude towards children that corrupts parenthood,” but this view is not widely
shared and seems dependent on a specific, rather hazily-sketched conception of
the good (2012, 71); if so, it moralistically violates republican neutrality. In short,
for Sandel to bring his political theory within the broad church of reasonable
republican views on domination, he would need to repent his atavistic hostility to
markets and commercial society, make peace with republican neutrality, and
embrace an exit-oriented, not a participation-and-regulation-oriented, state
interventionism.
Unlike Sandel, Hayek constructs his political theory on the same foundation of
freedom as non-domination as Pettit and other neo-republicans do—and this
despite the fact that he thinks of himself as a classical liberal rather than a
republican. In The Constitution of Liberty (1960), he starts by defining freedom
as “the state in which a man is not subject to coercion by the arbitrary will of
another or others” (11). Hayek contrasts such at-will interference with the lawful
coercion of a state that governs by “known general rules” and imposes “limited
and foreseeable duties”; such coercion is legitimate because it is “independent of
the arbitrary will of another person” and therefore “impersonal” in nature (21).
Pettit recognizes the kinship here but nonetheless says that Hayek’s conception of
freedom “falls short of freedom as non-domination, since it is consistent with
allowing domination . . . within those spaces where the relevant legal injunction
leaves people to other devices. Thus it is consistent . . . with domination occurring
in the workplace or the home or in any of a multitude of so-called private spaces”
(1997, 89–90). Pettit fails to substantiate this claim, however, and it is not
supported by Hayek’s writings, which do in fact concern themselves with the
problem of private domination within the interstices of rule-governed public
power. For example, Hayek worries that, due to the class origins and allegiances
of judges, the common law will become increasingly biased over time in favor of
dominant classes (e.g., landlords, creditors, and businesses), an injustice that
threatens the impartiality and non-arbitrariness of law and must consequently be
corrected via legislation by the people’s representatives (1982, Vol. 1, 89). Even
more strikingly, he considers the growing size and power of corporations a threat
to competition, and he responds to those who believe that “freedom of contract”
the virtues of civility and tolerance, of reasonableness and the sense of fairness” (1993, 194).
Consequently, favoring conceptions of the good that make room for civic virtue and patriotism
can be entirely consistent with republican neutrality. (For further details on this recent work, see
Lovett and Whitfield 2016.)
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 12/12/2016, SPi
 EXIT LEFT
Comp. by: EElangovan Stage : Revises1 ChapterID: 0002886574 Date:12/12/16
Time:14:56:22 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0002886574.3D
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 105
should be uncritically extended from natural to artificial persons by noting that
“it may on occasion be the duty of government to protect the individual against
organized groups,” as when corporations sign contracts in restraint of trade and
thereby injure consumers (1948, 115–16).
Having said this, Hayek worries more about the private power of unions than
businesses and more about public domination than private; that is, he assigns
very different weights to these threats to freedom than someone like Sandel
does. Hayek points to extraordinary legal privileges that have been granted
to labor combinations, such as “the use of the picket line as an instrument of
intimidation,” closed and union shops that violate the right to work, and
immunity against tort claims (1960, 274–5, 278–9). The private power created
by these privileges allows labor cartels to dominate not just employers but even
fellow workers, including but certainly not limited to those made unemployed by
the cartels’ acts in restraint of trade (1960, 269–72). Hayek’s emphasis on union
power may seem outdated, given the secular decline in union membership, but
that fall has taken place even while public-sector unionization has surged: in
2014, public-sector workers had a union-membership rate five times that of
private-sector ones (35.7 percent v. 6.6 percent) (Bureau of Labor Statistics
2015). Apart from the expansion in the number of so-called “right-to-work”
states, the legal privileges enumerated by Hayek still exist and continue to sustain
pockets of private power in labor markets, regardless of whether employers in
them have any market power themselves.
Hayek’s unease regarding the private power of unions becomes outright
anxiety when he turns to the increasing risk of state domination. To be clear,
Hayek’s worry here is distinct from the libertarian one: as a classical liberal,
he supports a rudimentary welfare state, including such exit-oriented state
interventions as educational vouchers for underprivileged children and even a
decent social-minimum income (1960, 257–9; 1982, Vol. 1, 141–2, Vol. 2, 84, 87,
Vol. 3, 55). He is apprehensive, however, about the possibility that the public—or,
more likely, pressure groups with rent-seeking purposes—will push the state to
move beyond this limited social agenda under the banner of equality of oppor-
tunity or distributive justice, which he thinks would endanger the very founda-
tions of the liberal social order (1982, Vol. 2, 84–8). To quote Hayek on this point:
No system of rules of just individual conduct, and therefore no free action of the
individuals, could produce results satisfying a principle of distributive justice. . . . The
fact is simply that we consent to retain, and agree to enforce, uniform rules for a
procedure which has greatly improved the chances of all to have their wants
satisfied, but at the price of all individuals and groups incurring the risk of unmerited
failure. (1982, Vol. 2, 69–70; cf. Nozick 1974, 160–4)
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Despite social justice being a mirage, the attempt to achieve it will allow the state
to accumulate discretionary powers that will become a danger to individual
freedom; the regulatory capture that I discussed earlier means that interest
groups will hijack these powers in order to serve their own selfish ends
and lobby bureaucrats and legislators for additional ones (1982, Vol. 2, 138–9,
Vol. 3, 10). For these reasons, Hayek endorses principled opposition to any
expansion of state power beyond that necessary for a minimal welfare state,
even when such an expansion is ostensibly for beneficial ends like reducing
private domination or advancing the general welfare.
Again, I find some of Hayek’s points persuasive but his overall assessment
unconvincing. As I noted at the end of Chapter 3, unionization can be justified
under certain circumstances as a second-best response to collusion among
employers and lack of legal agency among employees. Enhancing competition
in and resourcing exit from such labor markets would be better, but these policies
may be politically infeasible, in which case the sort of rigid opposition to union
privilege offered by Hayek would make the best the enemy of the good. Similarly,
while Hayek is right to worry about regulatory capture, he both understates the
threat of private domination by business interests and overstates the risk of public
domination by state administrators, whose discretionary powers can often be
limited by good institutional design, as I argued earlier. Although Pettit goes too
far in saying that Hayek’s conception of freedom is “consistent . . . with domin-
ation occurring in the workplace or the home or in any of a multitude of so-called
private spaces” (1997, 89–90), he is right in believing that Hayek focused
too much on public rather than private domination, an overemphasis that is in
part an understandable reaction to mid-twentieth-century Nazi and Soviet
totalitarianism.
My task here, though, is not to fully evaluate such ideas but rather to suggest
that there is a case for extending the range of reasonable republican views on
domination to the right, even as we move to exclude those social-democratic
views at the other end of this range. The bulk of my book has been a defense of
exit-oriented state interventionism and a critique of social-democratic policies
that try to empower voice directly, via participatory and constitutional routes,
rather than indirectly, by the less risky and more efficient path of enhanced
competition and resourced exit. I do concede, however, that the thesis of right-
wing republicans such as Hayek—viz., that even the relatively modest exit-
oriented policy strategy might lead to increased domination—is worthy of further
study and investigation. By contrast, the recent efforts of certain neo-republicans
to drive the doctrine ever further to the left (e.g., Gourevitch 2013 and 2014) are
less likely to be fruitful, partly because they rely upon a conception of freedom
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more focused on “structural domination” than on domination proper and thus
beyond republicanism. To draw on Sharon Krause’s work: insofar as unequal
ownership of the means of production is the result of a process that is “largely
unconscious and unintentional,” the product of innumerable accidents of birth
and lifestyle and myriad decentralized contractual arrangements, the mere fact
that some people are capitalists and some are workers does not constitute
domination; something more is required, such as collusive behavior by capitalists
in markets or in politics that allows them to acquire arbitrary power over workers
(Krause 2013, 2; cf. Pettit 2006b, 139).7 The proper response to this, however, is
not the socialist “labor republicanism” advocated by Gourevitch and Sandel, but
rather the exit-oriented method advanced throughout this book. The economic
model of republicanism remains the only strategy that answers republicanism’s
distinctive call to end arbitrary interference by private and public actors in the
lives of citizens.
7 I do not mean to imply by this that there is nothing morally objectionable about unequal
ownership of the means of production, especially if it is severe and enduring. It might be unfair or
even constitute a distributive injustice, which is Rawls’s view: see Rawls 2001, Part IV, on property-
owning democracy as a way of realizing justice as fairness. It might even be considered a sort of
oppression: see Krause 2013 and Young 1990, 37. All I want to claim here is that these concerns are
different from the distinctively republican concern with domination.
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Conclusion
If we have learned anything about the state over the past quarter of a millennium,
it is that constitutional democracy, whatever its flaws, is more effective than any
other political system at preventing the exercise of arbitrary power by public
agents. Combining democratic participation, both formal and informal, with
institutional checks and balances allows the people to hold their rulers to account
but simultaneously restrains popular power, keeping both rulers and ruled from
becoming tyrants. Given the success of this republican strategy in the political
realm, it is wholly unsurprising that contemporary republicans would try to
extend it to other realms too. Reasoning by analogy, they have endorsed both
participatory and constitutional solutions to the problem of private power. As
I have argued throughout the book, though, this analogy is a weak one: due to the
relative ease of exiting family and firm, the domestic and economic realms are
fundamentally unlike the political one—and even in the political realm, exit is
often feasible, increasingly so as we approach the local level. This essential
difference implies that the political model so beloved by neo-republicans is not
a universal strategy for dealing with arbitrary power but rather a special strategy
for specific social contexts. Insofar as a universal strategy exists, it is the one
suggested by a different analogy: that between the economic realm, on the
one hand, and the domestic and political realms, on the other. Markets of varying
kinds exist in all three—spousal markets, labor markets, locational markets, and
so forth—and when the state intervenes to make them properly competitive and
to help their participants enter and exit them at will, it creates environments free
of domination.
As we have seen, however, the economic model itself lacks universal applic-
ability. At the level of national politics especially, where the economic model’s
policy framework of resourced exit and enhanced competition must be created
and maintained, there is simply no substitute for voice, for the tricky business of
political entrepreneurship and coalition building in a democratic system. More-
over, given the high cost of international migration, inter alia, the economic
model is unlikely to have much relevance to the national state, and at lower levels
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of the state exit costs will usually remain high enough to require a substantial role
for the political model. Even in the domestic and economic spheres the political
model will have to play an auxiliary role at times: as I noted in the conclusions to
Chapters 2 and 3, when agency is compromised by psychological or physical
abuse, immaturity, senility, mental disability, or legal disempowerment, state
regulatory interventions will often be justified. In short, neither the economic
nor the political model can be treated as a one-size-fits-all solution to every
problem of domination in every sphere of human existence.
What general lessons can we draw, then, regarding the applicability of these
models? As I discussed in Chapter 4, our job is to find optimal mixes of account-
ability mechanisms, mixes that are sure to vary across social contexts. On the
basis of the arguments made so far in this book, I would suggest the following rule
of thumb for the task of institutional design: in any given social context—whether
domestic, economic, or political—the economic model is more promising as a
supplement to or even a substitute for the political model, ceteris paribus, the
more it is the case that these three enabling conditions hold:
1. full psychological agency of market participants, including all the relevant
technical and prudential capacities for active and effective involvement in
the marketplace;
2. full legal agency of market participants, including secure legal status,
equality before the law, and protection of a set of basic freedoms and
opportunities (such as rights to move, associate, contract, and own prop-
erty); and
3. exit costs that either are already low or can realistically be made so through
state action.
Because these conditions are met to different degrees in different areas of human
life, the relative strength of the economic model varies both within and between
spheres. Again, like the political model, it is far from being a panacea.
In the central chapters of this book, however, we have seen the many surpris-
ing ways that exit-oriented state interventionism can limit domination, at times
in conjunction with the political model but frequently alone. For fully competent
adults with legal status, the economic model can usually serve as an effective
guarantee of republican freedom in the spheres of family and market without the
assistance of the political model. Even in the sphere of the state, the economic
model can provide a powerful supplement to the political model, working in
tandem with it to diminish domination at the provincial and especially the local
level. Also, there are reasons to believe that the economic model will become
increasingly relevant across all spheres over time. For example, changes in the
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structure of economic activity—such as the transition from an industrial
economy to a service economy, with its need for more educated workers prompt-
ing greater investment in human capital—may enhance psychological agency,
thereby enabling a greater role to be played by the economic model.
None of this is meant to suggest that we should treat the economic model as
even a strong default, much less as a universal strategy for confronting domin-
ation. Nonetheless, given the fact that neo-republicans have a long track record of
overreliance on the political model, it might be a useful discipline for them to
consider the economic model first when they deliberate about policy responses to
domination, as a (temporary) corrective to certain mental habits and biases.
Treating the economic model in this manner as a weak default will require
neo-republicans to reorient their thinking about domination, obliging them to
trade their social-democratic partialities for market-friendlier ones and to take
the danger of state domination more seriously. By supporting policies like the
basic income, they have already begun this transition, and I hope this book will
persuade them to complete it.
I have repeatedly emphasized that the economic model is impossible to apply at
the level of the national state. Might it become possible at some point in the
future, though, and if so, what would this imply about the content of a global
republicanism? Neo-republicans have only recently started to explore the impli-
cations of republicanism for global justice and international relations more
widely.1 I would therefore like to end the book with a preparatory sketch for an
application of commercial republicanism to the international realm.
The cost of international migration is the main obstacle to its application, but
in time the spread of open societies, economic growth, improved education, and
reductions in transportation costs and language barriers (thanks in part to the
adoption of English as the international lingua franca) could help us overcome it,
at least sufficiently so to make the economic model a feasible competitor to the
political model internationally. We should immediately acknowledge, however,
that if republicans are likely to disagree with each other about exit-oriented state
interventionism within the nation-state, they are even more likely to disagree
about it in the international domain. Those favorable to such interventionism
would no doubt point out that a variety of international economic and political
1 See, for example, Buckinx et al. (2015) and Pettit (2010; 2014, especially ch. 6). I will reference
the second of these Pettit works throughout my preparatory sketch.
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institutions—including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the
United Nations, the European Union, and so forth—already exist and provide a
rudimentary framework for peaceful interstate cooperation that could be
expanded and deepened over time to encourage global political and economic
competition and the resourced exit of citizens and firms across national bound-
aries. Just as Tiebout-model competition between local governments can, if
enabled by fiscal federalism and enhanced mobility, limit the ability of local
officials to exploit and dominate their residents, so its equivalent in the global
arena might do the same to national officials, curbing abuses as extreme as
totalitarianism or as mild as complicity with rent-seeking pressure groups.
Those skeptical of such interventionism, though, would probably worry that
any global political institutions powerful enough to realize this vision would
themselves pose a threat to the world’s population, creating a risk of state
domination on an unprecedented scale.
Interestingly, these opposed republican ideas regarding international institu-
tions can both be found in the political thought of a single republican, Immanuel
Kant, and the way he resolved his own ambivalence about such institutions is
instructive. In his political works, Kant fixated on the great evil of interstate war,
in which rulers routinely exercise arbitrary power not merely over foreign
peoples but over their own subjects as well. His solution to this problem relies
heavily on an analogy: just as individuals can only hope to achieve domestic peace
by jointly submitting to a civil constitution, so nations can only hope to attain
international peace by mutually submitting to a cosmopolitan constitution, thus
joining a state of nations (Völkerstaat) with coercive powers that each nation
would have to obey for the sake of perpetual peace (1996, 307, 309, 328 [8:310–1,
312–13, 357]). A strong version of international republicanism thereby becomes
the remedy to the residual ills of a merely national republicanism.
As attracted as Kant is to this remedy on theoretical grounds, however, he
worries about its consequences in practice, and his unease with it—although
present from the beginning—only grows with time. Even in his earliest discussion
of a Völkerstaat, he notes that “if this condition of universal peace is still more
dangerous to freedom . . . by leading to the most fearful despotism (as has indeed
happened more than once with states that have grown too large),” then alterna-
tive political means must be used (1996, 307–8 [8:311]). He elaborates upon this
concern in “Toward Perpetual Peace,” where he notes that an international state
of nature would still be preferable to a “universal monarchy” or world republic,
which would grow into a “soulless despotism” and, in the course of gobbling up
smaller nations and extending its rule everywhere, would see its laws gradually
weaken and anarchy return, leaving nothing but a “graveyard of freedom” in its
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wake (1996, 336 [8:367]). By the time he pens The Metaphysics of Morals, he
realizes that these flaws are fatal to the idea of a Völkerstaat and even to perpetual
peace itself, which he now refers to as an “unachievable idea” (1996, 487 [6:350]).
The cure, in short, is worse than the disease, and the strong version of inter-
national republicanism must therefore be abandoned with regret.2
But all is not lost. The idea of perpetual peace, even if it is ultimately not
achievable, may still be approachable through a league of nations (Völkerbund), a
free federalism “in accordance with a commonly agreed upon right of nations”
that seeks peace but “does not look to acquiring any power of a state” (1996, 308,
327 [8:311, 356]). Its lack of coercive powers, however, limits its usefulness, so it
must be supplemented by other means both political and economic. First, the
participating nations must carry out internal political reform, making their civil
constitutions ever more consistent with the “idea of the original contract,” viz.,
that the “citizens of a state . . . must therefore give their free assent, through their
representatives, not only to the waging of war in general but also to each
particular declaration of war” (1996, 308, 484 [8:311, 6:345–6]). Such a reform,
by resting the fundamental war power in the hands of those least likely to exercise
it, will make nations less bellicose and promote international peace: unlike their
rulers, the people “will be very hesitant to begin such a bad game, since they
would have to . . . take upon themselves all the hardships of war (such as . . . doing
the fighting and paying the costs . . . )” (1996, 323 [8:350]). Second, the partici-
pating nations must recognize “cosmopolitan right,” viz., a “right to hospitality
[that] does not extend beyond the conditions which make it possible to seek
commerce” (1996, 329 [8:358]). Kant argues that “the spirit of commerce . . .
cannot coexist with war and . . . sooner or later takes hold of every nation”; once
nations acquiesce to the “power of money,” they will seek trade and peace out of
“mutual self-interest,” and warlike passions will gradually be displaced by busi-
nesslike interests (1996, 336–7 [8:368]; cf. Hirschman 1977).
These three elements of Kant’s political program—a league of nations (external
political republicanism), popular power (internal political republicanism), and
doux commerce (economic republicanism)—constitute what we might call a
minimal global republicanism, one focused on enabling law-governed human
2 Pettit argues along similar lines: “in the abstract, a world state might work very well. But in a
world where cultures vary enormously, agreed policymaking norms would be unlikely to crystallize in
the way they can in a more closely connected society. And in a world where trust is often in short
supply across cultural divides, there would be less likelihood of establishing those important unelected
authorities . . . who could credibly claim to make decisions in line with shared standards. . . . Thus the
cause of democracy, articulated in terms of freedom, argues for a world of many states” (2014, 158; cf.
Bohman 2007, 60).
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relationships within and across borders without resort to a world state. I believe
that a similar kind of minimal global republicanism could serve as the basis for an
overlapping consensus between those republicans who are supportive of a global
version of exit-oriented state interventionism and those who are more skeptical
(Rawls 1993, 133–72). This form of global republicanism would support the free
movement of goods, services, people, and ideas across national borders as well as
the international norms, rules, and institutions that would make such movement
possible, all without committing itself in advance to a Völkerstaat. Advocates of a
more ambitious, global version of state interventionism could view this as merely
a transitional form of international governance, one that is worthy of support in
its own right but also one that they would hope to see expanded and deepened
with the passage of time, so that exit rights from the nation-state could be made
substantive, not merely formal, via resourcing and the promotion of international
political and economic competition by a world state or federation with coercive
power. Their support for minimal global republicanism would still be sincere
instead of strategic, however, because they would only sanction a transition to
such coercive international institutions on the condition that long experience
with the voluntaristic form had reduced fears of a “soulless despotism” and
boosted confidence that global governance could be truly republican. Skeptics
of this more ambitious global agenda, however, could view such a minimal global
republicanism as approximating the final form of international governance,
confident that lengthy experience will heighten rather than reduce fears of
domination by a world state and thus buttress the status quo.
What would such a minimal global republicanism look like and require? It
should involve a set of commitments that republicans of all stripes can ratify and
would therefore need to focus narrowly on free trade, free migration, and the
norms, rules, and institutions required to facilitate them. As for free trade, we have
long experience with various rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, regional trade agreements (e.g., the North American Free Trade Agreement
and the Treaty of Rome), and their varied international enforcement mechanisms
(e.g., the World Trade Organization, the European Union, etc.), and this experi-
ence will prove invaluable in our ongoing efforts to further reduce tariffs—already
at historically low levels—as well as non-tariff barriers such as quotas, discrimin-
atory health-and-safety standards, etc. Unrestrained free trade at the global level
would provide enormous benefits to consumers now exploited and dominated by
their so-called “national champions” (i.e., national monopolists and oligopolists),
who frequently use demagogic means to keep their industries insulated from
foreign competition. It would also constitute a victory for developing countries
who have long fought for market access in wealthier ones: as Pettit points out, the
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Cairns Group of agricultural producers has often confronted the United States,
European Union, and Japan in GATT/WTO negotiations over trade liberalization,
whether by securing the Agreement on Agriculture in the Uruguay Round or
blocking the efforts of wealthy nations to protect their own farmers in the Doha
Round, but much work remains to be done before global free trade is fully realized
(2014, 173; cf. Laborde and Ronzoni 2015).
Nowhere, however, is the demagoguery more ubiquitous and more morally
repulsive than in debates on immigration. Free migration would again provide
substantial economic benefits by not only reducing the effectiveness of national
and regional labor cartels but also giving workers another way to escape local
labor monopsonies and oligopsonies that are distressingly common in develop-
ing countries, where poor transportation networks, ineffective antitrust author-
ities, and limited or nonexistent welfare systems lock workers into abusive
employment relations. Despite some progress over time (e.g., the free movement
of labor within the European Union), advanced industrial nations—including
immigrant societies such as the USA, Canada, and Australia—have continued to
pursue exclusionary immigration policies, and the debate over immigration in
both North America and Europe has become increasingly toxic over the past
decade. Progress on this essential element of a minimal global republicanism has
stalled and probably gone into reverse, and until labor is given the same rights of
free international movement that capital largely enjoys, republicanism’s goal of
non-domination in labor markets will never be fully realized.
These economic benefits of free migration, important as they are, pale beside
the benefits it can offer to refugees from totalitarian and authoritarian regimes
worldwide, which remain the greatest menace to republican liberty internation-
ally. The one-party states of North Korea, Cuba, and China and the pseudo-
democracies of Iran, Russia, and Venezuela exercise arbitrary power over their
own citizens on an ongoing basis through corruption, censorship, illegal deten-
tion, and the imprisonment, torture, and execution of political dissidents.
Though we are morally obligated to use political criticism and economic pressure
to encourage the internal political changes that in time will transform these
nations into open societies and members in good standing of the global order,
the most important action we can immediately take is to open our borders to the
victims of these regimes. As I argued in Chapter 4, voice and exit worked in
tandem to undermine the East-German dictatorship, with exit not only draining
the state of workers (and potential hostages) but also amplifying the voices of
those who remained behind; escaping from a dysfunctional system can put
additional pressure on that system and encourage reform, especially if it sets an
example for others and heightens public consciousness of the system’s failure.
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Even if these changes were never to occur, however, we would still advance
freedom as non-domination by simply admitting these refugees, who as a result
would no longer have to suffer under the abuses and degradations of arbitrary
political authority.3
This relatively limited plan for a global political and economic order—what
Kant would call a “republicanism of all states, together and separately” (1996, 491
[6:354])—would serve as a worthy object for our collective political energies. Ever
mindful of Kant’s warning that a world state would be a “soulless despotism” and
a “graveyard of freedom,” we would instead focus on the less ambitious but also
safer project of promoting global competition and the free movement of prod-
ucts, people, and ideas across borders, whose success would be a humble but
worthwhile approximation of Kant’s own inspiring republican vision. Future
generations, more experienced in global governance than we can ever hope to
be, might ultimately build the kind of world state that seemed too risky to our
generation, but they could only do so on foundations previously laid by a more
modest global republicanism.
3 Pettit defines “oppressive” regimes as those that “offend against those [justiciable] human rights
of its subjects,” and he reviews “many modes of response [to them], ranging from condemnation to
ostracism, economic sanction to military intervention” (2014, 179–81, 225n88). He fails to mention
refugee policies in this particular context, though they avoid many of the political costs—both
domestic and international—of economic and military interventions.
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